Transactive Energy for Flexible Prosumers Using Algorithmic Game Theory
- Georgios Tsaousoglou ,
- Pierre Pinson ,
- Nikolaos Paterakis
Abstract
In modern smart grids, the focus is increasingly shifted towards
distributed energy resources and flexible electricity assets owned by
prosumers. A system with high penetration of flexible prosumers, has a
very large number of variables and constraints, while a lot of the
information is local and non-observable. Decomposition methods and local
problem solving is considered a promising approach for such settings,
particularly when the implementation of a decomposition method features
a market-based analogy, i.e. it can be implemented in a Transactive
Energy fashion.
In this paper we present an auction-theoretic scheme for a setting with
non-convex prosumer models and resource constraints. The scheme is
evaluated on a particular case study and its scalability and efficiency
properties are tested and compared to an optimal benchmark solution. A
game-theoretic analysis is made with respect to how an intelligent
agent, that bids on behalf of a prosumer can try to strategize within
the auction, in order to make itself better-off. Our simulations show
that there is an alignment of incentives, i.e., when the prosumers try
to strategize, they actually improve the auction's efficiency.