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As an illustration, recall the doctrinal paradox, which famously shows that consistent individual judgment sets sometimes leads to an inconsistent collective outcome:  \begin{center}  \begin{table} \begin{table}[h]  \begin{tabular}{ l | c c c c }  & p & q & p \rightarrow q & \\   \hline 
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Consider now the following modification of the above case: assume that agent $c$ votes himself on issue $p$ but delegates to agent $b$ his vote on $q$ and on $p\rightarrow q$. We obtain the following situation, where agent's $c$ judgments are inconsistent:   \begin{table}[h]  \begin{center}  \begin{table}   \begin{tabular}{ l | c c c c }  & p & q & p \rightarrow q & \\   \hline 
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\hline  majority & 1 & 0 & 1 &   \end{tabular}   \end{table}  \end{center}  \end{table}  Note that the above shows that in the more general setting of liquid democracy, inconsistent individual judgment sets may lead to consistent collective outcomes, for instance. This raises new research question: what questions: What  are the conditions for a collective outcome to be consistent? And what consistent, when dropping the assumption of consistent individual judgments? What  are the criteria for rational delegation?\footnote{It \emph{rational delegation}?\footnote{It  seems intuitive to impose the following constraint: ifan  agent $i$ delegateson one  issue $r$ to an agent $j$, he should also delegate to $j$  all the remaining issues which depend solely on the truth of $r$ to the same agent $j$. $r$, given $i$'s judgment on non-delegated issues.  In our example, this means that it would not be rational for agent $c$ to delegate to agent $b$ on issue $q$ but not on issue $p\rightarrow q$, given that $c$'s judges $p$ true. } true.}  \section{Liquid Democracy as a limit case of DeGroot influence matrices}