deletions | additions       diff --git a/Revue_de_la_litt_rature__.tex b/Revue_de_la_litt_rature__.tex  index 59b5de8..bb1c528 100644  --- a/Revue_de_la_litt_rature__.tex  +++ b/Revue_de_la_litt_rature__.tex 
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Becker (1983) determines the political equilibrium resulting from the competition among pressure groups for political influence. He shows that the pressure groups have an incentive to reduce the deadweight costs of policies. Gradstein (1993) compares the performance of the private and public provisions of local public goods. Both allocation procedures create inefficiencies, the former being undermined by free riding incentives, the latter entailing socially wasteful costs of lobbying. Gradstein (1993) finds that public provision performs better when there is a small number of large jurisdictions. Aidt (1998) derives the equilibrium environmental policy in a common agency model of politics  (Grossman and Helpman, 1994), where the government seek to attract campaign contributions from lobby groups in order to maximize the likelihood of being reelected. Aidt (1998) shows that the equilibrium environmental policy is the (socially optimal) Pigouvian tax if all agents have their interests represented by an interest group. Recently, Aidt and Hwang (2014) have generalized the argument to the case of cross-national externalities and foreign lobbying. They show that the political equilibrium is socially efficient if all social groups are organized and all governments are equally corrupt. Finally, Graichen et al. (2001) analyze a Tullock contest, where an incumbent monopolistic utility and environmentalists confront for the contract for the supply of electricity. At the equilibrium, they show that the political contest induces the monopolist to use a more environmentally friendly technology and to reduce his output.  Il faut ajouter Malueg et Yates...  A major concern against lobbying is that rent-seeking activities induce socially wasteful costs. This issue (referred to as rent dissipation) is central since the early literature on the subject (Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974). Tullock (1980) was one of the first to investigate it, it (i.e., the magnitude of rent dissipation),  showing that both cases of over- and under-dissipation can arise. The has been studied in many different settings since then, showing in particular that it is sensitive to the number of players (Hillman and Riley, 1989), the heterogeneity of the players (Nti, 1999), the risk aversion of the players (Hillman and Katz, 1984), the asymmetry of information within players (W\"{a}rneryd, 2003), the timing of the game (Baik and Shogren, 1992), and the choice of the contest success function (Nti, 2004). \footnote{Recent surveys are Hillman (2013), Konrad (2007) and Long (2014).}