this is for holding javascript data
Sébastien Rouillon edited sectionComparison_of.tex
over 8 years ago
Commit id: eccf5203152ec45ff2b6b0947f0388b0fd6ed325
deletions | additions
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...
\begin{align}
s^{*}\left(b,k\right)
= & \int\nolimits
_{0}^{1}\left[\pi\left(x^{\ast}\left(\delta\right),y^{*}\right)\left(b-\delta\right)-x^{\ast}\left(\delta\right)-y^{\ast}\right]d\delta\nonumber _{0}^{1}
\left[
\pi\left(x^{\ast}\left(\delta\right),y^{*}\right)\left(b-\delta\right)
-x^{\ast}\left(\delta\right)-y^{\ast}
\right]
d\delta\nonumber \\
= &
\left(b-\frac{1}{2}\right)+\frac{\left(1-k\right)^{2}}{2\left(b-k\right)+\left(1-k\right)^{2}}\left(\frac{1}{2}-2b+k+\frac{1}{3}b^{2}f\left(\frac{k}{b}\right)\right),\label{eq:s*}
\end{alignat} \left(b-\frac{1}{2}\right)
+\frac{\left(1-k\right)^{2}}{2\left(b-k\right)
+\left(1-k\right)^{2}}\left(\frac{1}{2}-2b+k+\frac{1}{3}b^{2}f\left(\frac{k}{b}\right)\right),
\label{eq:s*}
\end{align}
where we define for all $0\leq k/b\leq1$
$$
f\left(\frac{k}{b}\right)=
...
\bigskip{}
Clearly, from the social point of view, the contest is preferable if and only if
\begin{equation}
s^{*}\left(b,k\right)>\max\left(0,b-1/2\right).\label{eq:s*>max}
\end{equation}
The purpose of the remaining of this section is to derive conditions such that this inequality holds true.
\bigskip{}
Let us first consider the situation where the level of assets of lobby $I$'s is small (i.e., $k\rightarrow0$). Then, we can calculate that
\begin{alignat*}
{1} \begin{align*}
\lim_{k\rightarrow0}s^{*}\left(b,k\right)= & \frac{2b}{1+2b}\left(b-1\right)<0.
\end{alignat*} \end{align*}
As condition (\ref{eq:s*>max}) is false, the cost-benefit analysis
is a better decision scheme.\bigskip{}