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Becker (1983) determines the political equilibrium resulting from the competition among pressure groups for political influence. He shows that the pressure groups have an incentive to reduce the deadweight costs of policies. Gradstein (1993) compares the performance of the private and public provisions of local public goods. Both allocation procedures create inefficiencies, the former being undermined by free riding incentives, the latter entailing socially wasteful costs of lobbying. Gradstein (1993) finds that public provision performs better when there is a small number of large jurisdictions. Aidt (1998) derives the equilibrium environmental policy in a common agency model of politics  (Grossman and Helpman, 1994), where the government seeks to attract campaign contributions from lobby groups in order to maximize the likelihood of being reelected. Aidt (1998) shows that the equilibrium environmental policy is the (socially optimal) Pigouvian tax if all agents have their interests represented by an interest group. Recently, Aidt and Hwang (2014) have generalized the argument to the case of cross-national externalities and foreign lobbying. They show that the political equilibrium is socially efficient if all social groups are organized and all governments are equally corrupt. Finally, Graichen et al. (2001) analyze a Tullock contest, where an incumbent monopolistic utility and environmentalists confront for the contract for the supply of electricity. At the equilibrium, they show that the political contest induces the monopolist to use a more environmentally friendly technology and to reduce his output.  Tullock (1967) was the first to alert that the real resources and efforts that lobbies expend to influence regulatory decisions are socially wasted. Since then, a large body of literature has focused on evaluating the magnitude of the loss associated to rent-seeking activities (Krueger, 1974). The initial framework designed to investigate it considered symmetric rent-seekers simultaneously determining their efforts under complete information (Tullock, 1980). Using stylized contest success functions (lottery and all-pay auction), Tullock (1980), (1980)  and Hillman and Samet (1987) have found that the rent dissipation was either smaller than or equal to the rent at stake. Their finding later This result has been the subject to many challenges in the literature and finally has  proved to be robust. Hillman and Katz (1984), (1984)  and Alcalde and Dahm (2010) have confirmed it with more general contest success functions. Hillman and Riley (1989), Baik (1994) and Nti (1999) have found obtained  that rent dissipation reduces when if  the rent-seekers are asymmetric, either because in the sense that  they put different valuations on the prize or because that  they differ in their ability to win the contest. Leininger (1993) and Morgan (2003) have extended the property of under-dissipation of the rent under considering  sequential timing of the contest game. Exploring alternative information structures, Wärneryd (2003), (2003)  and Malueg and Yates (2004) have shown that the intensity of rent-seeking does not increase in incomplete information settings. Finally, Katz et al (1990) and Nitzan (1991) have obtained that the free-riding incentives within pressure groups also limit rent dissipation. \footnote{Recent surveys are Hillman (2013), Konrad (2007) and Long (2014).} %A major concern against lobbying is that rent-seeking activities induce socially wasteful costs. This issue (referred to as rent dissipation) is central since the early literature on the subject (Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974). Tullock (1980) was one of the first to investigate it (i.e., the magnitude of rent dissipation), showing that both cases of over- and under-dissipation can arise. This issue has been studied in many different settings since then, showing in particular that it is sensitive to the number of contestants (Hillman and Riley, 1989), the size of the competing groups (Nitzan, 1991), the heterogeneity of the players (Nti, 1999), the risk aversion of the players (Hillman and Katz, 1984), the asymmetry of information within players (W\"{a}rneryd, 2003), the timing of the game (Baik and Shogren, 1992), and the choice of the contest success function (Nti, 2004). \footnote{Recent surveys are Hillman (2013), Konrad (2007) and Long (2014).}