deletions | additions       diff --git a/Revue_de_la_litt_rature__.tex b/Revue_de_la_litt_rature__.tex  index 25bfffb..c0d9d3e 100644  --- a/Revue_de_la_litt_rature__.tex  +++ b/Revue_de_la_litt_rature__.tex 
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Il faut ajouter Malueg et Yates...  A major concern against lobbying is that rent-seeking activities induce socially wasteful costs. This issue (referred to as rent dissipation) is central since the early literature on the subject (Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974). Tullock (1980) was one of the first to investigate it (i.e., the magnitude of rent dissipation), showing that both cases of over- and under-dissipation can arise. This issue has been studied in many different settings since then, showing in particular that it is sensitive to the number of contestants (Hillman and Riley, 1989), the size of the competing groups (Nitzan, 1991), the  heterogeneity of the players (Nti, 1999), thefree-riding incentives within groups (Nitzan, XXX), the  risk aversion of the players (Hillman and Katz, 1984), the asymmetry of information within players (W\"{a}rneryd, 2003), the timing of the game (Baik and Shogren, 1992), and the choice of the contest success function (Nti, 2004). \footnote{Recent surveys are Hillman (2013), Konrad (2007) and Long (2014).}