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\section{Conclusions}  We have presented two attacks where an adversary with a Quantum Computer is able to recover plaintexts. Both these attacks don't actually attack the NTRU primitive itself; instead, they attack the NAEP padding method, and take advantage of the fact that the parameters selected for the parameter sets are not sufficient if the attacker has a Quantum Computer. It would be straight-forward to modify adjust  these parameters parameter sets to use stronger components  (such as the size of $b$ and the hash function used) to foil these attaks. within the padding function.  We have also presented an attack that uses fewer operations than expected to recover the private key (assuming one of two parameter sets), and which is thoroughly impractical.