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\item Fix $\delta \gt 0$ and say that we care about measuring things which are larger than $\delta$. This means that we can have three sizes $a$, $b$ and $c$ with $a=b$ and $b=c$ but $a\not=c$. This should be fine as long as we're aware that equality here actually means that the difference is smaller than $\delta$.  \item Fix a time length $s$ for the happens rarely definition and ignore things which happen rarely.  \end{itemize}  We could actually use any reasonable definition of measuring and happens rarely, the ones above are provided as an example. Then we could say that the important things are the ones which are larger than $\delta$ and which do not happen rarely. Let us also fix an arbitrary time length $t\ge $t >  0$, a relative error $\epsilon \ge 0$ and a probability $q\ge $q >  0$ which is the probability of a random prediction to be successful given the previous constraints and let us denote by $f$ with $0 < f \le 1$ the fraction of the world\footnote{As above, everything that can be inferred from the artificial restrictions imposed by this paper to the possible worlds is not considered a part of $f$.} where we can make predictions about what happens after the given time length $t$, with the relative error $\epsilon$ and having a probability $q$ that the prediction is correct\footnote{This could be replaced by \ghilimele{having a probability greater or equal to $q$ that the prediction is correct}, which would also work when having a richer probability distribution for the correctness of the prediction}. Then, if the world is not designed, we have a countable number of finite (observable) descriptions out of a $\reale$ total number of descriptions. Then, for any continuous distribution, the probability of having a finite description with which we can make predictions for a time length of $t$, with a relative error $\epsilon$, with a probability $q$ and for a fraction of the world $f$, is $0$. To have a non-zero probability either $t = 0$ (which means that we are not making any prediction, we are just restating the present), $\epsilon = \infty$ (which means that our predictions have no connection to the reality), $q=0$ (which means that our predictions always fail) or $f=0$. We can discard the first option since then we would have no predictions. We can also discard the second and the third since such a description would not be useful in any way. The only remaining option is that $f=0$; as argued above, a description with $f=0$ can actually make sense. Therefore, with probability $1$, we have $f=0$ and the world has an infinite model.