Virgil Șerbănuță edited untitled.tex  about 8 years ago

Commit id: 7d6b0d6a0a046a1ac0511bc528f55aabd35c53fe

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The argument is more complex in order to avoid various pitfalls, but the basic idea is this:  I am trying to compute the probability of our world given that it was not created. For any property $p$ such that our world has this property, the probability of our world is at most the probability of $p$, where the probability of $p$ is the probability of all worlds having the $p$ property. Then, if there is such a property $p$ whose probability is $0$ then our world's probability is $0$. I will also discuss why it is enough to use that property. does not matter which property $p$ I am choosing.  The property $p$ for which I will attempt to show that it has a $0$ probability is \ghilimele{There is a mathematical theory that has a finite definition and is useful for making approximate predictions in a non-trivial part of our universe}.  For clarity, I have split the argument in two parts.   The first one uses "There is a mathematical theory that has a finite definition and fully models the universe" as the above property and shows that the probability of a non-created universe to have this property is 0. $0$.  However, this result is not really useful for a number of reasons, including that we may need to have an infinite definition only if we want infinite precision in our predictions, but for most or even all practical purposes we could not tell the difference between predictions with extremely good precision and predictions with infinite precision. In the second part I will also consider theories which do not fully model the universe and I will show that in a non-created universe we can't have a non-zero probability for a finite theory that works in a non-trivial part of a universe.