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% On peut recadrer un peu ici. 1/ Le fait est que les gouvernements subissent la pression des lobbies, dans ce domaine comme dans d'autres, mais peut-être plus dans celui-ci, du fait que les controverses scientifiques rendent l'intérêt collectif insaisisable ; 2/ Pour faire simple, on modélise le processus de décision du gouvernement comme un contest à la Tullock, les compétiteurs étant les groupes industriels et environnementaux. Une modélisation explicite obligerait à préciser le cadre institutionnel, à recenser les décideurs et acteurs publics (élus, fonctionnaires, etc), à identifier leurs motivations... Une telle approche est proposée par Laffont (2000) ;   This paper aims at representing the government decision-making process in such situations, accounting for the intervention of interest groups groups,  in a context of scientific controversy. Specifically, we analyze a Tullock contest (Tullock, 1980), with the two contestants being an industrial and an environmental lobby. The key assumption in our model is that the industrial lobby has private information about the detrimental externality, but can be held liable for damage \textit{ex post}. In this setting, we We  determine the equilibrium of the contest and derive both its positive and normative properties. In line with Brennan and Buchanan (1985), Importantly,  wefinally  identify the  circumstances when such that  the lobbying activities foster a more or less  efficient decision-making, decision-making from the government,  which could be used as a background . serve designing constitutional rules to restrict lobbying(Brennan and Buchanan, 1985).  In a sense, Cropper et al. (1992) provide an empirical background to our analysis. They examine the EPA's decision to cancel or continue the registrations of cancer-causing pesticides between 1975 and 1989. During this period, the final decision followed a two steps procedure, with the EPA first proposing a decision based on a risk-benefit analysis, and the interest groups then contesting it. Cropper et al. (1992) find that the EPA's decisions indeed balanced risks against benefits, but simultaneously that intervention by special-interest groups was also important in the regulatory process. They conclude that their ``findings provide both comfort and concern to those interested in improving the efficiency of environmental regulation'' (p. 178).