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\section{The benchmark model}  Suppose that an industrial lobby, denoted by $I$, has developed a new product. If the new product is marketed, lobby $I$ will obtain a benefit $b$ from selling it. However, the new product may also have environmental and/or health detrimental effects. If the new product is marketed, it is assumed that an environmental lobby, denoted by $E$, will bear a damage $\delta$.\footnote{It is assumed here that that the two lobbies truly and fully represent their members' interests. The problem of free-riding is considered in section 6.} By assumption, only lobby $I$ observes $\delta$ before the product is marketed.\footnote{The situation where neither lobbies observe $\delta$ is not considered, because it is immediate to show in this case that the regulator should never base his decision on the lobbies' behaviors. The situation where both lobbies $I$ and $E$ observe $\delta$ is considered in section 6.} However, it is common knowledge that $\delta$ is uniformly distributed on $\left[0,1\right]$.\footnote{The reasons why we postulate that the benefit is public information, whereas the damage is private information, are as follows. On the one hand, the industrial lobby is in a privileged position to conduct laboratory experiments to test the product. Actually, dealing with the genetically modified organisms used for food or feed, Spiroux de Vend\"{o}moi et al. (2010) explain that the tests are not independently conducted and the raw data are not disclosed by the companies, which thus enjoy finer information about the environmental and/or health effects of their products. On the other hand, we argue that this \emph{private} information, which is obviously critical to determining the damage, is almost irrelevant to determining the benefit. The environmental externalities accompanying the product marketing affect \emph{third parties} and, thus, do not influence the benefit from selling the product. By cons, the The  health effects affect the \emph{consumers} themselves and, thus, can impact the benefit, provided that the consumers \emph{appropriately} internalize them. However, the current regulations in many countries prevent this to happen in the case of genetically modified organisms used for food or feed, due to lack of labeling, making the consumers unable to discern which foods contain genetically modified organisms, and due to lack of publicly disclosed testing.} %\footnote{The reasons why we postulate that the benefit is public information, whereas the damage is private information, are as follows. On the one hand, the industrial lobby is in a privileged position to conduct laboratory experiments to assess the environmental and/or health effects of the new product. Actually, dealing with the genetically modified organisms used for food or feed, Spiroux de Vend\"{o}moi et al. (2010) explain that the tests are not independently conducted and the data are kept in secret by the companies, which thus have finer information regarding the environmental and/or health effects of their products. On the other hand, it can be argued that this (private) information, which is clearly critical to determining the damage, is not that relevant to determining the benefit. Consider anew the genetically modified organisms used for food or feed. As an \emph{externality} affecting \emph{third parties}, the environmental effects (i.e., genes dissemination, insecticide residues, loss of biodiversity) do not impact the benefit from selling the product. By cons, as a \emph{side-effect} of a \emph{market exchange}, the health effects potentially impact it, if the consumers appropriately anticipate them. However, this will not be the case, because of the lack of labeling in major growing countries (Spiroux de Vend\"{o}moi et al., 2010) and because only the companies has accurate information regarding health effects.}