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title = {{Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists}},  journal = {Journal of Corporate Finance},  }  " data-bib-key="Clifford_2008" contenteditable="false">Clifford 2008 examines the shareholder activism by hedge funds on a sample of 197 hedge funds families  between 1998 and 2005. When the hedge funds acquire more than five percent of the firms equity, it is obliged to file a regulatory disclosure with the SEC (the form***). In this disclosure the hedge fund has to state whether its investment intentions are passive or active and in case of active investment intentions also to specified its planed actions. The fund can later make changes to this disclosure in form of amendments. Clifford finda that the firms targeted with active investment intentions tend to improve their operating performance and earn larger excess stock returns than firms targetted for passive investment purposes.  On the side of the hedge funds, he finds that the hedge funds that engage in activism tend to have longer lock-up periods and withdrawal notifiation periods than other non-activist hedge funds.