Looking at the works of Murphy, Cruikshank, and Martineau it becomes evident that a central principle of autoethnography is decolonization. While autoethnography is an effective mode of decolonization, it is not exempt from criticism. In her brief article, “Fighting Back or Moving On: An Autoethnographic Response to Critics”, Carolyn Ellis draws attention to some criticism that autoethnography faces. Ellis states that poststructuralists see autoethnography as “too realist and linear”, and that aestheticists see autoethnography as being “too concerned with being a science” \cite{Ellis2009}. More pertinent to the discussion of autoethnography as a means of decolonizing anthropology is the social sciences criticism that “autoethnography isn’t sufficiently realist or scientific; it’s too aesthetic and literary” \cite{Ellis2009}. This criticism raises the question: to what extent does anthropology have to be scientific; and further, is an autoethnographic approach to anthropology any less subjective than other methods? When confronting this question it is important to keep in mind that anthropology is a multivocal discipline, and that different anthropologists have different ideals for methodology. For instance, Marvin Harris, a “polemic” figure in anthropology, would likely challenge the value of autoethnography. Cultural materialists such as Harris look beyond indigenous insight with hopes to create more broad understandings of culture, focusing on the role environment has taken in shaping cultures \cite{harris2016}. In essence, this translates culture into empirical evidence. Contrary to this methodology is that of Richard Geertz, an interpretive anthropologist. Central to Geertz methodology is the idea that culture should be studied not for laws but for meaning \cite{geertz2016}. These methodologies highlight how anthropologists place differing values on science in the discipline, a pattern that suggests that anthropologists who seek empirical evidence and laws might oppose autoethnography, as its introspective focus often lacks an assertion of universal theory. However, interpretive anthropologists might find autoethnography to be an effective form of fieldwork, offering something similar to a thick description that can be analyzed for understanding. The criticism that autoethnography is not scientific enough only applies to those who believe that anthropology is primarily a scientific endeavour, where many other methodologies can effectively utilize autoethnography. Unfortunately, anthropology's science bias has had effect on the reception of autoethnographic publishing, particularly the amount of works that are accepted into "first-tier, blind peer-reviewed journals"; statistics suggest a low publishing rate of 17% for autoethnographic pieces \cite{makris2012}. The science-centric criticism of autoethnography has reduced its dispersal as a methodology, but this criticism is in itself problematic. Faye Harrison refers to this methodology as “the mining and the extraction of data”, a quote that draws attention to the objectifying of subjects \cite{harrison}. In short, an apparent lack of theory and empiricism in autoethnography does not mean it is not anthropological or irrelevant; rather it is a methodology for anthropologists who do not solely value science. Ellis’ article also draws attention to the criticism “auto has no place in social science”\cite{Ellis2009}. There are two arguments that can be made to show that “auto” does in fact have a place in anthropology. The first argument that contradicts this criticism is, as Spiro states, that “objectivity is an illusion” and that it contributes to the maintenance of unequal power balances \cite{spiro1996}. The idea that “auto” does not belong in anthropology implies that anthropology is an objective science that is unaffected by the anthropologists beliefs. In reality, all anthropology is shaped by the ideas of the anthropologist; therefore autoethnography’s reliance on introspection is not inappropriate, rather it is reflexive. The second argument is that this reflexivity can be a beneficial element to ethnography. It is important to keep in mind that ethnographies are written by people. Perhaps the most prominent work regarding this is Renato Rosaldo’s “Grief and a Headhunters Rage”, in which Rosaldo states that ethnographies which “eliminate intense emotions not only distort their descriptions but also remove potentially key variables from their explanations” \cite{rosaldo1993}. Autoethnography’s introspective nature embraces emotions, and does not deceive itself by suggesting any objective nature. To counter the criticism that autoethnography is not scientific, it can be said that anthropology should not be a solely scientific discipline. Autoethnography contributes to anthropology not by postulating grand concepts and universal structures, but provides insight into the intricacies of the relationship between an individual and the culture they are a part of, and while doing so negates the colonial aspects of empirically-focused anthropologies. 
    When individuals are able to perform ethnographies of their own cultures, the role of the anthropologist appears to be threatened. The anthropologist still plays an important role in these autoethnographies, as anthropological insight is what separates autobiography from autoethnography. The anthropologist is a cross-cultural facilitator, providing context into these stories and allowing for them to be understood in other cultures. The work of Murphy is autoethnographic rather than autobiographical because he approaches his situation from the perspective of an anthropologist. Cruikshank shifts the work of Ned, Sidney, and Smith from autobiographical to autoethnographic by explaining the role that these stories played to these women. To explain how these stories are relevant, Cruikshank turns to anthropology. Martineau makes the argument that Reid's sculptures are autoethnographic by examining them through anthropologies framework. While this work can be interpreted as autoethnographic before Martineau's argument, he draws attention to how its cultural insight was overlooked. Through anthropological mediation and contextualization, autobiography and even art can be seen as ethnographic.
    In conclusion, autoethnography is a useful tool for decolonizing both Canadian anthropology, and anthropology practised elsewhere. Autoethnography helps decolonize by mitigating a physical colonial presence, as seen in the contrast between the works of Murphy and Malinowski. Autoethnography also acts as a vehicle for progressive anthropological ideals. This can be seen in the contrast between the works of Cruikshank and Barbeau, and how Cruikshank allows for Indigenous people to have their own voice. Martineau shows how the work of Bill Reid can be interpreted as autoethnography, and how conforms to Pratt’s definition of autoethnography as well as the guidelines for public anthropology. While it is clear that autoethnography is useful in decolonizing anthropology, it is often criticized for its divergence from science, which itself can be seen as problematic and colonial. Autoethnography, while not the only means of decolonization, is a progressive approach to anthropology that should be utilized by more anthropologists in the future. As seen throughout this essay, autoethnography is present in Canadian anthropology, and has had tangible results in decolonization, largely by giving Indigenous people the opportunity to relay information about their own culture without having to submit to the role of an informer, subject, or participant. Autoethnography takes anthropology from the hands of a colonizer and gives it to groups that have long been suppressed and ignored, and through this a power balance is somewhat restored. Autoethnography is a powerful means of decolonization, but it might not always be suitable for some situations, making it important for other areas of anthropology to also acknowledge and mend their colonial undercurrents.