Going back to A), if we locate detection, observation, prevention/defense in the institution which is the competent intelligence agency, it is interesting to note the possibility of politicization existing in actions. It is seemingly not difficult to determine on what the forming and setting up of detection indicators depends, and equally so for decisions on observation, prevention or active defense, but in regard to potential results it is beneficial to try to observe the problem with an appropriate complexity. This imposes the indisputability of the system politicization in the context of setting up national goals, protected values, etc., making this a contentious area in which we can locate answers. The concept of politicization is not even the best term for this, especially in the context in which it has been used in recent years, since we are dealing with a regular relation in which the system protects the constitutional order of the state and is therefore subject to the set goals of political structure which are contained in the Constitution, laws and other regulations and are in that sense institutionalized. The question posed here is whether it is at all possible to have a system that would not be ‘politicized’ in such a regular way. For the purposes of this paper, I can call this type of politicization regular.
Furthermore, if we take into account the relation between national goals and protected values while approaching protected values not only in the normative sense but also in the sense of an open knowledge corpus outside of the normative part, and specifically as a part of knowledge that is generally considered correct in the society, we can envision the following imaginary scenario.
Let us return to A) and, in order to escape regular politicization, skip all actions, from 1 to 3. If 4 happens, the group wins the democratic elections and becomes a political structure which, after creating knowledge bottom up, is in a position to standardize knowledge; moreover, to turn it into knowledge that must be protected. In this way, social structure can be restructured top down. Let’s call it scenario B.
After the imaginary scenario B comes scenario C in which identical actions occur, but there is factor M, not escaping regular politicization, due to which scenario C is called ‘hostile action’ and thus is characterized as a negative phenomenon against which the system must fight. In other words, it must detect, observe, prevent, and ultimately actively defend a restructured society that now embraces a completely different body of knowledge while much of the knowledge that existed before scenario B is deemed inappropriate, dangerous to the safety and health of the society and brought to a point where negativity of that knowledge can even be standardized.
Beyond evaluating the positive and negative, the scenario is questioned in the context of influence operations and attitudes toward them. Is it legitimate, is it a consequence of negligence or intentional omission, will it be considered by the competent institution, is it a consequence of a circular or gradual irregular system politicization? Can we talk about the concept of an ideological framework when it comes to hostile action in scenario C, but adopt the concept of regular politicization aimed at the preservation of scenario B when it comes to defense caused by a hostile action C?

On the other hand..

On the other side of the targets of hostile actions is their author as factor M. I will divide actions into two general categories – attack and defense, which does not exclude the possibility of a different categorization. It is clear that the concepts of attack and defense can intersect and that their manifestations can be ambiguous. Some hostile actions can essentially be seen as defense in terms of a preventive attack, deterrence, and similar concepts. In a broader sense of the term, we can also talk about gaining someone’s trust, achieving a goal that could not be achieved otherwise, etc. Therefore, for the purpose of identifying the true nature of actions, it is useful to consider all sides of politicization as well as its layers and shapes.
Here, I am talking about the politicization of the intelligence system using the meaning and content of the term in a way it was used and analyzed by other authors. It may overlap with one of the two concepts defined for the purpose of this paper, regular and irregular politicization, with both of them or with neither of them.
Stephen Marrin cites Harry Howe Ransom, according to whom politicization (Marrin, 2013:33) ‘has multiple meanings’ and identified three different kinds: 1. ‘partisan politicization when an agency or an issue has become a point of contention between organized political groupings, normally political parties’; 2. ‘popularization, or publicity, which generates public debate over ends and means (frequently leading to) bipartisan politicization’; and 3. ‘when intelligence are influenced by imbedded policy positions. When preferred policies dominate decision making, overt or subtle pressured are applied on intelligence systems, resulting in self-fulfilling intelligence prophecies or “intelligence to please” that distorts reality.’ He concludes that politicization, according to Ransom’s definition ad 1) and ad 2), does not necessarily lead to worse outcomes and that he is attempting to discover the causes of the process despite the negative connotations of the term. This line of thinking enables a deeper understanding of the decision-making process on both the intelligence level and the political level as well as the way in which they are interwoven. In terms of study, such a value-neutral concept of politicization paves the way for finding subtle boundaries in understanding the elements of the process as it is devoid of negative connotations and becomes a legitimate subject of research, which is brave and borderline, but most importantly, it is promisingly connected to the reality because, as Marrin says (2013:33): ‘That intelligence becomes intertwined with politics is inevitable byproduct of the intentional production of useful knowledge to support foreign policy and national security decision making . Such decision- making occurs within a political or policy context, so the fact that the intelligence becomes embedded in politics should not be a surprise. Instead, the existence of this kind of politicization should be expected as part of the normal policymaking process.’. However, the last definition ad 3) has an immanent negative connotation due to its essence expressed in a phrase ‘intelligence to please’ which implies the distortion of the analysis because of the failure to apply the standard of objectivity by omitting certain findings, highlighting suitable parts of the collected information, delaying the analysis and using related procedures in order to accommodate political preferences.
Here I shall analyze the difference between the regular politicization, described in the text, in which, within the concept of defense, indicators are set in accordance with the political and social order for the purpose of the analysis of potential dangers and the politicization ad 3) in which the analyses are made as part of the planning of hostile actions, according to indicators which politically change faster than the overall political and social order and are subject to a wide range of influences.
When talking about a standard form of analysis, Marrin claims that it is the intent that makes analysis bad in the context of politicization, thus arguing that good politicization cannot be distinguished from the bad one only on the basis of a possibility of ideas and concepts influencing the interpretation (Marrin 2013).
While discussing about intelligence failures Gill and Phythian (2018:139) have no doubt that Betts’s concept of politicization referring on political pressure with the impact on the intelligence process ‘would benefit from greater definitional clarity’ so they are adding to their discussion Treverton’s five different forms that politicization may take. It goes from hard range to the soft one, from the direct pressure to the shared mind set. And although they emphasize the danger of the politicization that just seemingly transcends regime type, they leave unanswered the question of appropriate distance and independence of the intelligence in relation to the decision-making politics.
In the context of questioning boundaries, is the shared mind set a situational phenomenon related to one case or to a group of cases? Or can it exist as a more permanent phenomenon and share certain similarities with regular politicization? Is the shared mind set as a situational phenomenon a more harmful form of politicization than the shared mind set as a more permanent sameness of intelligence and politics? We might ask the question of who intelligence works for if it is not allowed to have the same permanent shared mind set as the one policymakers have in the same system, making it possible to consider scenarios in which it shares a mind set with some other policymakers in some other systems. Theoretically, it sounds complex, but practically speaking, it is an old phenomenon and not at all shocking. Another question in a series of questions is whether radical depoliticization leads to objectivity of intelligence or to hostile actions in which the intelligence system transforms from the system that should recognize factor M into factor M. This, again, puts us outside of categories of positive and negative because I have already stated that in certain calculations, factor M can also offer a positive solution in the context of the impact on concerned society .

Irregular politicization of the intelligence system as the result of the simulation

From the excerpt in the previous part, I can conclude that only factor M is a source of the irregular politicization of the intelligence system, because its influence makes scenario B the one that must be defended and scenario C the one to be defended against unlike M’s decision on defending scenario A. Therefore, promoting regular politicization when it is suitable, and not promoting it/demonizing it when it is not, sounds more irregular than regular.

Factor M

All sources of the irregular politicization here are marked as factor M and should should be verified in terms of strength, content, people, their risks, and benefits and should thus be evaluated so that they can be included in the planning of the activities of the system as a whole and especially of the intelligence system.
Few main characteristics of the factor M could be extracted from the simulations above:
1.      it is outside of categories of positive and negative
a)      in certain calculations, factor M can also offer a positive solution in the context of the impact on concerned society
b)      social consensus would certainly be one of the few legitimate factors M for which it is assumed that they lead to a positive outcome for the society from its perspective, so the lack of detection can be seen as irregular politicization which makes it possible to consider its positive aspects in addition to the emphasized negative ones. At that point, it would be possible to talk about true levelling of natural social restructuring as producing and reproducing (Gurvitch 1965) and influence operations whereby holder/representative of factor M can also receive additional impulses that he did not take into account during planning
c)      another question in a series of questions is whether radical depoliticization leads to objectivity of intelligence or to hostile actions in which the intelligence system transforms from the system that should recognize factor M into factor M.
2.      there can be a holder of the factor M power and there can be a/the representative/s of the factor M power
a)      On the other side of the targets of hostile actions towards concerned society is their author as the factor M
b)      Factor M can be a foreign policy factor which includes large-scale geopolitical factors, a financial factor that may or may not have its roots imported with large-scale geopolitical factors, a consensus of a significant part of the social structure, an economic factor, a partial interest of a certain group with sufficient power to be a factor M and all of them may be related or even derived from each other.
3.      promoting regular politicization when it is suitable and not promoting it/demonizing it when it is not
a)    whatever shape it takes, it has the power to evaluate the situation that goes beyond the existing state of things which includes the social structure and political structure or their parts that are currently qualitatively or quantitatively relevant
When it comes to a previous situation analysis or subsequent one for the purposes of the learned lesson, it is certainly necessary to take into account the limitations of the intelligence system in the context of democratized societies in which making decisions about specific activities fortunately goes through control mechanisms and depends on the reached consensus. This is precisely why it is important to take into account point (scenario) A, as well as factor M, in which cases the intelligence system legitimately and legally performs its tasks according to the prescribed procedure maxims which are continuously renewed in order to adapt to the recurrent ‘new circumstances’ and ‘old problems’. The possibility of the existence of a positive aspect of irregular politicization shows that all elements should be taken into account in the analysis calculation, whether it is a subsequent analysis or a previous one, in order to reach useful results.