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Given a cognitive interpretation, we can project the agent's physical internal state into a space of cognitive variables. Consequently, we can observe a ``cognitive dynamics'': the changes in the agent's (attributed) beliefs and desires caused by sensory input (and responsible for actuator output).  \subsection{Theories Of Rationality}  By itself, the cognitive interpretation $C$  is meaningless, since there are no semantics attached to the attributed cognitive content of the agent's mind. It acquires meaning only when coupled with a theory of rationality: rationality $R$:  a normative ideal of how beliefs and desires should be related to sensations and actions. We will define a $\Tau$ theory of rationality $R$ as a function describing, for an agent with cognitive state $(b, d, \phi) \in B \times D \times \Phi$, faced with sensory input $s \in S$, what the rational options are for the agent's next beliefs, desires and actions.  \[ R: B \times D \times \Phi \times S \rightarrow \to 2^B \times 2^D \times 2^A \]  ...where $2^X$ denotes the powerset of $X$