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\item Fix $\delta \gt 0$ and say that we care about measuring things which are larger than $\delta$. This means that we can have three sizes $a$, $b$ and $c$ with $a=b$ and $b=c$ but $a\not=c$. This should be fine as long as we're aware that equality here actually means that the difference is smaller than $\delta$.  \item Fix a time length $s$ and ignore things which happen rarely.  \end{itemize}  We could use any reasonable definition of measuring and happen rarely. Then we could say that the important things are the ones which are larger than $\delta$ and which do not happen rarely. Let us also fix an arbitrary time length $t\ge 0$, a relative error $\epsilon \ge 0$ and a probability $q\ge 0$ which is the probability of a random prediction to be successful given the previous constraints and let us denote by $f$ with $0 < f \le 1$ the fraction of the world\footnote{As above, everything that can be inferred from the artificial restrictions imposed by this paper to the possible worlds is not considered a part of $f$.} where we can make predictions about what happens after the given time length $t$, with the relative error $\epsilon$ and having a probability $q$ that the prediction is correct. correct\footnote{This could be replaced by \ghilimele{having a probability greater or equal to $q$ that the prediction is correct}, which would also work when having a richer probability distribution for the correctness of the prediction}.  Then, if the world is not designed, we have a countable number of finite (observable) descriptions out of a $\reale$ total number of descriptions. Then, for any continuous distribution, the probability of having a finite description with which we can make predictions for a time length of $t$, with a relative error $\epsilon$, with a probability $p$ $q$  and for a fraction of the world $f$, is $0$. To have a non-zero probability either $t = 0$ (which means that we are not making any prediction, we are just restating the present), $\epsilon = \infty$ (which means that our predictions have no connection to the reality), $p=0$ $q=0$  (which means that our predictions always fail) or $f=0$. We can discard the first option since then we would have no predictions. We can also discard the second and the third since such a description would not be useful in any way. The only remaining option is that $f=0$; as argued above, a description with $f=0$ can actually make sense. Therefore, with probability $1$, we have $f=0$ and the world has an infinite model. There is a distinction that we should make. When predicting (say) weather we can't make long-term precise predictions, and this happens because weather is chaotic, that is, a small difference in the start state can create large differences over time. This could happen even if the universe is deterministic and we know the laws of the universe perfectly, as long as we don't know the full current state of the universe. However, as argued above, with probability $1$, our hypothetical intelligent beings would not be able to make predictions for a significant part of the universe because they would have no idea about how their universe works, not because they don't know its state precisely enough.  [TODO: I should think about what happens when replacing $p$ with a distribution probability. Nothing happens.]  Besides the \ghilimele{finite description for a non-zero fraction of the observable universe} property, we can look at some of the properties of our universe like having the same forces acting through the entire space, for all moments in time. It is harder to give a mathematical proof that these are zero-probability ones, but if we think that given a set of universes having these properties, sharing the same mathematical space (e.g. $\reale^3$) and having at least two distinct elements, one can slice and recombine them in infinite ways, it is likely that these properties are also zero-probability ones. An example of such a combined possible universe is the one with infinite planets on a line mentioned above. In other words, the cosmological principle is (very) likely to be a zero-probability property. Similarly, if we take the rules for how the universe works as we perceive them, most likely there is a zero chance that they would apply through the entire universe and a very low chance that they would apply outside of earth / our solar system.  In other words, if our world is not designed, there is a good chance that we may know a lot about what happens on Earth, maybe something about what happens in our solar system, we almost surely don't know what happens in our galaxy and outside of it. Also, we have a good chance of knowing how the world works now and in the near past and future, but we probably don't know what were the physical laws in the distant past or how they will be in the distant future. [TODO: put this below and link it to the conclusion.]