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In this paper we map the MAPF problem to a {\em combinatorial auction} problem. Combinatorial auctions are auctions in which participants can place bids on ``bundles'' of items rather than individual items. CAs are useful when agents have non-additive valuations of items. For example, an agent might have a high valuation for a bundle that includes a flight to a vacation destination and a hotel, but will not want to buy the hotel if it cannot get a good price for the flight. CAs have been used in many applications, including including airport time slot allocation~\cite{rassenti1982combinatorial} and transportation service procurement~\cite{song2003combinatorial}.   In combinatorial auction Formally, in a CA  the auctioneer puts up for sale a set of items $M$ and agents bid on bundles of items $B \subset M$. The auction auctioneer then  determines a final an  allocation of bundles based on agents' bids, such that no item is sold to more than one agent.