This  correction campaign represents a vital case study for the policies of the GCC countries in the area of labor market and demographics, as it is the first-of-a-kind initiative to adopt active labor market policies (ALMP) to encounter the structural problems in the labor market and demographics. The campaign has two prongs: providing subsidies for firms that employ Saudis and discourage employing non-Saudis by increasing their cost, and enforcing the law on foreign irregular workers. Since Saudi is the largest country among GCC countries in terms of GDP and population and because of the far-reaching implications of the campaign on millions of citizens and noncitizens,  it noncitizens,  it  has become of vital importance to study it, starting from its causes, stances of the different stakeholders, to its results and implications.

The 

The  main hypothesis of the paper is that this law enforcement campaign has had a very negative effect on specific non-Saudi communities, especially the Yemeni community, for the  accompanying the  accompanying  media campaign that worked on demonizing the foreign labor, setting it as a scapegoat for the economic and security troubles in the Kingdom. On the other hand, the effects of the campaign on the unemployment rate among Saudis has been very limited mainly because the majority of occupations of the foreign labor require low skills with limited wages, which Saudis are reluctant to take on. Economic implications are mainly an increase price levels and and delays in completion of projects and construction of facilities which depend on the labor of foreigners. This raises questions on the effectiveness of the campaign, and whether it represents a long-term solution for the structural distortion in the labor market in the Kingdom.

Overview 

Overview  on the Campaign

The Campaign

The  governmental direction came after four months of the legislation of Committees of Management and Human Resources in the Shoura Council a proposal to deal with workers in violation of labor and residency laws, through amending the Clause Article  No. 39 which illegalize change of sponsor, making the law more strict. strict._visa_2013  it also deleted abolished  the Clause Article  No. 233 of the law which include punishments for violators of the former clause. article.  the proposal burdens the security agencies with the responsibility of chasing workers under the sponsorship of other than their original ones, self-employing foreign workers (commonly known as “amala saeiba”), absentees, and apprehended border-crossing individuals, by detaining, punishment, and deporting them. _visa_2013  The proposal details the punishment against firms and individuals that employ irregular workers, including preventing and restricting them from recruiting foreign workers in the future. 

Irregulars future.

Irregulars  workers are generally divided into three types: expatriate workers who are still in the country despite having their working permits expired or revoked, expatriate workers with valid working permits but they have “escaped” from their employers and have been reported as “escapees,” and expatriate workers working for other than their original employers without updating their information according to the Residency Regulations and Work and Workmen Law. The Minister of Labor then, Adel Faqeeh, Fakieh,  stated that these actions will help the market “increase the nationalization percentage in the facilities,” facilities,”_faqih:_2013  and will help Saudis opening their own business after getting rid of “illegal competition.” The Ministry reiterated afterwards that the campaign will help increase the number of working Saudis.

The Saudis._60_2013

The  surprising decision has caused a shock in business and official circles and in labor-exporting countries due to the millions of expatriate workers in Saudi. Branches of Ministry of Labor and and General Directorate of Passports of Ministry of Interior were overcrowded with numerous workers seeking to update their information according to the Residency Regulations. After the Ministry of Labor and General Directorate of Passports emphasized that the grace period will not be extended, extended,_-jawazat:_2013  a royal direction to extend it by three months, months,_joy_2013  indicating how official agencies were taken by surprise with updating the information of over one million workers. By the end of the original period, more than half a million were forcibly deported, which increased to around a million after the extended grace period out of 6 million workers. The status of 4.7 million workers was corrected.

Historical  Context

GCC corrected.

In an attempt to prove its positive effects, Adel Faqih, Labor Minister, announced that 250 thousands Saudis have benefited from the employment services during the correction campaign. In May 2014, Mufrej al-Haqbani, Vice Labor Minister, announced that the correction campaign has increased the rate of employment from 35 thousands t0 65 thousands monthly, increasing the number of Saudis in the private sector from 700 thousands to 1.5 million by the end of the correction period.

Historical Context

GCC  countries have enjoyed huge revenues as a result of the increased oil prices and nationalization of oil companies in the second oil boom between 1973-1985, which made available a capital capable theoretically to form modern welfare states. However, as Omar Al-Shihabi argues, the local labor force presents the political elite with three problems: first, the inability of the local labor force, quantitatively and qualitatively to satisfy the needs of the available capital and the magnitude of planned projects; second, subjugating the local population to the needs of the capital which strived for free-0f-rights labor contradicts that the state promises of a higher level of economic welfare as a result of increased oil revenues; third, dependence on local labor force -as was evident in the labor movement in the fifties- might form a political conscience that could lead it to demand participation in decision-making and distribution of oil reviews, especially amidst the heightened worry among decision-makers in the GCC and the west of emergent leftists and nationalist movements. As a result, the political elite opted for importing cheap non-Arab labor -mostly South Asian- with no secured political or economics rights. In 1975, labor from Arab countries formed approximately 72% of the labor force, but it fell to less than 40% in the mid-90s. Local labor has found the public sector, with its high wages, shorter working hours, and the social security it provides, a suitable choice. Thus, citizenship was tied to the social and financial benefits the public sector job provides, whiles the rights of expatriate workers remained weak and under the control of capital in the private sector. Citizens have become increasingly reliant on the social and economic benefits provided by the state, and on the other hand, state has become independent of society as oil revenues spared the state the need of collecting taxes from citizens. 

Thus, citizens.

Thus,  over the years of the second oil boom, the percentage of Saudi workers to the total labor force accelerated downwards from 74.8% in 1975, to 47.3% in 1980, to 33.3% in 1990. By the dawn of the ninth decade, with the decrease of oil price, increase of population, and inability of the public sector to absorb more numbers of citizens, the problem of unemployment surfaced. To encounter unemployment, the state has adopted the “Saudization” policy to encourage the private sector to employ more Saudis and impose restrictions on employing foreign labor. But the private sector was not willing to employ citizens, whom it considered expensive and unproductive, whiles while  citizens themselves find it greedy, opportunistic, and lacking proper working conditions. As both sides this undesire, Al-Shihabi argues that GCC governments opted to substitute its Arab employees in their bureaucracies with citizens, with decreasing expenditures on developmental projects.

Oil projects.

Oil  price increase from $22 dollars in 1990 to its peak, $144 in 2008 which allowed for the accumulation of approximately $2 trillion available for use in mega projects, which promoted the private sector to continue importing foreign labor, making the population growth rates in the gulf the highest in the world. However, world.However,  this phase had different characteristics than previous ones, including the privatization wave and the increase of foreign labor in the private sector mainly, in accordance with the recommendations of International Monetary Fund and International Bank. One of the characteristics that differentiates the foreign labor this time is reliance on them by ordinary citizens as a source of income, not just major capitalists.

With 

With  the saturation of the public sector, some citizens has opted for the private sector, not as employees but rather as employers through renting multiple-story buildings and shops, trading of visas, or working as a front image of establishments managed by expatriate workers, forming a major form of rent-seeking behavior. Omar Al-Shehabi refers the readers to statistics showing that almost half of the foreign labor are distributed between small- and mid-size enterprises and domestic jobs. The sponsorship system (kafala) served as one the ways to distribute oil wealth through the importation of cheap foreign labor and controlling the surplus value it produces. 

Before produces.

Before  the Campaign

In Campaign

In  the beginning of 2013, the total labor force was 11,286,744, with employed being 10,634,733, and non-Saudi employees were 6,003,616, which is 56,45% of the total employees. Consistent employees.Consistent  with our description of the political economy of Saudi, these employees are concentrated in the private sector, in which 99% of the expatriate workers are employed. It can observed that the educational level of their majority is low, as 62.3% are below high school level, therefore 59% are in “support engineering” and “services” occupations; and by sector 26%.5 are in construction, 22.3% in wholesale, and 15% in domestic jobs. In fact, three quarters of jobs created by the Saudi market in the three years between 2009-2011 were fulfilled by foreign workers.  

Apparently, 

Apparently,  most of the the jobs created by the Saudi markets does not require high levels of education. Statistics point to weak qualification of labor force as the working permits for professional occupations that require “high or very high qualification” were only 12% of the total permits.

Stances permits.

Stances  of Stakeholders

Interests 

Interests  of business persons and firms are represented through the Chambers of Commerce in 28 cities/provinces across the kingdom, under the umbrella of Council of Saudi Chambers. Chambers of Commerce are one of the few lobbies in Saudi, where two-thirds of the members of Board of Directors are elected every four years, and the remaining third are appointed by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Business persons and firms were cautious at best, and alarming and condemning at worst, while trying to show up supportive of enforcing the Residency Laws and Law of Workmen and Work, and ending unemployment among Saudi youth.

On youth.

On  the highest level of business owners, after more than  than  a year of expiry of extended grace period, Abdulrahman Al-Zamil,  Director of Council of Saudi Chambers,Abdulrahman Al-Zamil  was careful to be appear  in support of the correction campaigns undertaken by the Ministries of Labor and Interior to regulate the saudi markets and end the violations of the foreign labor, emphasizing the importance of enforcing regulations. However, during the campaign, the Director of National Council of Contractors and member of Council of Saudi Chambers, Fahhad Al-Hammadi, warned that the grace period has resulted in the loss of 15% of profits of investors and 40% of small-size enterprises will be shut down by the end of the grace period. This fear is not surprising considering that the construction sector is the on the most dependent sectors on cheap foreign labor. Chambers of Commerce indicated that they want to extend the grace period in several meetings between the Ministry of Labor and Chambers of Commerce. After the decision to extend it three additional months, Director of Council of Saudi Chambers stated that “extend the grace period of correction strengthens the economic stability of facilities of the private sector and accelerates its steps towards nationalization.” While the Chambers of Commerce mainly represent the large-size enterprises, small-size enterprises do not have a similar venue to represent its interests that can be affected largely by the correction campaign as they would be forced to pay the fees of status correction, with much lesser size and profits. Even though it is hard to observe their reactions, as there are no lobbies representing them such as the Chambers of Commerce, several investigations reported that their fears of the campaign of the ministry. One reported a small business owner saying that the difficulty of obtaining legal work visas might drive them out of the market.

Reactions market.

Reactions  of Foreign Labor and their Governments

Even Governments

Even  though there are no accurate governmental data on the number of foreign labor in Saudi by nationality, al-Riyadh Newspapers reported estimates of the on the migrant labor by nationality, according to World Bank. The Bank.The  first place was Indian workers, that numbered a million and 453 thousands, second place was shared was Egyptians and Pakistanis that numbered a million and 6 thousands, fourth place was Yemenis that numbered 894 thousands, and fifth and sixth places were occupied by Filipinos and Bangladeshis, numbering 447 thousands and 391 thousands respectively.

Labor-exporting 

Labor-exporting  governments were worried about the fate of its citizens affected by the Saudi campaign. Indian embassy, who is responsible for around two millions, mobilized and was in continuous communications with Saudi Ministry of Labor and   Ministry and  Ministry  of Foreign Affairs, trying to offer help through its website and visits. In April, Fillipino embassy issued a warning to its citizens urging them to comply with the Law of Workmen and Work that prohibits working for different sponsors, working in jobs other than what is indicated in their work permits, or being without a work permit. It advised its citizens with expire residencies to remind their employers to extend them to avoid troubles with the Ministry of Labor, while the Filipino media covered the cases of detentions of workers in violation with the Residency Laws. In a report covering the news of arrest of 30, a Fillipino embassy official stated that  “Needless that  “Needless  to say, the embassy is monitoring what is happening to our people there and it is ready to extend assistance to any Filipino who is arrested because of the violation of the Saudi labor law.”

But law.”

But  not all migrants were recipients of care by their embassies as it was the case of Indians and Filipinos. Yemenis, for instance, didn't get any official help by their embassy, even though they represent the second largest community of Arab workers in the Kingdom (approximately 900 thousands), 300 thousands were exposed to detention and deportation at the beginning of the campaign. For example, Udai Amin Al-Jarjeeri, a 32-year-old accountant and a father of 4 girls, was forced by deteriorating economic conditions after the 2011 revolution to shut down his office in Dhumar Province and emigrate to Saudi, only to find that this job contract is fake, to be finally detained and deported. He complained from mistreatment by the Yemeni embassy in dealing with his situation. Among thousands of deported Yemenis, Abdullah Al-Qabti, a 27-year-old plumber says, “we were treated like criminals or slaves, thrown into and out of trucks.” Muneer Al-Bashiri complained that they were “thrown into a truck like sheep.” Najeeb Al-Udaini, head of Yemeni Migrants Organization states, “our problem is not with the Saudis; it’s with the Yemeni government, whose embassy is impossible to reach.” An investigation in Al-Arabi Al-jadeed newspaper affirms the statement of Al-Udaini, as consensus from migrant Yemenis in Saudi emphasized the absence of any positive role by the Ministry of Migrants Affairs and the Yemeni embassy in Riyadh. The secretary of the Yemeni community in Riyadh was reported saying, “the Ministry of Migrants Affairs  does Affairs  does  not want real representatives of migrants, but rather clients serving as tribal sheikhs.”

Field sheikhs.”

Field  Results of the Security Campaign

With Campaign

With  the end of grace period announced by the King, Ministry of Interior started it field campaign to punish violators of Residency Regulations and Law of Workmen and Work, and it has not stopped until the writing of this paper in April 2015. Ministry of Interior publishes on a daily basis statistics on the results of the field security campaign on its website. By the end of March 2015, the number of violators forcibly deported amounted to one million and fifty thousands, but these numbers are not broken down by nationality, as they are always referred to as “from different ages and nationalities.” Asked by the former newspaper on whether the campaign targets Yemenis disproportionately, a former official in Saudi embassy in Yemen answered, “if the correction campaign targets Yemenis and exclude others, the process of issuing new work visas would have not continued daily in the embassy.” 

Other embassy.”

Other  statistics issued by the Ministry of Interior might be utilized to gauge the degree of nationality community was affected, without implying that the campaign targeted specific nationalities. According to statistics of immigrants caught at the Saudi borders for Shawwal 1436 AH (May - June 2014), the overwhelming majority (99%) are the Saudi-Yemeni border. The number of immigrants caught at the Saudi-Yemeni border only (Asir, Najran, and Jizan provinces), amounted to 27,043 while all other provinces (al-Madinah, Tabuk, al-Jouf, Northern Area, and Eastern Area provinces) were 7 immigrants only. Statistics of ther months do not differ much, where the number of caught immigrants ranged from 44 thousands to 19 thousands during the months of the 1435 AH (November 2013 - October 2014). It 2014).It  can be assumed that a not very low percentage of those who try succeed into getting into the kingdom, otherwise no one would try.

These 

These  statistics are not surprising when considering the wall installed on the Saudi-Iraqi border, and the difficulty of crossing the sea, “because of the advanced techniques and radars that the guard borders possess enabling them to detect crossers by sea” as the spokesperson of Border Guard, General Mohammed al-Ghamdi puts it, and the absence of push factors in other neighboring GCC countries. Thus, Yemenis remain more likely than others to enter Saudi illegally, immediately being in violation of the Laws of Residency, in contrary to, for instance, South Asians, who enter the country legally and then violate the the law in later years. If can be assumed, cautiously, that the Yemeni immigrants (in addition to African immigrants) that cross the Southern borders were disproportionately affected. Before even the the beginning of the security campaign that followed the end of the grace period that ended in November 2013, the number of deported Yemenis in March 2013 totalled about 130 thousands, and security Yemeni officials expected the deportation of additional 80 thousands with the beginning of the security campaign in November 2013.

Thus, 2013.

Thus,  even though the correction campaign has not appeared to target specific nationalities, it probably affected disproportionately the labor of a country that tied to Saudi culturally, socially, and geographically, yet with much lower income. The negative ramifications has probably started even before the end of the correction campaign. Abdulqader Ayedh, deputy Minister of Immigrants Affairs, has warned of decreased remittances of Yemeni immigrants working in Saudi in June 2013. Warning of worsening unemployment rate in Yemen (World Bank estimates it 17.7% in 2012) and deterioration of economic conditions increases the probability of civil unrest. This seems logical as the Yemen is sliding increasingly towards a civil war that prompted a Saudi-led military coalition of ten countries. It is worthing noting that the elimination of the exclusion of the Sponsorship System granted to Yemenis in 1990, with the resulted deportation of one million Yemenis had been followed by a civil war between the north and the south in 1994. The 1994.The  ramifications of the correction campaign might go beyond the borders of the Kingdom, affecting the internal situation in Yemen, which does not seem to be a considered consequence of decisions-makers.  

There 

There  are no available data from the Ministry of Labor or Ministry of Interior on the breakdown of deported labor by sector and professional occupation. However, labor-intensive sectors would be the most negatively affected, when 84.5% of the labor is concentrated in of  the private sector are concentrated in  construction, retail sales, wholesales, wholesale and retail, manufacturing,  agriculture, forestry, hunting  and fishing sectors. industries.  Construction sector seems to be hit hardest given the its high number of foreign labor. Moammar Al-Atawi,  Director of Contracting Committee in Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry,Engineer Moammar Al-Atawi  clarifies that nationalization (Saudization) percentage in the construction sector does not exceed 10.12%, with around 4 million and 270 thousands working at its 270 thousands small-size enterprises. According to Raed Al-Aqeeli,  the member of National Committee at the Saudi Chambers of Commerce,Raed Al-Aqeeli,  36% of construction projects has stopped because of the correction campaign. Director of Contractors Committee at Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Abdullah Radwan, said that “labor market is in chaos because of the large number of deported foreign labor during the correction campaign,” and “firms and contractors are facing incomplete projects, with high wages and weak demand being imposed.”

According imposed.”

According  to the census of private establishments in 2010 undertaken by the Central Department of Statistics, the number of private establishments amounted to one million and 300 thousands establishments, 71% of them are operating, numbered at 919,078 establishments. Small establishments which employe 1-4 workers make 84%, while mid-size establishments, that employ 5-19 workers, make 13%. Even though there is not a new census of private establishments after the correction campaign, some date show a decrease in the number of small operating establishments in the past two years because of measures of the Ministry of Labor. Ali Al-Uthaim,  Director of National Committee of Entrepreneurs in Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry,Ali  Al-Uthaim  claimed that the decrease percentages reached 9.04% for the number of small establishment in 2010 reached 9.04%, and 11.1% for very small establishments, and that 191 thousands very small establishments and 21 thousands small establishments were driven out of the market.

The market.

The  Peculiarity of the Campaign

Announced Campaign

Announced  goals of the campaign do not differ substantially from the Saudization policies undertaken by the government since the 90s as a solution to the problem of increasing unemployment among Saudis. But this large-scale campaign seems to be conducted in the frame of “imposing and enforcing the law,” in contrary to previous approaches that relied on general public policies and incentives. In other words, the campaign was an indicator of governmental direction that deals with unemployment -with the cause being foreign labor- as a security problem that threatens citizens and the state. This is evident in the wide media coverage of the public raids carried by the Ministry of Interior and the closing of violating firms and the rampant checkpoints in cities, and the horror and feeling of insecurity that prevailed among the irregular foreign labor with the advent of “law and order” phase.  

The 

The  force used by the Saudi authorities prompted condemnation from western human rights organization. Joe Stork, deputy director of Human Rights Watch's Middle East and North Africa division, stated that “Saudi authorities have spent months branding foreign workers as criminals in the media, and stirring up anti-migrant sentiment to justify the labor crackdown. Now the Saudi government needs to rein in Saudi citizens who are attacking foreign workers.” The workers.”The  organization documented the violence witnessed in Manfouha neighborhood south of Riyadh, where many numbers of Ethiopians reside.

On 

On  the other hand, official authorities justified the campaign by promising that it will provide jobs for Saudis, and Ministry of Labor announced that it will contribute to the opening of thousands of jobs for citizens, male and female, but economic reasoning and statistics show that these promises have not been achieved.

According achieved.

According  to the numbers of the Central Department of Statistics and Information, unemployment rate amongst Saudis for June 2013 was 11.7%, compared to 11.8% at the beginning of 2013, and 11.7% midyear 2013. Then, 2013.Then,  overall, the campaign didn’t help to substantially decrease the unemployment rate among Saudis, and the high levels of unemployment persisted in the youth category (25-29 year-old) that it reached 38.9% in 2014. The likely explanation for the failure of the campaign in decreasing the rate of unemployment is that most of the unemployed are Bachelor's degree holders, with 51%, followed by high school certificate holders, with 34.4% while the majority of deported foreign labor possess low educational qualifications.

Economics 

Economics  of foreign labor

To labor

To  prove the positive outcomes of the campaign on employment of Saudis, Adel Faqeeh, the Minister of Labor affirmed that 25o 250  thousands took advantage of the employment services during the campaign. In May 2015, Mufrij Al-Haqbani, Deputy Minister of Labor, announced that the correction period increased the employment from 35 thousands to 65 thousands monthly, and the number of Saudis in the private sector increased from 700 thousands to 1.5 million after the correction period. Then, Ministry of Labor implies that the presence of this foreign labor is harmful to the interests of Saudi citizens and aggravates the problem of unemployment, and deporting them -through these campaigns- will result in substituting them with local labor. But how accurate are these claims/expectations from an economic point of view?

The view?

The  argument that states deported foreign labor will be replaced by local labor ignores the slopes of supply and demand. For the sake of simplicity, we can assume that, without foreign labor, the supply of local labor will be weak with high wages (“Local demand” in the graph). However, with the presence of foreign labor, the supply curve will shift to the right with a change in its slope (“Total Demand including Foreign Labor” in the graph), as the number of workers will increase substantially (Column N2) -taken into consideration the difference in wages and the number of willing citizens to take on these jobs- with a big decrease in wages (Line W2). When all foreign labor is deported, the number of workers will be limited to the local demand with higher wages as the slope of the curve of local supply is higher (Point B) Then, in the most extreme case, deporting all foreign labor will not result in replacing them with local labor, but rather will the number of local workers will increase with a lesser number, with an increase in wages in elimination of many jobs occupied by the foreign labor.

Theoretically, economy?

Theoretically,  on the short-term, immigration or foreign labor decreases the wages of workers they are in competition with and increases the wages of complementary workers.   Low-wages workers.  Low-wages  foreign labor increase competition on low-skilled jobs. In the same time, high-wages local labor are benefited because they will pay less in return of services that low-wages foreign labor provide, which enable them to specialize in the jobs that suits their skills and educational levels.

For levels.

For  instance, the immigration of one million elementary-school-educated workers might result in a severe competition with the elementary-school-educated local workers. In the United States of America, for example, wages of high-school dropouts are negatively affected by immigration as their wages decreased by 6.2%, while it would have been 1.7% at the abscence of immigrants because most of immigrants -especially illegal immigrants- occupy jobs that are competed over by American high-school dropouts. However, since the jobs occupied by the irregular workers almost entirely do not require high skills, the logical outcome of deporting them will be an increase in prices and elimination of many jobs. Even jobs.Even  if there is partiality for local workers in foreign-labor-intensive sectors, the new laws such as the minimum wages for nationals will make the former safe from such negative effects of completion and the wage decrease it causes.

The 

The  unintended consequences such as increase in prices and the elimination of numerous jobs, were evident in the construction and contracting sector, where newspaper reports talked about a 150% increase in wages with the start of inspections that followed the end of the grace period. The food sector witnessed a similar result as the prices of food commodities increased by 20% in the same period. General analysis shows that the effects of the irregular workers correction campaign had a negative effect on consumer of goods and services provided by the foreign labor, as wages increased and operations decreased. While the employers were negatively affected as the return on capital and investment decreased which might drive many of them out of the market, which explains the complaints expressed by many employers in sectors as non-foreign-labor-intensive as the healthcare sector.

Albeit sector.

Albeit  the results above, the Ministry of Labor shows sign of being in preparation of renewal of the correction campaign, as Adel Faqeeh, Minister of Labor Labor,  has stated that at the end of 2014, “the correction campaign will return strongly because there is no justification for any violator of this country’s laws to stay, and only those who obey its laws and regulations should stay. Enterprises that are working regularly can satisfy its needs according the regulations of Ministry of Labor, and we should not let any talk about negative consequences of the campaign to serve as a justification for allowing violators to work under any circumstances.” Okaz newspaper published a report on a plan by the Ministry of Labor to relaunch the campaign, that includes interviews with some of the foreign labor and a director of a recruitment office, unanimously agreeing on the positive results of the campaign, and emphasized the need to abide by the Laws of Residency and Law of Workmen and Work. It the genuinity of this report cannot be independently verified, the statement of Minister of Labor and the published interviews all point to the “necessity to abide by the laws” to work in the Kingdom, not to the alleged positive effects on the economy particularly or its alleged positive effect on unemployment rate, especially with the promises made by the ministry officials before the start of the first campaign, highlighting again the security footprint that shaped the campaign. It can be observed that ABdulrahman Al-Zamil, the Director of Saudi Chambers of Commerce, also focused on this security side in his statement to the media, where he said that “enforcing the regulations is a must on all levels, whether it’s against irregular foreign labor, businessmen or Saudi individuals,” adding that the campaign is beneficial to the private sector.

Conclusion

After sector.

Conclusion

After  more than year of the end of comprehensive campaign carried by the Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Interior to correct the status of irregular workers, and deporting more than a million, numbers do not show an improvement in unemployment rate, as it has been hovering slightly below 12% despite the many promises officials made. On the contrary, the campaign has resulted in the increase of prices of many goods and services and negatively affected the ordinary Saudi citizen - the primary consumer of such goods and services, in the first place. The direct economic outcomes have not differed from the compulsory Saudization policies adopted by the government since the 90s, which indicates the unlikeliness of finding a solution for unemployment without reducing the dependence on oil as an engine for economic growth. Indeed, if the goal of the campaign is finding a solution for the Saudi national having troubles getting a job -despite having high educational qualifications-, it has failed to achieve that until the writing of this paper in April 2015. This is unexpected to change since the answer of this dilemma requires creating new job opportunities that suits the education levels of nationals through a comprehensive economic strategy that works on finding projects that exploit the human resources of the young generation of thee Saudis and the economic peculiarities of the regions. A sustainable developmental policy in light of a durable knowledge-based economy is the only way to guarantee a solution for the problem of unemployment, in contrary to the security campaigns that portray foreign labor as the source of troubles and that deporting violators will be the fast solution for a long-term deep-rooted problem.