Regionalization approaches wherein utilities in close geographic proximity cooperate to manage drought risks and co-invest in new infrastructure are increasingly necessary strategies for leveraging economies of scale to meet growing demands and navigate deeply uncertain risks. Successful regional cooperative investment and management pathways, however, must equitably balance the interests of multiple partners while navigating power relationships between regional actors. In long-term infrastructure planning contexts, this challenge is heightened by the evolving system-state dynamics, which may be fundamentally reshaped by infrastructure investment. This work introduces Equitable, Robust, Adaptive, and Stable Deeply Uncertain Pathways (DU PathwaysERAS), an exploratory modeling framework for developing regional water supply management and infrastructure investment pathways. Our framework explores equity and power relationships within cooperative pathways using multiple rival framings of robustness, each representing a competing hypothesis about how performance objectives should be prioritized. To capture the time-evolving dynamics of infrastructure pathways, DU PathwaysERAS features new tools to measure the adaptive capacity of pathway policies and evaluate time-evolving vulnerability. We demonstrate our framework on a six-utility water supply partnership seeking to develop cooperative infrastructure investment pathways in the Research Triangle, North Carolina. Our results indicate that commonly employed framings of robustness can have large and unintended adverse consequences for regional equity. Results further illustrate that regional and individual vulnerabilities are highly interdependent, emphasizing the need to craft agreements that limit counterparty risks from the actions of cooperating partners. Beyond the Research Triangle, these results are broadly applicable to cooperative water supply infrastructure investment and management globally.

Urban water utilities, facing rising demands and limited supply expansion options, increasingly partner with neighboring utilities to develop and operate shared infrastructure. Inter-utility agreements can reduce costs via economies of scale and help limit environmental impacts, as substitutes for independent investments in large capital projects. However, unexpected shifts in demand growth or water availability, deviating from projections underpinning cooperative agreements, can introduce both supply and financial risk to utility partners. Risks may also be compounded by asymmetric growth in demand across partners or inflexibility of the agreement structure itself to adapt to changing conditions of supply and demand. This work explores the viability of both fixed and adjustable capacity inter-utility cooperative agreements to mitigate regional water supply and financial risk for utilities that vary in size, growth expectations, and independent infrastructure expansion options. Agreements formalized for a shared regional water treatment plant with fixed or adjustable treatment capacities, coupled with structured financing for partner utilities, are found to significantly improve regional supply reliability and financial outcomes. Regional improvements in performance, however, mask tradeoffs among individual agreement partners. Adjustable treatment capacity allocations add flexibility to inter-utility agreements but can compound the financial risk of each utility as a function of the decision-making of the other partners. Often the sensitivity to partners' decision-making under an adjustable agreement degrades financial performance, relative to agreements with fixed capacities allocated to each partner. Our results demonstrate the significant benefits cooperative agreements offer, providing a template to aid decision-makers in development of water supply partnerships.

Regional cooperation among urban water utilities is a powerful mechanism for improving supply reliability and financial stability in urban water supply systems. Through coordinated drought mitigation and joint infrastructure investment, urban water utilities can efficiently exploit existing water supplies and reduce or delay the need for new supply infrastructure. However, cooperative water management brings new challenges for planning and implementation. Rather than accounting for the interests of a single actor, cooperative policies must balance potentially competing interests between cooperating partners. Structural imbalances within a regional system can lead to conflict between cooperating partners that destabilize otherwise robust planning alternatives. This work contributes a new exploratory modeling centered framework for assessing cooperative stability and mapping power relationships in cooperative infrastructure investment and water supply management policies. Our framework uses multi-objective optimization as an exploratory tool to discover how cooperating partners may be incentivized to defect from robust regional water supply partnership opportunities and identifies how the actions of each regional partner shape the vulnerability of its cooperating partners. Our methodology is demonstrated on the Sedento Valley, a highly challenging regional urban water supply benchmarking problem. Our results reveal complex regional power relationships between the region's cooperating partners and suggest ways to improve cooperative stability.