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author = {Joseph A. Grundfest},
title = {Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians inside the Gates},
journal = {Stanford Law Review}
}" data-bib-key="Grundfest_1993" contenteditable="false">
Grundfest 1993 argues hat these campaigns may be even more effective than direct issue-oriented shareholder proposals because the directly impact professional reputation of the board members.
On the other hand, many others perceive the "just vote no" campaigns as ineffective. The withholding of the votes does not itself result in removing a director from the board. Directors run for their position often unopposed. Therefore just voting "no" does not influence their election and represents only a symbolic gesture.
Del Guercio et al examine gesture.
DELGUERCIO 2008 examine a sample of 112 publicly announced "just no vote" campaigns between 1990 and 2003. They find that these campaigns are usually sponsored by public pension funds and target large poorly managed companies. This is in contrast with hedge funds who usually use different forms of activism and target rather smaller firms. They also find that these "just vote no" campaigns are usually successful and result in increased CEO turnover and significant improvements in post-campaign operating performance.
