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\section{Introduction}  In recent years, several scientific and political controversies have arisen regarding the market introduction of new products and/or new technologies. Key examples are genetically modified organisms and hydraulic fracturing to extract shale gas. In both cases, a common feature is that the regulatory decision to approve, or to ban, the  new product and/or new technology, faces the challenge of balancing large economic profits against uncertain (and possibly huge) environmental and/or health detrimental effects. The stylized fact is that this has lead to large differences in regulations among countries, which may reflect the preferences of various interest groups involved in the process. \footnote{See Vigani and Olper (2013), for genetically modified organisms, and Johnson and Boersma (2012), for hydraulic fracturing to extract shale gas.}  % On peut recadrer un peu ici. 1/ Le fait est que les gouvernements subissent la pression des lobbies, dans ce domaine comme dans d'autres, mais peut-être plus dans celui-ci, du fait que les controverses scientifiques rendent l'intérêt collectif insaisisable ; 2/ Pour faire simple, on modélise le processus de décision du gouvernement comme un contest à la Tullock, les compétiteurs étant les groupes industriels et environnementaux. Une modélisation explicite obligerait à préciser le cadre institutionnel, à recenser les décideurs et acteurs publics (élus, fonctionnaires, etc), à identifier leurs motivations... Une telle approche est proposée par Laffont (2000) ;  This paper aims at representing the government decision-making process in such situations, accounting for the intervention of interest groups in a context of scientific controversy about the environmental and/or health detrimental externalities. controversy.  Specifically, we analyze a Tullock contest (Tullock, 1980), with the two contestants being an industrial and an environmental lobby. A The  key assumption in our model is that the industrial lobby has private information about the detrimental externality, but can be held liable for damage \textit{ex post}. In this setting, we determine the equilibrium of the contest and derive both its positive and normative properties. Finalement, en adoptant une perspective constitutionnelle, à l'instar de Brennan and Buchanan (1985), nous déterminons dans quelles conditions une telle procédure de décision devrait être admise.  In a sense, Cropper et al. (1992) provide an empirical background to our analysis. They examine the EPA's decision to cancel or continue the registrations of cancer-causing pesticides between 1975 and 1989. During this period, the final decision followed a two steps procedure, with the EPA first proposing a decision based on a risk-benefit analysis, and the interest groups then contesting it. Cropper et al. (1992) find that the EPA's decisions indeed balanced risks against benefits, but simultaneously that intervention by special-interest groups was also important in the regulatory process. They conclude that their ``findings provide both comfort and concern to those interested in improving the efficiency of environmental regulation'' (p. 178).