deletions | additions       diff --git a/section_Discrete_Auctions_and_Price__.tex b/section_Discrete_Auctions_and_Price__.tex  index 5e6dc09..6a47225 100644  --- a/section_Discrete_Auctions_and_Price__.tex  +++ b/section_Discrete_Auctions_and_Price__.tex 
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\int_{y^*}^\infty \d y \rho^{\text{st.}}_{D}(y) = \int_{-\infty}^{y^*} \d y \rho^{\text{st.}}_{S}(y) \equiv v^*,  \end{equation}  where $v^*$ is the volume exchanged during the auction. For the simple exponential case above, this equation can be readily solved as:   \be \begin{equation}  \label{eq:lin-imp}\nonumber y^* = \frac{1}{2\mu} \ln \frac{\Omega_+}{\Omega_-},  \end{equation}  with a clear interpretation: if the new buy order intentions accumulated since the last auction happen to outsize the new sell intentions during the same period, the auction price will exceed the fundamental price,  
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The main point of the present section is that when the inter-auction time is large enough, each auction clears an equilibrium supply with an equilibrium demand, with very simple and predictable outcomes. This corresponds to the quasi-static dynamics discussed in item 2., Section ~\ref{sec:eco}, and to the standard representation of market dynamics in the Walrasian context, since in this case only the long-term properties of supply and demand matter and the whole transients are discarded. The next section will depart from this limiting case, by introducing a finite inter-auction time such that the transient dynamics of supply and demand becomes a central feature in the theory.