Virgil Șerbănuță edited untitled.tex  almost 8 years ago

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\section{Disclaimer}  See \href{https://www.authorea.com/users/48154/articles/116937/_show_article}{https://www.authorea.com/users/48154/articles/116937/_show_article} for a newer version of this \paper{}, at the moment when this was written it was a work in progress and it may still be so.  The \paper{} below started as a mathematical attempt to understand what it would mean to live in a world that is not designed, but, in the end, the mathematical part turned out to be rather small, containing only a few simple properties about set cardinalities and probabilities. I think that the non-mathematical ideas are fairly obvious consequences of the mathematical ones, so many people have already thought about them – I have also found quotes from various people that seem to hint at the idea below. However, I did not manage yet to find anyone drawing the same conclusions in the same way. The closest I could get is the idea that the order of the Universe implies or suggests that there is a God. The fine-tuning of the Universe is also close\footnote{\href{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuned_Universe}{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuned\_Universe}}. However, I think that what I'm presenting in this \paper{} is different from what I have read about both of these, maybe being complementary to the fine-tuning argument.  For a description of the fine-tuning argument see \href{http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/#CosFinTun}{http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/\#CosFinTun}\footnote{Ratzsch, Del and Koperski, Jeffrey, "Teleological Arguments for God's Existence", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .}. I think that the argument presented in this paper solves most, if not all of the fine-tuning objections in the quoted page, while improving the probability constraints, i.e. it shows that our Universe has a zero probability. However, this paper does not present an improvement of the fine-tuning argument, it describes a different way to compute the probability of our Universe, so it can have its own set of objections.