Epistemic relevance
Discussing the issue of risk of politicization, Omand (2020) rejects
Sherman Kent’s pure, academically rigorous model, valuing it as false
comfort while also considering it as an obstacle to achieving the full
functionality of intelligence, i.e. he considers it a reducing element.
At the same time, he does not dispute the human tendency that makes
intelligence users produce assessments that suit their worldviews and/or
political preferences. He clearly addresses the problem in order to
encapsulate the collision into a principle according to which analysts
should be trained in both understanding the users and explaining the
situation. ‘As a former chair of the JIC famously wrote: The best
arrangement is intelligence and policy in separate but adjoining rooms,
with communicating doors and thin partition walls, as in cheap hotels.’
(Omand 2020:44).
What is the relation between the shared mind set and the quote by the
former chair of the JIC? At what level would the latter concept be on
Treverton’s scale? Would he include it there? Or would he agree that it
is a minimum that one cannot do without?
If we take a moment to look at the fundamental that Floridi (2008:90)
analyzes in isolation from the subject matter, a claim such as ‘Agents
require a constant flow and a high level of processing of relevant
information in order to interact successfully among themselves and with
the environment in which they are embedded.’ can serve as a useful point
of interest.
The usefulness of the issue on both sides is reflected in the increased
ability to produce epistemic relevant information as seen in the simple
example given by Floridi in the chapter on the relevance of
misinformation. If a student’s answer to the question ‘Who fought in the
Battle of Thermopylae?’ is ‘Napoleon’, it is clear that they said
something incorrect, uninformative and irrelevant to someone who is
interested in the battle, but it could be relevant to someone who is
grading the student’s knowledge of history. Due to such examples,
Floridi considers it necessary to keep the domain and context in which
relevance is evaluated, as well as the level of abstraction at which
relevance is evaluated, clear and fixed during the analysis because
otherwise the outcome is a conceptual carnage.
According to Strawson’s Principle of Relevance (Floridi 2008:73) we
‘intend in general to give or add information about what is a matter of
standing or current interest or concern’. Floridi adds that this process
most often happens in the interaction of questions and answers, which
corresponds to the Borlund’s claim, as Floridi paraphrases, that
relevance is situational.
If we return to the questions that require answers from analysts (what,
where, when and who) and which are used to achieve situational
awareness, we can imagine answers similar to the student’s response
described above. They would certainly be poorly received by information
users/decision makers while the informative answers would at least be
accepted at a basic level. However, it is hard to dispute the fact that
it is them who ask the questions what, where, when and who and not the
analysts, so we should think about whether this can be seen as regular
politicization of the process/shared mind set/rooms in cheap hotels,
level up or down.
Betts claims (2007) that given the purpose of intelligence, which is to
serve politics, there is an agreement on the principle according to
which users/decision makers lead the process with their requests and
prioritization and this acts to strengthen the relevance and mitigate
futile or misdirected efforts. He, however, also mentions the problems
which occur in practice when applying the principle everyone generally
agrees with and the need for better integration of intelligence
requirements and concerns of decision makers, which further strengthens
the importance of the perspective that takes into account the
regularities that Floridi implements in his consideration of epistemic
relevance.
Betts further describes situations in which, due to lack of
communication, that is, ‘abdication’ of the decision maker, intelligence
formed ‘key intelligence questions (KIQs) to “identify topics of
particular interest to national policymakers” when Departmental
intelligence agencies set comparable mechanisms for determining
requirements.’(Betts 2007:72) and regardless of the fact that in the
circumstances of that time the attempt did not yield results, it is
possible that this could be a bright spot in the discussion of
politicization. It is to be expected, and entirely legitimate, to
express at least five reasons against such an approach, which goes
beyond the scope of this paper, but I can mention some that do not
require much thought – non-transparency of prioritization, excessive
secrecy in relation to the public interest, possibility of several forms
of corruption, reduced opportunities for public oversight, etc. Most
importantly, it is necessary to take into account the degree to which
phenomena depend on the human factor, which only in sufficient quantity
makes up the system from which we expect the correction of action
irregularities, regardless of the position of individual human factors
in a given moment. Therefore, the choice of personnel is often a crucial
intervention into the system’s irregularity, as opposed to the
organization and reorganization of quality control mechanisms, which are
also important, but only secondarily. However, it cannot be disputed
that this approach prevented politicization, at least initially, and
induced an attempt at professionalization.
Perhaps it is not the best analogy, but it is certainly worth mentioning
that economic entities, which are now largely international and
transnational, can certainly be influence holders and may even be factor
M. At least some of the cons mentioned above can be attributed to them,
but their existence does not cause significant concern in the context of
democracy and its values. It is true that the argument is that it is
about private capital which as such must enjoy certain fundamental
autonomy while it is really about that – about private capital which
generates profit for the owner. However, the instrumentalization of
functions, the scope of action and the interwovenness with other
structures are certainly outside of the realm of autonomy, but not even
those circumstances make them minimally equal to ‘suspicious and
probably bad guys in intelligence’.
Nevertheless, I consider these possibilities for the sake of the
argument and not because of the belief that they should or should not be
implemented. In a similar vein, it is necessary to emphasize that with
this last principle I am stepping away from epistemic relevance, unless
I transfer the relation to other entities and allow a version in which
the epistemic relevance of intelligence is determined between other
agents. We can imagine a situation (scenario) D in which the analyst is
the one who asks questions and the one who answers them (it may be the
same agent or different one or it may be the act of a certain group of
personnel in accordance with the agreed document, but in any case
located in the intelligence system) while all sources, human and
non-human, are treated as an agent with whom epistemic relevance is
determined in certain domains, context and at a certain level of
abstraction. In doing so, we then agree that the product probably will
not have epistemic relevance for the information user/decision maker who
will, nonetheless, without their own engagement, receive a concise,
informative intelligence that may or may not be followed.
If we look at this model in theory, it could seem that politicization is
comprised in the decision maker’s decision to act/not to act and that it
is limited to it; since the decision-making function lies in the
political structure, the model works. However, in theory, it is not
difficult to come up with a model that works, yet it is also not
difficult to refute it, which then, admittedly, makes it a legitimate
result of consideration.
Conclusion
This analysis of the issue touched
upon debatable points in the problem area, as well as areas in which it
is possible to search for answers or even new questions. Although it is
not yet possible to get exact answers, any new opening in a given
problem area can help in the consideration of the phenomenon as a whole
and of its parts and thus contribute to the processes.
From the current position of the intelligence system, any detection of
factor M may prove crucial. Restoration of ethical principles, such as
employees of the competent agency leaving their private political views
in the confines of their homes even after they cease to be active
officials or stopping the leakage of information that is less a
consequence of omissions and more frequently of political actions, are
just some elements (Gentry 2021) which could protect the system from
irregular politicization.
A number of other suggestions possibly useful in the continuous
correction of actions could certainly be discussed. That is to say, the
reproducibility of problems encountered by the intelligence system and
their modification in the environment are certainly reasons to
continuously question the actions toward the intelligence system and its
actions toward the rest of the system with which it was imported through
formal or informal connections. Last but not least, part of the
solution, inevitably lies in the society and its resilience while
developing critical thinking that can help it in becoming more
constructive audience/actors in the interactive scenarios.