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The \paper{} below started as a mathematical attempt to understand what it would mean to live in a world that is not designed, but, in the end, the mathematical part turned out to be rather small, containing only a few simple properties about set cardinalities and probabilities. I think that the non-mathematical ideas are fairly obvious consequences of the mathematical ones, so many people have already thought about them – I have also found quotes from various people that seem to hint at the idea below. However, I did not manage yet to find anyone drawing the same conclusions in the same way. The closest I could get is the idea that the order of the Universe implies or suggests that there is a God. The fine-tuning of the Universe is also close\footnote{\href{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuned_Universe}{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuned\_Universe}}. However, I think that what I'm presenting in this \paper{} is different from what I have read about both of these, maybe being complementary to the fine-tuning argument.  For a description of the fine-tuning argument see \href{http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/#CosFinTun}{http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/#CosFinTun}. \href{http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/#CosFinTun}{http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/\#CosFinTun}\footnote{Ratzsch, Del and Koperski, Jeffrey, "Teleological Arguments for God's Existence", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .}.  I think that the argument presented in this paper solves most, if not all of the fine-tuning objections in the quoted page?, page,  while improving the probability constraints, i.e. it shows that our Universe has a zero probability. However, this paper does not present an improvement of the fine-tuning argument, it describes a different way to compute the probability of our Universe, so it can have its own set of objections. Since it started as a mathematical \paper{} I may use \ghilimele{we} instead of \ghilimele{I} more often than I should, but you should consider it an invitation to work together in discovering some ideas. And if some of those ideas are wrong or unclear\footnote{Given my lack of experience with philosophy this is more probable than I would like.}, I welcome counterarguments and feedback\footnote{Authorea allows everyone to comment on the \paper{}. I may switch to a different commenting system if it turns out that something better is needed. You can also try e-mailing design dash and dash chance at poarta dot org.}. 
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If that's true then there may be other worlds\footnote{We don't have any proof for the existence of other worlds, but one could expect them to exist for the same reason that ours exists. If ours has no reason at all for existing, which is likely if it is not created, then it's likely that other worlds would also not need any reason for existing and would simply be. However, for the purpose of this \paper{} it does not matter if there are other worlds or not and maybe we will never be able to tell if other worlds exist or not.}. Even if there are no other worlds, one could easily imagine that ours worked in a different way, say that the speed of light is different or gravity works differently. We will denote by \definitie{possible worlds} these other worlds that either are or could have been.  \section{Rough argument summary}  I am trying to compute $P(\mbox{our world}\mid\mbox{there is no Creator})$. I know that for any property $p$ such that our world has this property, $P(\mbox{our world} \mid \mbox{there is no Creator})$ is at most $P(p \mid \mbox{there is no Creator})$, where $P(p)$ is the probability of all worlds having the $p$ property. Then I will find such a property $p$ for which $P(p \mid \mbox{there is no Creator}) = 0$, showing that $P(\mbox{our world}\mid{there is no Creator})=0$. I will also discuss why it is enough to use that property.  The property $p$ for which I will attempt to show that $P(p \mid \mbox{there is no Creator}) = 0$ is \ghilimele{There is a mathematical theory that has a finite definition and is useful for making approximate predictions in a non-trivial part of our universe}.  The argument is presented then in two parts.   The first one uses "There is a mathematical theory that has a finite definition and fully models the universe" as the above property and shows that the probability of a non-created universe to have this property is 0. However, this is result is not really useful for a number of reasons, including that we may need to have an infinite definition only if we want infinite precision in our predictions, but for most or even all practical purposes we could not tell the difference between predictions with extremely good precision and predictions with infinite precision.  In the second part I will also consider theories which do not fully model the universe and I will show that in a non-created universe we can't have a non-zero probability for a finite theory that works in a non-trivial part of a universe.  ------------------------------------------------  Then the first part argument has the following steps:  1. If our world is not created then either there are other worlds, or our world could have been different.  2. We will consider only worlds which are "well behaved", e.g. they can be modelled mathematically (for a reasonable definition of modelling that focuses on predictions), they can have intelligent life, there is a concept of time and so on.  3. We will consider all the possible theories that could model such worlds. Their set has the same cardinal as the real numbers.  4. For any reasonable statistical distribution, the set of finite theories has zero probability.  5. Therefore P(p | there is no Creator) = 0.  The second part of the argument reuses steps 1-4 from the first part, rephrased to allow partial modelling, but also has a few extra ones.  6. In order to have intelligent beings one needs finite theories that are useful.  7. In order to have a finite theory with a non-zero probability the only option is to have a theory that only works in a small part of the universe, so small that it covers a 0 fraction of the universe.  8. Therefore P(p | there is no Creator) = 0.  \section{Modelling possible worlds}  First, let us note that there can't be any causal interaction between two different possible worlds. If two worlds are interacting, it's more reasonable to say that they are actually a single possible world with two parts.