The   evolution and maintanance of cooperation is a hotspot in biology. Since   cooperation entials a cost to cooperators therefor selfish individuals   -who are willing to reap the benenfits of cooperation but refuse to play  the cost- can exploit individuals with a cooperative dispostion. This   could lead to the collapse of cooperation. One of the key issues is how   to prevent this kind of exploitation. It is clear that communication and  information either on the intentions or about the “reputation” of   potential partners can play a cricial role in this porcess. This type of  information can be either used in partner or behavioral strategy   choice. In case partner choice individuals can decide (unilaterally or   bilaterally) whom to interact with; in case of behavioral strategy   choice individuals have an assigned partner(s) and the task of the   individual is to decide between a number of alternatives -usually to   cooperate or to not cooperate, but sometimnes with the option of   punishement. Both partner and strategy choice is a decision situation   where information about the partner can influence the decision in a   crucial way. While both of these situations are extensively studied both  in biology and in economics both by means of modelling and experiemnts,  communication is very often assumed to be honest. This assumption while  it seems to be a necessary simplification –as the majority of these   studies focus on cooperation- may result in misleading conclusions.   Communication need not be honest, not even on average () and the   question of dishonesty is most prominent in situations with conflict of   interest. Social dilamme situations are prime examples of these   scenarios thus the issue of dishonesty applies with full force. In other  words there is no a priori reason to assume that communication must be   honest in such situations. This is important because without honesty   cooperation could easily collpase in such situations (e.g.). Our goal   is to investigate the evolution and the miantanence of honest signalling  under such circumstances.