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A \textbf{universe description} $D$ is a set of noncontradictory mathematical axioms that describe the "laws of the universe". I will call each of the mathematical models in which these axioms are true a possible universe for the description $D$ and $D$ is a description for each of this possible universes. Note that a universe will have many possible descriptions and a description may describe multiple universes.  One could argue that a mathematical definition of the laws of a possible universe is too limiting and that there may be possible universes without this kind of description. That could be, and we could replace "mathematical axioms" with "natural language sentences" without changing much of what follows, except for making the argument somehow more complicated. Still, even "natural language sentences" could be too limiting, but the argument below works even in this case, as long as only needs that  our universe has a mathematical description of its laws. A description $D$ \textbf{implies} a statement $S$ if $S$ is $S$ is a property of all universes $U$ for which $D$ is a description. In this case I will also say that $S$ is \textbf{true for} $D$.  If we have a probability $p$ on a set of universe descriptions $\cal S$ then the probability $p(S)$ of a sentence of a sentence $S$ is the probability of the set of descriptions for which $S$ is true.  Given the definitions above, this is the layout of my argument.  \begin{ennumerate}  \item A possible universe description is a set of mathematical axioms. Any set of noncontradictory mathematical axioms which is at most countable is a possible universe description.  \item There is an infinite and uncountable (of cardinality at least $\reale$) set of possible universe descriptions in which Turing-complete entities could exist, which are fundamentally different and for any two such descriptions their sets of possible universes are disjoint. The Turing-complete entities have access to data which could be used to provide a description of the universe and the descriptions which could be built this way also form an uncountable set. [TODO: maybe replace Turing-complete with intelligent and expand on the descriptions provided by the intelligent entities]. Let us denote this set by $\cal T$.  \begin{ennumerate}  \item There is such a set which has descriptions somehow similar to our universe, making them more plausible.  \end{ennumerate}  \item For any sentence $S$ which is true in a countable set of universe descriptions and any probability distribution which is not heavily biased (i.e. any continous probability distribution) the probability of $S$ is zero.  \begin{ennumerate}  \item Given such a probability distribution over $T$, let $\cal T_0$ be the set of all descriptions in $\cal T$ in which there a true sentence $S$ of probability zero. Then the probability of $\cal T_0$ is zero. Note that the sentence is not of the type mentioned above.  \item There set of finite descriptions is countable, so the property "Has a finite description" has a probability 0 in $T$. [TODO: This construction should also work when the descriptions are not disjoint, but they allow full predictions of events in their universes].  \end{ennumerate}  \end{ennumerate}  znzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz