deletions | additions       diff --git a/untitled.tex b/untitled.tex  index cf6012f..8d4b74e 100644  --- a/untitled.tex  +++ b/untitled.tex 
...
\end{center}  Consider now the following modification of the above case: assume that agent $c$ votes himself on issue $p$ but delegates to agent $b$ his vote on $q$ and on $p\rightarrow q$. We obtain the following situation: situation, where agent's $c$ judgments are inconsistent:  \begin{center}  \begin{table}  
...
\end{table}  \end{center}  As the Note that thw  above shows, shows that  in the more general setting of liquid democracy, inconsistent individual judgment sets may lead to consistent collective outcomes, for instance. This raises new research questions: question:  what are the conditions for a collective outcome to be consistent? And what are the criteria for rational delegation? \section{Liquid Democracy as a limit case of DeGroot influence matrices}