deletions | additions       diff --git a/If_you_wait_to_do__.tex b/If_you_wait_to_do__.tex  index d27725f..24d7947 100644  --- a/If_you_wait_to_do__.tex  +++ b/If_you_wait_to_do__.tex 
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Most of the analyses on establishments location choices presented in the first two chapters treats treat  only one selected activity sector at a time, typically industrial or retail activities. Very few empirical studies, i.e., Dube et al. (2016) or Buczkowska et al. (2014) develop models for a number of various sectors, yet still, these models are analyzed independently without considering strategic interactions between the sectors. Literature revised in Chapter III and especially works of Zhu and Singh (2009), Seim (2006), Jia (2008), Berry (1992), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a), Ellickson and Misra (2012), Singh (2009), Draganska et al. (2008) ((, Chatman et al. (2016))) helps understand why it is worth considering within- and inter-industry interactions. An excellent review of Draganska et al. (2008) gives a classification of possible modeling choices along plural dimensions, in the informational, temporal contexts, considering the timing of moves, and the discrete, continuous, or mixed decisions of establishments. Our context is a static discrete game of incomplete information. An establishment's payoff from choosing a particular location depends on its expectation of the optimal location choices of its competitors and exogenous market characteristics (Zhu and Singh, 2009). Based on the expected distribution of other agents across market locations, each establishment selects the location that maximizes its payoff given its own type (Seim, 2006).   %Establishments base their decisions on what they expect other players will do, where they will locate (Draganska et al., 2008).