Sabina Buczkowska edited If_you_wait_to_do__.tex  over 7 years ago

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Chapter IV  starting with the the trailbreaking work of Teitz (1968) who introduces the idea that a firm serves the market from multiple locations in the context of Hotelling's linear city model. Since then other researchers, such as Thill (1997), Chu and Lu (1998), Pal and Sarkar (2002), Janssen et al. (2005), Karamychev and van Reeven (2009), Iida and Matsubayashi (2011), Takaki and Matsubayashi (2013), Neven (1987), Peng and Tabuchi (2007), Granot et al. (2010), or Nishida (2015) have been proposing multi-store firms location models.  Chapter IV pronounces the fact that location-store models typically do not consider competing rival-chain stores and the strategic interactions between stores within the same chain. The profitability is a function of player i's entire network and the competitors' networks (Nishida, 2015). The literature on business stealing and learning effects, cannibalization effects and economies of scale described in Chapter IV (see, e.g., Toivanen and Waterson, 2005; Aquirregabiria and Suzuki, 2015) ) is not consistent in specifying which of these effects has a prevailing influence on location decisions and depends on the tore type.   Yang (2015) and Igami and Yang (2015) study Canada's fast food hamburger industry of five substituable with one another chains. Toivanen and Waterson (2005) analyze fast food restaurants in the UK. Thomansen (2005) focuses on two fast food chains in California. Nishida (2015) convenience-store chains in Japan. Schiraldi et al. (2013) and Holmes (2011) observe the UK supermarket industry, such as Walmart and other supercenters.   Nwogugu (2006) distance  X discusses