Each donor was given a five dollar show-up fee and ten dollars to use in the experiment. Each donor read some information about the recipient, then privately and anonymously gave any amount of the ten dollar pie of his or her choosing – from zero to ten dollars – to the welfare recipient and kept the rest. Each recipient earned the sum of the donations from the donors she was matched with.
randomly provided direct information about the recipient's attachment to the labour force – have large and very robust positive effects on offers.
average donations to lazy, no-info, and industrios were: 1.8, 3.2, and 2.78 correspondigly.
Those donators who were categorized as Humanitarians along Katz-Hass Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism scale, donated 5.00 out of a 10.00 pie to industrious recipients, and only 1$ to 'lazy' ones.
She measured the chance of finding jobs in a population of unemployed. Several questions regarding their attitudes were asked:
No results with an exception of risk attitude. More risk averse individuals are less selective, i.e. that they have lower reservation wages – which then lead to higher employment probabilities. Time preferences, trust and reciprocity do not affect the probability of being employed
Risk -.009 (0.003)
Time 0.004 (0.003)
Trust 0.003 (0.004)
Reciprocity 0.003 (0.005)
Survey: It has been demonstrated that differences in psychological distress between the recurrently unemployed and those insecurely reemployed are not significant.
Solidarity game (Selten 1998) played with unemployed recruited in German unemployment centers (N=230).
They matched them in pairs, telling them that it is unknown whether a second person is employed or unemployed (to avoid in-group effect). Then they played a lottery with them - by rolling a dice, they had a chance to win either 10 euro or 0. The same happened with another partner. Before playing the lottery they could choose whether they would like to share some of their earnings if (and only if) they win and another person loses. The degree of prosociality (as always) was measured by the amount they'd like to donate to another participant.
Two-person game, with inequality of endowments. A 'poor' guy could choose the level of efforts. After that a 'rich' participant played a dictator's game. In some treatments before taking the decision of donation, (s)he could observe if the 'poor' made enough efforts to get rid of poverty.
Expectations that dictators give less to those who show low efforts and willingness to leave the poverty.
No effect on the behavior of either dictator or recipient.