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A Christian believes that the world is created. However, this belief is not shared by everyone, so it's worth thinking about what this means. If the world is created, then it's likely to be the way it is because its Creator\footnote{Not everybody that believes that the world is created thinks that God created it. Still, I hope that they would agree that naming the creator of this world as "the Creator" is reasonable.} wanted it to have certain properties so in order to understand why our world works the way it does, one would need to understand the intent of its Creator. While it is worth thinking about it, I will not try to pursue this path here.  Let us consider the other case. If the world was not created, then there may be other worlds\footnote{We don't have any proof for the existence of other worlds, but one could expect them to exist for the same reason that ours exists. If ours has no reason at all for existing, which is likely if it is not created, then it's likely that other worlds would also not need any reason for existing and would simply be. However, for this paper it does not matter if there are other worlds or not.}. Even if there aren't other worlds, ours could have been different. We will denote by \textbf{possible \definitie{possible  worlds} these other worlds that either are or could have been. \section{Possible worlds}  How would a possible world look like? It could have exactly the same fundamental laws as ours, but with the matter organized differently. It could have similar laws, but with different universal constants. It could have different fundamental particles (or whatever the basic building blocks of our universe are, assuming that there are any). Or it could be completely different, i.e. different in all possible ways.  It could be that our logic and reasoning are universal instruments, but it could also be that some of these possible worlds could be beyond what our reasoning can grasp and others could have properties for which our logic is flawed. Aknowledging that, let us see if we can say anything about the possible worlds that we could understand and could model in some way. In the following, the \textbf{possible \definitie{possible  worlds} term will denote only the possible worlds which we could model (including models which need an infinitely long description, but which still follow our rules for reasoning). This notion of "model" is not precise enough. Let us restrict the "possible worlds" term even more, to the possible worlds that we could model mathematically, even if that may leave out some worlds. We will also do the reverse and say that any non-contradictory set of axioms models some possible worlds\footnote{Even if some of those models seem outlandish, there could be something that follows those rules and that is completely separated from anything else, not interacting with any other universe in any way. I would say that this something would be an universe. If you don't like it, in the following I am going to restrict what I call a possible universe.}. 
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Given a specific formalism for specifying axioms that uses a finite alphabet, for each possible world, we could only consider the smallest set of axioms that allow predictions, smallest being defined as "having the smallest length when written on paper". This is not a well defined notion for a few reasons. First, there could be multiple systems with "the smallest length" (one obvious case is given by reordering the axioms). In such a case, we could define an order for the symbols that we are using in our formalism and we could pick the system with the smallest length and that is the smallest in the lexicographic order. Second, there could be systems of axioms of infinite length. For this, we will only consider systems which, when written on an infinite paper, use a countable number of symbols. This means that all will have the same length, but we can still use the lexicographic order to compare them. We will ignore systems which need an uncountable set of symbol places. With an axiom system chosen in this way we would also solve the "too-specific problem" since we would remove any axiom that's not absolutely needed.  If $U$ is an universe and $A$ is the smallest set of predictive axioms as described above, then we would say than $A$ is the \definition{optimal \definitie{optimal  set of axioms for $U$}. If $A$ is a set of axioms which is optimal for some universe $U$ then we say that $A$ is an \definition{optimal \definitie{optimal  set of axioms}. Now let us see if we actually need infinite length systems. We can have infinite systems of axioms, and there is no good reason to reject such systems and to ignore their possible worlds, so we will take them into account. It is less clear that we can't replace these infinite systems with finite ones. Indeed, let us use any binary encoding allowing us to represent these systems as binary strings, i.e. as binary functions over the set of natural numbers, i.e. $f:\naturale\longrightarrow \multime{0, 1}$. Then the following scenario becomes plausible: for any universe $U$ with an infinite system of axioms $A$, we can consider $U+encoding(A)$ to be an universe in itself. Then it's likely that we can find a finite system of axioms which describe $U+encoding(A)$. While, strictly speaking, this would be a different universe than the one we had at the beginning, it is also similar enough to it so one may be tempted to use only finite systems of axioms.