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\end{itemize}  This is a bit hand-wavy, but we could use any reasonable definition of "measuring" and "happen rarely". Then we could say that the important things are the ones which we can measure with a precision greater than $\epsilon$ and which do not happen rarely. Let us also fix an arbitrary time length $t>0$, an acceptable error $\delta \ge 0$ for our predictions and let us denote by $f$ with $0 < f \le 1$ a fraction of the world where we can make predictions using the given time $t$ and the acceptable error $\delta$.  Then, if the world is not created, then using for  any continuous distribution distribution,  the probability of having a finite description with which we can do this make predictions for a time length of $t$, with an error $\delta$ and for a fraction of the world $f$,  is $0$, which means (with $0$. To have a non-zero  probability 1) either $t \le 0$ (which means  that$f=0$. This happens even if  we don't care about predicting things precisely (i.e. are not  making $\delta$ larger) any prediction)  or if we restricts ourselves $\delta = \infty$ (which means that our predictions have no connection  to small time scales (making $t$ smaller). the reality) or $f=0$. We can discard the first option since then we would have no predictions.  We can also discard the second since such a description would not be useful in any way. The  only make prediction for remaining option is that $f=0$; as argued above,  a tiny part of description with $f=0$ can actually make sense. Therefore, with probability $1$, we have $f=0$ and  the universe, so tiny that it's practically nothing ($f=0$). world has an infinite model.  [TODO: Start rewriting from here.]  Then, again, our choice There  is between the world being created and us missing an infinite part of our observable model description which models things a distinction  that we deem important. If we miss an important infinite part of our observable model description then I argue that should make. When predicting (say) weather  we could not can't  make any long term prediction or speak about long-term precise predictions, and this happens because weather is chaotic, that is, a small difference in  the relatively distant past because, by definition, start state can create large differences over time. This could happen even if  the important parts that universe is determinist and  we are missing would change know  the outcome laws  ofour predictions too much. Therefore saying that our world is (say) 100 years old would have roughly  the same chance of being true universe perfectly,  as saying that is n billion years old [TODO: Think about this, it's tricky. If there are intelligent beings in a world then their intelligence is likely to be useful. Then it means that at least a part of long as we don't know  the world must be understandable and predictions can be made with a finite model full current state  of the world. But then the model they universe. However, as argued above, with probability $1$, our hypothetical intelligent beings  would build is infinite. This means that they can find a model that allows some sort of not be able to make  predictions for a fraction $f$ significant part  oftheir world and they can increase this fraction by research. They will never have $f=1$, but if we denote  the theory universe because  they would  haveat a time $t$ by $T_t$ and the fraction of the world that they can predict by $f_t$ then $f_t$ converges to $1$ when $t$ converges to infinity. But then for any fraction of the world $f<1$,  no matter idea about  how close to $1$, there is a finite time at which there is a theory that can predict a fraction $f$ of the universe. ]. their universe works, not because they don't know its state precisely enough.  There is another distinction that we should make. When predicting weather we can't make long-term precise predictions, and this happens because weather is chaotic??, that is, a small difference in the start state can create large differences over time. This could happen even if the universe is determinist and we know the laws of the universe perfectly, as long as we don't know the full current state of the universe. On the other hand, with an infinite observable model we wouldn't be able to make long term predictions because we don't actually know how the world works, not because we don't know its state precisely enough. [TODO: Start rewriting from here.]  And there is yet another difference a second distinction  that we should make. In a deterministic universe, knowing the laws of the universe and its full state we could, in theory, fully predict its future. But an universe does not have to be deterministic. In this case, we would search for the best set of laws for predicting the future state. Note that we could have an universe that seems non-deterministic for any finite set of laws but which has an infinite set of laws under which it is deterministic. Indeed, it seems that in a case in which we can easily observe the effects of some laws of the universe, we could probably infer a finite statistical law about it. In this case, the best set of laws would be the infinite one. [TODO: Think about finite statistics. Is it always true? Probably not, if the stats made in a day are completely different from stats made in another day. How frequent would it be? What does it mean?] [TODO: Give examples in which our main assumptions about the universe, i.e. homogeneity and isotropy, are broken. Are these finite properties, or zero-probability ones? They are not finite, but considering that we can combine any at most countable set of homogenous and isotropic universes with compatible times into another universe, then it's likely that they are zero-probability ones. We need intelligent beings to be able to live through these changes, but even then it looks like we can combine a lot of universes into one, suggesting that these properties are zero-probability for many reasonable probability distributions. TODO: Give examples on how to combine. Say in a clear way what do I mean by combining a lot of universes into one, making it obvious why the probability should be zero. We experience gravity differently at various times and places - tides, variation from one place to another on Earth, on the Moon, when falling, although the law that describes gravitation does not change. We could imagine an universe where the actual law changes.]