A document by Bruce G. Charlton. Click on the document to view its contents.

We argue that a theory of the evolution of Empathizing (E) and Systemizing (S) needs first to clarify that these are personality traits, as distinct from cognitive abilities. The theory should explain both the observed reciprocity of, and the sexual difference between, E and S in a context of the historical emergence of these traits and their balance in relation to local selection pressures. We suggest that the baseline state is that (since humans are social animals) ancestral human hunter gatherers are assumed to be relatively High Empathizers, lower in Systemizing: thus more interested in people than in things. Changes related to the development of agriculture and technology meant that it became economically useful for some men to become more interested in ‘things’ than in people, as a motivation for them to learn and practice skills that were vital to personal and (secondarily) social survival, reproduction and expansion. This selection pressure applied most strongly to men since in the sexual division of labour it was typically men’s role to perform such tasks. We further hypothesize that High Systemizing men were rewarded for their socially vital work by increased resources and high status. Because marriages were arranged in traditional societies mainly by parental choice (and the role of parental choice was probably increased by agriculture), it is presumed that the most valued women, that is young and healthy women thereby having high reproductive potential, were differentially allocated to be wives of economically successful High Systemizers. Such unions of economically successful High Systemizing men with the most reproductively valuable women would be expected to lead to greater-than-average reproductive success, thereby amplifying the population representation of genes that cause high systematizing in the population. This hypothesis makes several testable predictions.

It may seem odd to assert that patient brooding and waiting for imaginative validation is the proper way of doing science; after all, most professional scientists and philosophers believe that the essence of science is ‘evidence’ derived from observations and experiments, synthesized by some kind of logical and rational method. But personal experience, history and theoretical considerations all suggest that a prolonged state of ‘patient brooding’ is the hallmark and prerequisite of ‘deep science’; a practical necessity for the most creative and significant breakthroughs.

It seems to me that the learning and practice of science naturally falls into approximately seven year units; and indeed the same could be said about ‘life’. (Note: My operational definition of ‘seven’ is ‘more than five but less than ten’.)  My academic life has certainly been consistent with this idea; and here I describe the first seven year unit of my work as an active scientist: this was the seven years I spent as a laboratory researcher focused primarily on the adrenal cortex. This unit was successful; in the sense that I solved, to my own satisfaction, the problem I was working-on. There may be some general interest and instruction to be derived from taking this specific example as a generalisable account of the different phases and aspects of an arc of science – how a line of research may be initiated, developed and brought to a conclusion. Furthermore, it is suggested that other scientists might (if it comes naturally to them) consider changing their focus and developing new interests every seven years or so.

The validity of science depends on the integrity of the individual scientist. It is often supposed that science is a distinctive process or system externally regulating the individual scientist; an assumption that science is a mechanism into-which data and ideas are fed and from-which valid knowledge emerges. By this view, the individual scientist is not crucial because individual errors, inabilities and (even) dishonesty are all eliminated by various feedback processes. This conceptualisation of science provides individual ‘scientists’ with a free pass to relax the strictness and purity of their personal honesty and motivations. But all and any possible external systems ultimately require the integrity of individuals, and inner integrity cannot be imposed but most come from within. When individuals concerned with science lack personal integrity then other lower, commoner and more powerful motivations will take-over science. The implication is that when a young scientist is learning to be a scientist he cannot simply learn the subject but must also be working on his own personal development: he must develop integrity until it becomes an iron law. In particular he must develop the understanding that: 1. Truth must become an inflexible habit; 2. Science is spiritual; 3. Truth is a transcendent value; 4. Science is not a methodology, but an attitude, a motivation, a way of being; 5. The proper attitude of a scientist to his subject is a kind of love, a devotion to the phenomenon of which understanding is being sought. Therefore, science must be dominated by honest individuals of indestructible integrity. When individual scientists lack or lose self-motivated integrity, then science simply ceases to be.

Advice to a young biologist who wants to be a real scientist (rather than pursuing a successful career as a paid researcher and administrator) is summarised under ten points: 1. Be an amateur; 2. Read old books and papers; 3. Use your intuition; 4. Follow your nose; 5. Study what really interests you; 6. The timescale of real science is hours/ days or 7-year/ decade units; 7. Apprentice to a master; 8. Publish (only) when you wish to communicate, and (only) what you wish to communicate; 9. Publish (only) for those who are interested, honest and competent; 10. The validity of your work is primarily self-evaluated.

Modern biology was initially established by Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859 and fully implemented by the Neo-Darwinian synthesis of natural selection with genetics that solidified in the middle twentieth century. I will argue that this ‘paradigm’ is based upon fundamental metaphysical assumptions that render formally-insoluble some of the most important theoretical problems of biology. These problems include the origin of life, the major transitions of evolution, the origins of sexual reproduction and of species, and the basic mechanism behind ‘group selection’. The fundamental deficit of the current metaphysics of biology is that it lacks a unified and coordinated teleology (direction, purpose, goals). I advocate a new teleological and metaphysical basis for biology that is minimally based on a ‘deist’ conception of reality: i.e. that everything is governed by a unified principle of purpose, order and meaning. Such a teleology suggests a definition of biology around the concept of development – that is the growth, differentiation, coordination and interactions of entities; unfolding through time through the lifespan and across generations. The local and specific implementation of teleology is suggested to be accomplished by a hierarchy of cognitive organizing entities that are located outwith biological systems. These putative organizing entities work on biological entities primarily through building-in purposiveness during development. A deistic system directed by organizing entities is, of course, not a ‘biological’ theory; but then, neither is natural selection a biological theory: both are metaphysical frameworks for the science of biology.

The broad diagnostic category of DSM Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is heterogeneous, and we suggest that it can be subdivided into at least three groups: those with Negative-emotionality who experience strong negative emotionality such as misery, anxiety, guilt, fatigue etc; Hyper-emotionality who experience strong emotions in both negative and positive directions; and Hypo-emotionality who experience weak or blunted emotions. This model was tested using an internet survey of 251 subjects that measured strength of depressive symptoms; and strength and directionality of emotions. All three emotionality groups were significantly more depressed than controls. This indicates that depressive symptoms may be a consequence of at least three different emotional patterns. One implication may be that different emotionality sub-types could benefit from different treatments.