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Davide Grossi edited section_An_application_to_liquid__.tex
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\section{An application to liquid democracy}
The natural interpretation of BDPs is in terms of processes of opinion formation (cf. \cite{Grossi_2014}) where agents' opinions are dictated by a personal `guru'.\footnote{Under a convergence assumption, they could be thought of concrete instantiations of profile-transformation functions (from the set of all opinion profiles to the set of all opinion profiles) as studied in \cite{List_2010}.}
This While this is obviously
too constrained a
model to very constrained model, it does capture
realistic the very constrained form of opinion formation
processes. We claim, however, that BDPs can serve as useful models to analyze aspects of implicit in the
opinion aggregation system called so-called {\em liquid
democracy. democracy} method for the aggregation of individual opinion.
\subsection{Liquid \subsection{Insights into liquid democracy}
In liquid \subsection{Liquid democracy
(also known as
``proxy voting") for each issue submitted to vote, each agent can either cast his own vote, or he can delegate it to another agent (a ``proxy"), who he considers to be better equipped to make the best decision. As such, proxy voting stands in between direct democracy and standard representative democracy.\footnote{Liquid democracy is based on the software known as Liquid Feedback (\url{liquidfeedback.org}). Campaigns (e.g., Make Your Laws, \url{www.makeyourlaws.org}, US) and even parties with representatives that sat in national parliaments (e.g., Piratenpartei, Germany) are using and advocating the software.} a BDP}
Despite the key ideas behind proxy voting have appeared in several contributions in political theory, Liquid democracy is an aggregation procedure conceive to
date little systematic work exists on stand between direct and representative democracies.\footnote{Liquid democracy is supported by the
system. Some analyses from a voting theory perspective have been put forth software known as Liquid Feedback (\url{liquidfeedback.org}). Campaigns (e.g., Make Your Laws, \url{www.makeyourlaws.org}, US) and even parties with representatives that sat in
\cite{Green_Armytage_2014} but, to national parliaments (e.g., Piratenpartei, Germany) are using and advocating the software.}
At its heart is the
best so-called method of
our knowledge, no model has been proposed ``proxy voting" \cite{Miller_1969,Tullock_1992}.
For each issue submitted to vote, each agent can either cast his own vote, or he can delegate it to another agent---a ``proxy")---and that agent can delegate in turn to yet another agent and so
far.\footnote{The on. In the end only
exception is possibly \cite{Boldi_2011}} the agents that decided not to delegate their votes cast their ballots, for instance under majority rule.
It has been argued that liquid democracy leads to collective outcomes which are closer to individual opinions than representative democracy \cite{}.
It has also been argued that liquid democracy would be too unstable to be implemented %Despite the key ideas behind proxy voting have appeared in
practice as a replacement of representative democracy \cite{}. several contributions in political theory, to %date little systematic work exists on the system.
\subsection{Liquid Some analyses of liquid democracy
as from a
BDP} social choice-theoretic perspective have been put forth in \cite{Alger_2006} and \cite{Green_Armytage_2014}, and from an algorithmic perspective in \cite{Boldi_2011}. However, the system remains rather underinvestigated.
\subsection{Cycles}
Massive information loss (all votes in the cycles, and those upstream are lost) --> but not all cycles are necessarily disrupting the aggregation.