Going back to A), if we locate detection, observation,
prevention/defense in the institution which is the competent
intelligence agency, it is interesting to note the possibility of
politicization existing in actions. It is seemingly not difficult to
determine on what the forming and setting up of detection indicators
depends, and equally so for decisions on observation, prevention or
active defense, but in regard to potential results it is beneficial to
try to observe the problem with an appropriate complexity. This imposes
the indisputability of the system politicization in the context of
setting up national goals, protected values, etc., making this a
contentious area in which we can locate answers. The concept of
politicization is not even the best term for this, especially in the
context in which it has been used in recent years, since we are dealing
with a regular relation in which the system protects the constitutional
order of the state and is therefore subject to the set goals of
political structure which are contained in the Constitution, laws and
other regulations and are in that sense institutionalized. The question
posed here is whether it is at all possible to have a system that would
not be ‘politicized’ in such a regular way. For the purposes of this
paper, I can call this type of politicization regular.
Furthermore, if we take into account the relation between national goals
and protected values while approaching protected values not only in the
normative sense but also in the sense of an open knowledge corpus
outside of the normative part, and specifically as a part of knowledge
that is generally considered correct in the society, we can envision the
following imaginary scenario.
Let us return to A) and, in order to escape regular politicization, skip
all actions, from 1 to 3. If 4 happens, the group wins the democratic
elections and becomes a political structure which, after creating
knowledge bottom up, is in a position to standardize knowledge;
moreover, to turn it into knowledge that must be protected. In this way,
social structure can be restructured top down. Let’s call it scenario B.
After the imaginary scenario B comes scenario C in which identical
actions occur, but there is factor M, not escaping regular
politicization, due to which scenario C is called ‘hostile action’ and
thus is characterized as a negative phenomenon against which the system
must fight. In other words, it must detect, observe, prevent, and
ultimately actively defend a restructured society that now embraces a
completely different body of knowledge while much of the knowledge that
existed before scenario B is deemed inappropriate, dangerous to the
safety and health of the society and brought to a point where negativity
of that knowledge can even be standardized.
Beyond evaluating the positive and negative, the scenario is questioned
in the context of influence operations and attitudes toward them. Is it
legitimate, is it a consequence of negligence or intentional omission,
will it be considered by the competent institution, is it a consequence
of a circular or gradual irregular system politicization? Can we talk
about the concept of an ideological framework when it comes to hostile
action in scenario C, but adopt the concept of regular politicization
aimed at the preservation of scenario B when it comes to defense caused
by a hostile action C?
On the other hand..
On the other side of the targets of hostile actions is their author as factor M. I will divide actions into two general
categories – attack and defense, which does not exclude the possibility
of a different categorization. It is clear that the concepts of attack
and defense can intersect and that their manifestations can be
ambiguous. Some hostile actions can essentially be seen as defense in
terms of a preventive attack, deterrence, and similar concepts. In a
broader sense of the term, we can also talk about gaining someone’s
trust, achieving a goal that could not be achieved otherwise, etc.
Therefore, for the purpose of identifying the true nature of actions, it
is useful to consider all sides of politicization as well as its layers
and shapes.
Here, I am talking about the politicization of the intelligence system
using the meaning and content of the term in a way it was used and
analyzed by other authors. It may overlap with one of the two concepts
defined for the purpose of this paper, regular and irregular
politicization, with both of them or with neither of them.
Stephen Marrin cites Harry Howe Ransom, according to whom politicization
(Marrin, 2013:33) ‘has multiple meanings’ and identified three different
kinds: 1. ‘partisan politicization when an agency or an issue has become
a point of contention between organized political groupings, normally
political parties’; 2. ‘popularization, or publicity, which generates
public debate over ends and means (frequently leading to) bipartisan
politicization’; and 3. ‘when intelligence are influenced by imbedded
policy positions. When preferred policies dominate decision making,
overt or subtle pressured are applied on intelligence systems, resulting
in self-fulfilling intelligence prophecies or “intelligence to please”
that distorts reality.’ He concludes that politicization, according to
Ransom’s definition ad 1) and ad 2), does not necessarily lead to worse
outcomes and that he is attempting to discover the causes of the process
despite the negative connotations of the term. This line of thinking
enables a deeper understanding of the decision-making process on both
the intelligence level and the political level as well as the way in
which they are interwoven. In terms of study, such a value-neutral
concept of politicization paves the way for finding subtle boundaries in
understanding the elements of the process as it is devoid of negative
connotations and becomes a legitimate subject of research, which is
brave and borderline, but most importantly, it is promisingly connected
to the reality because, as Marrin says (2013:33): ‘That intelligence
becomes intertwined with politics is inevitable byproduct of the
intentional production of useful knowledge to support foreign policy and
national security decision making . Such decision- making occurs within
a political or policy context, so the fact that the intelligence becomes
embedded in politics should not be a surprise. Instead, the existence of
this kind of politicization should be expected as part of the normal
policymaking process.’. However, the last definition ad 3) has an
immanent negative connotation due to its essence expressed in a phrase
‘intelligence to please’ which implies the distortion of the analysis
because of the failure to apply the standard of objectivity by omitting
certain findings, highlighting suitable parts of the collected
information, delaying the analysis and using related procedures in order
to accommodate political preferences.
Here I shall analyze the difference between the regular politicization,
described in the text, in which, within the concept of defense,
indicators are set in accordance with the political and social order for
the purpose of the analysis of potential dangers and the politicization
ad 3) in which the analyses are made as part of the planning of hostile
actions, according to indicators which politically change faster than
the overall political and social order and are subject to a wide range
of influences.
When talking about a standard form of analysis, Marrin claims that it is
the intent that makes analysis bad in the context of politicization,
thus arguing that good politicization cannot be distinguished from the
bad one only on the basis of a possibility of ideas and concepts
influencing the interpretation (Marrin 2013).
While discussing about intelligence failures Gill and Phythian
(2018:139) have no doubt that Betts’s concept of politicization
referring on political pressure with the impact on the intelligence
process ‘would benefit from greater definitional clarity’ so they are
adding to their discussion Treverton’s five different forms that
politicization may take. It goes from hard range to the soft one, from
the direct pressure to the shared mind set. And although they emphasize
the danger of the politicization that just seemingly transcends regime
type, they leave unanswered the question of appropriate distance and
independence of the intelligence in relation to the decision-making
politics.
In the context of questioning boundaries, is the shared mind set a
situational phenomenon related to one case or to a group of cases? Or
can it exist as a more permanent phenomenon and share certain
similarities with regular politicization? Is the shared mind set as a
situational phenomenon a more harmful form of politicization than the
shared mind set as a more permanent sameness of intelligence and
politics? We might ask the question of who intelligence works for if it
is not allowed to have the same permanent shared mind set as the one
policymakers have in the same system, making it possible to consider
scenarios in which it shares a mind set with some other policymakers in
some other systems. Theoretically, it sounds complex, but practically
speaking, it is an old phenomenon and not at all shocking. Another
question in a series of questions is whether radical depoliticization
leads to objectivity of intelligence or to hostile actions in which the
intelligence system transforms from the system that should recognize
factor M into factor M. This, again, puts us outside of categories of
positive and negative because I have already stated that in certain
calculations, factor M can also offer a positive solution in the context
of the impact on concerned society .
Irregular politicization
of the intelligence system as the result of the simulation
From the excerpt in the previous part, I can conclude that only factor M
is a source of the irregular politicization of the intelligence system,
because its influence makes scenario B the one that must be defended and
scenario C the one to be defended against unlike M’s decision on
defending scenario A. Therefore, promoting regular politicization when
it is suitable, and not promoting it/demonizing it when it is not,
sounds more irregular than regular.
Factor M
All sources of the irregular politicization here are marked as factor M and should should be verified in terms of strength, content, people, their risks, and benefits and should thus be evaluated so that they can be included in the planning of the activities of the system as a whole and especially of the intelligence system.
Few main characteristics of the factor M could be extracted from the simulations above:
1. it is outside of categories of positive and negative
a) in certain calculations, factor M can also offer a positive solution in the context of the impact on concerned society
b) social consensus would certainly be one of the few legitimate factors M for which it is assumed that they lead to a positive outcome for the society from its perspective, so the lack of detection can be seen as irregular politicization which makes it possible to consider its positive aspects in addition to the emphasized negative ones. At that point, it would be possible to talk about true levelling of natural social restructuring as producing and reproducing (Gurvitch 1965) and influence operations whereby holder/representative of factor M can also receive additional impulses that he did not take into account during planning
c) another question in a series of questions is whether radical depoliticization leads to objectivity of intelligence or to hostile actions in which the intelligence system transforms from the system that should recognize factor M into factor M.
2. there can be a holder of the factor M power and there can be a/the representative/s of the factor M power
a) On the other side of the targets of hostile actions towards concerned society is their author as the factor M
b) Factor M can be a foreign policy factor which includes large-scale geopolitical factors, a financial factor that may or may not have its roots imported with large-scale geopolitical factors, a consensus of a significant part of the social structure, an economic factor, a partial interest of a certain group with sufficient power to be a factor M and all of them may be related or even derived from each other.
3. promoting regular politicization when it is suitable and not promoting it/demonizing it when it is not
a) whatever shape it takes, it has the power to evaluate the situation that goes beyond the existing state of things which includes the social structure and political structure or their parts that are currently qualitatively or quantitatively relevant
When it comes to a previous situation analysis or subsequent one for the purposes of the learned lesson, it is certainly necessary to take into account the limitations of the intelligence system in the context of democratized societies in which making decisions about specific activities fortunately goes through control mechanisms and depends on the reached consensus. This is precisely why it is important to take into account point (scenario) A, as well as factor M, in which cases the intelligence system legitimately and legally performs its tasks according to the prescribed procedure maxims which are continuously renewed in order to adapt to the recurrent ‘new circumstances’ and ‘old problems’. The possibility of the existence of a positive aspect of irregular politicization shows that all elements should be taken into account in the analysis calculation, whether it is a subsequent analysis or a previous one, in order to reach useful results.