\documentclass[10pt]{article}

\usepackage{fullpage}
\usepackage{setspace}
\usepackage{parskip}
\usepackage{titlesec}
\usepackage[section]{placeins}
\usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage{breakcites}
\usepackage{lineno}
\usepackage{hyphenat}





\PassOptionsToPackage{hyphens}{url}
\usepackage[colorlinks = true,
            linkcolor = blue,
            urlcolor  = blue,
            citecolor = blue,
            anchorcolor = blue]{hyperref}
\usepackage{etoolbox}
\makeatletter
\patchcmd\@combinedblfloats{\box\@outputbox}{\unvbox\@outputbox}{}{%
  \errmessage{\noexpand\@combinedblfloats could not be patched}%
}%
\makeatother


\usepackage{natbib}




\renewenvironment{abstract}
  {{\bfseries\noindent{\abstractname}\par\nobreak}\footnotesize}
  {\bigskip}

\titlespacing{\section}{0pt}{*3}{*1}
\titlespacing{\subsection}{0pt}{*2}{*0.5}
\titlespacing{\subsubsection}{0pt}{*1.5}{0pt}


\usepackage{authblk}


\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage[space]{grffile}
\usepackage{latexsym}
\usepackage{textcomp}
\usepackage{longtable}
\usepackage{tabulary}
\usepackage{booktabs,array,multirow}
\usepackage{amsfonts,amsmath,amssymb}
\providecommand\citet{\cite}
\providecommand\citep{\cite}
\providecommand\citealt{\cite}
% You can conditionalize code for latexml or normal latex using this.
\newif\iflatexml\latexmlfalse
\providecommand{\tightlist}{\setlength{\itemsep}{0pt}\setlength{\parskip}{0pt}}%

\AtBeginDocument{\DeclareGraphicsExtensions{.pdf,.PDF,.eps,.EPS,.png,.PNG,.tif,.TIF,.jpg,.JPG,.jpeg,.JPEG}}

\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
\usepackage[T2A]{fontenc}
\usepackage[polish,english]{babel}



\usepackage{float}








\begin{document}

\title{Society and possible~ transformative influence of the politicization of
the intelligence system~ ~ ~~}



\author[1]{Dora Gelo Čolić}%
\affil[1]{Affiliation not available}%


\vspace{-1em}



  
  \date{June 15, 2024}


\begingroup
\let\center\flushleft
\let\endcenter\endflushleft
\maketitle
\endgroup





\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{abstract}
The targets of hostile actions towards specific society may be:
knowledge, national identity, social and political structure, critical
infrastructure and defense and security sector, etc. and it is expected
that the range of targets will expand in the future and that the number
of possible targets is open and infinite, that is, it is
incomprehensibly broad. In this sense, the analysis will be limited to
only a few targets whose mutual relations will be simulated in the
context of content and scope. Their relation to the politicization of
the intelligence system will also be examined as well as politicization
itself through the available literature review Emphasis is given to the
potential scenarios resulting from the hostile action, as well as to the
possible moments when they could be prevented with the minimal damage to
the protected society. For the purpose of this paper, in order to
research potential models, decision-making system has been analysed and
distinction is made between regular and irregular politicization of the
process.%
\end{abstract}%



\sloppy


\emph{Keywords:} politicization, society resilience, political
structure, communication, transformative influence, decision-making
system~~

\section*{Introduction}

{\label{introduction}}

Although it is not yet possible to get exact answers, any new opening in
a given problem area can help in the consideration of the phenomenon as
a whole and of its parts and thus contribute to the processes. The
question is how to begin to analyze the subject under consideration. It
might be prudent to begin with the following question: what is the
politicization of the intelligence system? But one could also begin with
the question: what consequences it produces on the decision-making
system?

The targets of hostile actions are knowledge, national identity, social
and political structure, critical infrastructure and defense and
security sector, etc. and it is expected that the range of targets will
expand in the future and that the number of possible targets is open and
infinite, that is, it is incomprehensibly broad but still inseparable
from the concerned society. One could easily conclude that performers of
these actions could not survive without their audience/actors in
interactive scenarios they inititated.

This analysis will be limited to only a few targets whose mutual
relations will be simulated in the context of content and scope. Their
relation to the politicization of the intelligence system will also be
examined as well as politicization itself through the available
literature review.

Emphasis is given to the potential scenarios resulting from the hostile
action, as well as to the possible moments when they could be prevented
with the minimal damage to the protected society. For the purpose of
this paper, in order to research potential models, decision-making
system has been analysed and distinction is made between regular and
irregular politicization and the consequences they project on the
decision-making system.

This preliminary communication takes in account also information flow
and its relevance in possible models by discussing how epistemic
relevance could be the key factor in improving outcome of communication
and following that overall outcome in regards to concerned society.

\section*{National identity}

{\label{national-identity}}

Since it is a concept that is hard to define, there are numerous
descriptions of its content, the viewpoints from which it is observed
and ultimately the disciplines that deal with it. Given the context of
this analysis, I shall observe its functional dimension because that is
precisely the dominant target of the attacks by the influence
operations. National identity is a cohesive factor of the society in the
sense of collectivization of interests, branding of the nation and
consequently the state (Skoko 2009), which is closely related to the
achievement of political and economic goals. On the other hand, national
identity is associated with a sense of group belonging which is in
opposition to an individual `who does not belong' and in this sense, it
may seem as a weak link to the author of the influence operation, which
often corresponds to reality.

`The Croatian example illustrates that the (elite) ideology was adopted
if it was attractive to other groups, in the sense of national and
cultural identity, if it succeeded in imposing a responsibility that
could have equal constitutive power, if there were no alternative
ideologies, in the sense of it being constitutively crucial, if the
``imposed discourse'' was accepted as the only one because any other
would imply unwanted coercion, if the ideology was ``planted'' as if it
came from the people, which was accomplished here in the sense of the
``general, common thing'' and if the ruling discourse of the elite
possessed the media and ways to launch that discourse in the sense that
it had found the most appropriate modes of representation. In the case
of raising awareness of the Croatian subject, such ideology, with its
excellence, choice, quality, and persuasiveness, was ``made to order'',
so it could have had a strong effect.' (Milanja 2012:162)

\section*{Knowledge and social and/or political
structure}

{\label{knowledge-and-social-andor-political-structure}}

If an open knowledge corpus and a controlled knowledge corpus exist
(Tu\selectlanguage{polish}đ\selectlanguage{english}man 2008), it is expected that both corpora will be the target. The
open knowledge corpus is more available than the controlled knowledge
corpus when viewed from the perspective of availability. However, in the
context of operation planning, open knowledge could be significantly
harder to influence in a substantial sense because in its essence, it
has a high level of general acceptance and rootedness in a particular
group which also includes accustomedness to certain knowledge.

Similar to the concept of national identity, there are various
theoretical meanings of the concept social structure. The best way
(Afri\selectlanguage{polish}ć \selectlanguage{english}1987) to begin the explanation is to enumerate concepts that are
believed to be the opposite of a structure: chaos, amorphousness,
idiosyncratic human behavior without any regularity, etc. In contrast to
these concepts, typical characteristics of the social structure are
social order, social system, behavior pattern, organized unity,
relations organization, configuration of relations in which people
participate, relations between groups and individuals, weak balances of
multiple relation hierarchies, relation networks, interconnectedness of
different social structures. The social structure typologies differ
according to the characteristics of the elements and the nature of the
relation which connects the elements. The influence on the given
structure can be wide-ranging, barely visible or a strong, and often
more precise, blow. Given that over time a need to restructure society
arises, stemming naturally from the development process, influence is
carried out in a slow process that mimics the usual rearrangement in
order to maintain dynamics and follow trends. In other words, it mimics
the situation in which human beings produce and reproduce society
(Gurvitch 1965).~ That kind of long-term planning and anticipation seems
more acceptable and in line with today's times, so it is much easier to
justify or cover up.

Due to the nature of this knowledge, the attack on the controlled
knowledge corpus seems paradoxically easier to carry out with methods
that aren't publicly known but could be imagined as actions that require
subtlety and have a long duration with the overall process that is more
stable and predictable. As political structure indicates structural,
formal and institutional dimensions of politics, it could be platform
for its performance.

\section*{The question of criteria}

{\label{938744}}

Phythian and Gill (2018:129), while discussing the limits of
Intelligence respectively mentioned US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
who `captured a central and inescapable fact: in a highly complex world,
uncertainties and insecurities abound, and intelligence, however well
funded and organized, cannot be omniscient.' The authors furthermore
clearly differentiate between limits of intelligence, some of which are
related to the lack of information or cognitive constraints of the
personnel, while others are related to the process, including
difficulties in identifying goals, routine guidance caused by practical
or ideological reasons and directed towards known, common suspects,
bureaucratic reasons, and difficulties in sharing information due to the
concept of secrecy. However, they still find that numerous cases of
failure are due to analytics, which includes the influence of
ideological frameworks. In the context of this paper, it is interesting
to analyze the difference between the concept of an ideological
framework and the concept in which the intelligence system is
responsible for the political and social system and which is in this
paper thus referred to as regular politicization. Does the specific
difference lie in the reasons for action or in terminology? Or is the
key in terminology and certain words leave a better impression, so the
word `ideology' is worse than the word `values'?

The fact is that the answer in this section is not unambiguous, and it
is especially not simple. It seems we do not know where to start, so we
do not touch upon problems such as difficult conditions for gathering
useful information, misinformation, the speed of information change,
etc. According to many sources, gathering information is no longer a
problem in today's world. As per some estimates (Omand 2020) open
sources contain a high percentage of required information, indicating an
increased need to improve the decision-making process, mainly the
analysis process. However, regardless of the percentage ratio of
required information in open sources and the need for gathering
information in other ways, capacities should not be reduced just because
everything seems more accessible. That is, accessibility is precisely
what can present an obstacle to good work in terms of assessing the
relevance, purposefulness, and usefulness of information (Weissmann and
Nilsson 2024). But if we are not sure what we are looking for and why,
the capacities we are developing are very unlikely to fulfill their
function.

\section*{Simulation of the relation between national identity and social
structure generally and in the context of
knowledge}

{\label{952388}}

It is not seemingly clear how to approach a situation in which the
social structure or its parts begin to question the element of national
identity, especially in the circumstances of today's trends.
Furthermore, when discussing attacks or influence operations, it is
necessary to analyze whether the factors with a negative opinion on
national identity as a necessity for the development of the society are
actors of the influence operation and what exactly is necessary for an
action to be considered an influence operation. In a democratic
framework, society carries the opportunities for conversation and
exchange of opinions, lack of judgement for holding different opinions,
coexistence of opposing opinions and actions; however, discussions about
premises of communication and a necessity for setting boundaries are
becoming more prominent. It is difficult to determine what these
boundaries would be apart from the existing legal framework with an
emphasis on the criminal law and the increasing use of criminal law
mechanisms in the context of media freedoms, defamation of character,
etc., but this will not be discussed in this analysis.

The purpose of this preliminary communication is to reach different
insights into the relationship between system politicization and
influence operations in relation to its consitutent part and that is
concerned society.

If we return to the negative opinion on national identity as a
constitutive element of cohesion necessary for the development of
society and to those who hold that opinion we can find question
ejecting: To what extent is it possible to discuss this topic in a
democratic society and how does this conversation have to be held in
order not to pose a security threat?

Perhaps just thinking about redefining the concept would not necessarily
lead to bigger breaches in the cohesive fabric of society if it were not
followed by a complete negation of one or more content elements of the
concept. Therefore, we distinguish different levels and think about the
line of detection after which we should start observing the phenomenon:

\begin{enumerate}
\tightlist
\item
  organization into specific groups, associations etc. which act by
  creating knowledge in and outside of the state,
\item
  when the created knowledge with its content significantly changes
  ingrained (established) narratives in the society,
\item
  when connections with other groups start, which in turn raise the
  level of action,
\item
  when the created knowledge enters the political sphere of action by
  reaching a certain level and context of the connection.
\end{enumerate}

We could perhaps conclude for the purposes of this analysis that ad 4)
represents belatedness because it is the moment in which observation or
acting in defense could be defined as antidemocratic.

Going back to A), if we locate detection, observation,
prevention/defense in the institution which is the competent
intelligence agency, it is interesting to note the possibility of
politicization existing in actions. It is seemingly not difficult to
determine on what the forming and setting up of detection indicators
depends, and equally so for decisions on observation, prevention or
active defense, but in regard to potential results it is beneficial to
try to observe the problem with an appropriate complexity. This imposes
the indisputability of the system politicization in the context of
setting up national goals, protected values, etc., making this a
contentious area in which we can locate answers. The concept of
politicization is not even the best term for this, especially in the
context in which it has been used in recent years, since we are dealing
with a regular relation in which the system protects the constitutional
order of the state and is therefore subject to the set goals of
political structure which are contained in the Constitution, laws and
other regulations and are in that sense institutionalized. The question
posed here is whether it is at all possible to have a system that would
not be `politicized' in such a regular way. For the purposes of this
paper, I can call this type of politicization regular.

Furthermore, if we take into account the relation between national goals
and protected values while approaching protected values not only in the
normative sense but also in the sense of an open knowledge corpus
outside of the normative part, and specifically as a part of knowledge
that is generally considered correct in the society, we can envision the
following imaginary scenario.

Let us return to A) and, in order to escape regular politicization, skip
all actions, from 1 to 3. If 4 happens, the group wins the democratic
elections and becomes a political structure which, after creating
knowledge bottom up, is in a position to standardize knowledge;
moreover, to turn it into knowledge that must be protected. In this way,
social structure can be restructured top down. Let's call it scenario B.

After the imaginary scenario B comes scenario C in which identical
actions occur, but there is factor M, not escaping regular
politicization, due to which scenario C is called `hostile action' and
thus is characterized as a negative phenomenon against which the system
must fight. In other words, it must detect, observe, prevent, and
ultimately actively defend a restructured society that now embraces a
completely different body of knowledge while much of the knowledge that
existed before scenario B is deemed inappropriate, dangerous to the
safety and health of the society and brought to a point where negativity
of that knowledge can even be standardized.

Beyond evaluating the positive and negative, the scenario is questioned
in the context of influence operations and attitudes toward them. Is it
legitimate, is it a consequence of negligence or intentional omission,
will it be considered by the competent institution, is it a consequence
of a circular or gradual irregular system politicization? Can we talk
about the concept of an ideological framework when it comes to hostile
action in scenario C, but adopt the concept of regular politicization
aimed at the preservation of scenario B when it comes to defense caused
by a hostile action C?

\section*{On the other hand..}

{\label{147379}}

On the other side of the targets of hostile actions is their author as
factor M. I will divide actions into two general categories -- attack
and defense, which does not exclude the possibility of a different
categorization. It is clear that the concepts of attack and defense can
intersect and that their manifestations can be ambiguous. Some hostile
actions can essentially be seen as defense in terms of a preventive
attack, deterrence, and similar concepts. In a broader sense of the
term, we can also talk about gaining someone's trust, achieving a goal
that could not be achieved otherwise, etc. Therefore, for the purpose of
identifying the true nature of actions, it is useful to consider all
sides of politicization as well as its layers and shapes.

Here, I am talking about the politicization of the intelligence system
using the meaning and content of the term in a way it was used and
analyzed by other authors. It may overlap with one of the two concepts
defined for the purpose of this paper, regular and irregular
politicization, with both of them or with neither of them.

Stephen Marrin cites Harry Howe Ransom, according to whom politicization
(Marrin, 2013:33) `has multiple meanings' and identified three different
kinds: 1. `partisan politicization when an agency or an issue has become
a point of contention between organized political groupings, normally
political parties'; 2. `popularization, or publicity, which generates
public debate over ends and means (frequently leading to) bipartisan
politicization'; and 3. `when intelligence are influenced by imbedded
policy positions. When preferred policies dominate decision making,
overt or subtle pressured are applied on intelligence systems, resulting
in self-fulfilling intelligence prophecies or ``intelligence to please''
that distorts reality.' He concludes that politicization, according to
Ransom's definition ad 1) and ad 2), does not necessarily lead to worse
outcomes and that he is attempting to discover the causes of the process
despite the negative connotations of the term. This line of thinking
enables a deeper understanding of the decision-making process on both
the intelligence level and the political level as well as the way in
which they are interwoven. In terms of study, such a value-neutral
concept of politicization paves the way for finding subtle boundaries in
understanding the elements of the process as it is devoid of negative
connotations and becomes a legitimate subject of research, which is
brave and borderline, but most importantly, it is promisingly connected
to the reality because, as Marrin says (2013:33): `That intelligence
becomes intertwined with politics is inevitable byproduct of the
intentional production of useful knowledge to support foreign policy and
national security decision making . Such decision- making occurs within
a political or policy context, so the fact that the intelligence becomes
embedded in politics should not be a surprise. Instead, the existence of
this kind of politicization should be expected as part of the normal
policymaking process.'. However, the last definition ad 3) has an
immanent negative connotation due to its essence expressed in a phrase
`intelligence to please' which implies the distortion of the analysis
because of the failure to apply the standard of objectivity by omitting
certain findings, highlighting suitable parts of the collected
information, delaying the analysis and using related procedures in order
to accommodate political preferences.

Here I shall analyze the difference between the regular politicization,
described in the text, in which, within the concept of defense,
indicators are set in accordance with the political and social order for
the purpose of the analysis of potential dangers and the politicization
ad 3) in which the analyses are made as part of the planning of hostile
actions, according to indicators which politically change faster than
the overall political and social order and are subject to a wide range
of influences.

When talking about a standard form of analysis, Marrin claims that it is
the intent that makes analysis bad in the context of politicization,
thus arguing that good politicization cannot be distinguished from the
bad one only on the basis of a possibility of ideas and concepts
influencing the interpretation (Marrin 2013).

While discussing about intelligence failures Gill and Phythian
(2018:139) have no doubt that Betts's concept of politicization
referring on political pressure with the impact on the intelligence
process `would benefit from greater definitional clarity' so they are
adding to their discussion Treverton's five different forms that
politicization may take. It goes from hard range to the soft one, from
the direct pressure to the shared mind set. And although they emphasize
the danger of the politicization that just seemingly transcends regime
type, they leave unanswered the question of appropriate distance and
independence of the intelligence in relation to the decision-making
politics.

In the context of questioning boundaries, is the shared mind set a
situational phenomenon related to one case or to a group of cases? Or
can it exist as a more permanent phenomenon and share certain
similarities with regular politicization? Is the shared mind set as a
situational phenomenon a more harmful form of politicization than the
shared mind set as a more permanent sameness of intelligence and
politics? We might ask the question of who intelligence works for if it
is not allowed to have the same permanent shared mind set as the one
policymakers have in the same system, making it possible to consider
scenarios in which it shares a mind set with some other policymakers in
some other systems. Theoretically, it sounds complex, but practically
speaking, it is an old phenomenon and not at all shocking. Another
question in a series of questions is whether radical depoliticization
leads to objectivity of intelligence or to hostile actions in which the
intelligence system transforms from the system that should recognize
factor M into factor M. This, again, puts us outside of categories of
positive and negative because I have already stated that in certain
calculations, factor M can also offer a positive solution in the context
of the impact on concerned society .

\section*{Irregular politicization of the intelligence system as the
result of the
simulation}

{\label{874924}}

From the excerpt in the previous part, I can conclude that only factor M
is a source of the irregular politicization of the intelligence system,
because its influence makes scenario B the one that must be defended and
scenario C the one to be defended against unlike M's decision on
defending scenario A. Therefore, promoting regular politicization when
it is suitable, and not promoting it/demonizing it when it is not,
sounds more irregular than regular.

\section*{Factor M}

{\label{789201}}

All sources of the irregular politicization here are marked as factor M
and should should be verified in terms of strength, content, people,
their risks, and benefits and should thus be evaluated so that they can
be included in the planning of the activities of the system as a whole
and especially of the intelligence system.

Few main characteristics of the factor M could be extracted from the
simulations above:

1.~~~~~ it is outside of categories of positive and negative

a)~~~~~ in certain calculations, factor M can also offer a positive
solution in the context of the impact on concerned society

b)~~~~~ social consensus would certainly be one of the few legitimate
factors M for which it is assumed that they lead to a positive outcome
for the society from its perspective, so the lack of detection can be
seen as irregular politicization which makes it possible to consider its
positive aspects in addition to the emphasized negative ones. At that
point, it would be possible to talk about true levelling of natural
social restructuring as producing and reproducing (Gurvitch 1965) and
influence operations whereby holder/representative of factor M can also
receive additional impulses that he did not take into account during
planning

c)~~~~~ another question in a series of questions is whether radical
depoliticization leads to objectivity of intelligence or to hostile
actions in which the intelligence system transforms from the system that
should recognize factor M into factor M.

2.~~~~~ there can be a holder of the factor M power and there can be
a/the representative/s of the factor M power

a)~~~~~ On the other side of the targets of hostile actions towards
concerned society is their author as the factor M

b)~~~~~ Factor M can be a foreign policy factor which includes
large-scale geopolitical factors, a financial factor that may or may not
have its roots imported with large-scale geopolitical factors, a
consensus of a significant part of the social structure, an economic
factor, a partial interest of a certain group with sufficient power to
be a factor M and all of them may be related or even derived from each
other.

3.~~~~~ promoting regular politicization when it is suitable and not
promoting it/demonizing it when it is not

a)~~~ whatever shape it takes, it has the power to evaluate the
situation that goes beyond the existing state of things which includes
the social structure and political structure or their parts that are
currently qualitatively or quantitatively relevant

When it comes to a previous situation analysis or subsequent one for the
purposes of the learned lesson, it is certainly necessary to take into
account the limitations of the intelligence system in the context of
democratized societies in which making decisions about specific
activities fortunately goes through control mechanisms and depends on
the reached consensus. This is precisely why it is important to take
into account point (scenario) A, as well as factor M, in which cases the
intelligence system legitimately and legally performs its tasks
according to the prescribed procedure maxims which are continuously
renewed in order to adapt to the recurrent `new circumstances' and `old
problems'. The possibility of the existence of a positive aspect of
irregular politicization shows that all elements should be taken into
account in the analysis calculation, whether it is a subsequent analysis
or a previous one, in order to reach useful results.

\section*{Epistemic relevance}

{\label{380803}}

Discussing the issue of risk of politicization, Omand (2020) rejects
Sherman Kent's pure, academically rigorous model, valuing it as false
comfort while also considering it as an obstacle to achieving the full
functionality of intelligence, i.e. he considers it a reducing element.
At the same time, he does not dispute the human tendency that makes
intelligence users produce assessments that suit their worldviews and/or
political preferences. He clearly addresses the problem in order to
encapsulate the collision into a principle according to which analysts
should be trained in both understanding the users and explaining the
situation. `As a former chair of the JIC famously wrote: The best
arrangement is intelligence and policy in separate but adjoining rooms,
with communicating doors and thin partition walls, as in cheap hotels.'
(Omand 2020:44).

What is the relation between the shared mind set and the quote by the
former chair of the JIC? At what level would the latter concept be on
Treverton's scale? Would he include it there? Or would he agree that it
is a minimum that one cannot do without?

If we take a moment to look at the fundamental that Floridi (2008:90)
analyzes in isolation from the subject matter, a claim such as `Agents
require a constant flow and a high level of processing of relevant
information in order to interact successfully among themselves and with
the environment in which they are embedded.' can serve as a useful point
of interest.

The usefulness of the issue on both sides is reflected in the increased
ability to produce epistemic relevant information as seen in the simple
example given by Floridi in the chapter on the relevance of
misinformation. If a student's answer to the question `Who fought in the
Battle of Thermopylae?' is `Napoleon', it is clear that they said
something incorrect, uninformative and irrelevant to someone who is
interested in the battle, but it could be relevant to someone who is
grading the student's knowledge of history. Due to such examples,
Floridi considers it necessary to keep the domain and context in which
relevance is evaluated, as well as the level of abstraction at which
relevance is evaluated, clear and fixed during the analysis because
otherwise the outcome is a conceptual carnage.

According to Strawson's Principle of Relevance (Floridi 2008:73) we
`intend in general to give or add information about what is a matter of
standing or current interest or concern'. Floridi adds that this process
most often happens in the interaction of questions and answers, which
corresponds to the Borlund's claim, as Floridi paraphrases, that
relevance is situational.

If we return to the questions that require answers from analysts (what,
where, when and who) and which are used to achieve situational
awareness, we can imagine answers similar to the student's response
described above. They would certainly be poorly received by information
users/decision makers while the informative answers would at least be
accepted at a basic level. However, it is hard to dispute the fact that
it is them who ask the questions what, where, when and who and not the
analysts, so we should think about whether this can be seen as regular
politicization of the process/shared mind set/rooms in cheap hotels,
level up or down.

Betts claims (2007) that given the purpose of intelligence, which is to
serve politics, there is an agreement on the principle according to
which users/decision makers lead the process with their requests and
prioritization and this acts to strengthen the relevance and mitigate
futile or misdirected efforts. He, however, also mentions the problems
which occur in practice when applying the principle everyone generally
agrees with and the need for better integration of intelligence
requirements and concerns of decision makers, which further strengthens
the importance of the perspective that takes into account the
regularities that Floridi implements in his consideration of epistemic
relevance.

Betts further describes situations in which, due to lack of
communication, that is, `abdication' of the decision maker, intelligence
formed `key intelligence questions (KIQs) to ``identify topics of
particular interest to national policymakers'' when Departmental
intelligence agencies set comparable mechanisms for determining
requirements.'(Betts 2007:72) and regardless of the fact that in the
circumstances of that time the attempt did not yield results, it is
possible that this could be a bright spot in the discussion of
politicization. It is to be expected, and entirely legitimate, to
express at least five reasons against such an approach, which goes
beyond the scope of this paper, but I can mention some that do not
require much thought -- non-transparency of prioritization, excessive
secrecy in relation to the public interest, possibility of several forms
of corruption, reduced opportunities for public oversight, etc. Most
importantly, it is necessary to take into account the degree to which
phenomena depend on the human factor, which only in sufficient quantity
makes up the system from which we expect the correction of action
irregularities, regardless of the position of individual human factors
in a given moment. Therefore, the choice of personnel is often a crucial
intervention into the system's irregularity, as opposed to the
organization and reorganization of quality control mechanisms, which are
also important, but only secondarily. However, it cannot be disputed
that this approach prevented politicization, at least initially, and
induced an attempt at professionalization.

Perhaps it is not the best analogy, but it is certainly worth mentioning
that economic entities, which are now largely international and
transnational, can certainly be influence holders and may even be factor
M. At least some of the cons mentioned above can be attributed to them,
but their existence does not cause significant concern in the context of
democracy and its values. It is true that the argument is that it is
about private capital which as such must enjoy certain fundamental
autonomy while it is really about that -- about private capital which
generates profit for the owner. However, the instrumentalization of
functions, the scope of action and the interwovenness with other
structures are certainly outside of the realm of autonomy, but not even
those circumstances make them minimally equal to `suspicious and
probably bad guys in intelligence'.

Nevertheless, I consider these possibilities for the sake of the
argument and not because of the belief that they should or should not be
implemented. In a similar vein, it is necessary to emphasize that with
this last principle I am stepping away from epistemic relevance, unless
I transfer the relation to other entities and allow a version in which
the epistemic relevance of intelligence is determined between other
agents. We can imagine a situation (scenario) D in which the analyst is
the one who asks questions and the one who answers them (it may be the
same agent or different one or it may be the act of a certain group of
personnel in accordance with the agreed document, but in any case
located in the intelligence system) while all sources, human and
non-human, are treated as an agent with whom epistemic relevance is
determined in certain domains, context and at a certain level of
abstraction. In doing so, we then agree that the product probably will
not have epistemic relevance for the information user/decision maker who
will, nonetheless, without their own engagement, receive a concise,
informative intelligence that may or may not be followed.

If we look at this model in theory, it could seem that politicization is
comprised in the decision maker's decision to act/not to act and that it
is limited to it; since the decision-making function lies in the
political structure, the model works. However, in theory, it is not
difficult to come up with a model that works, yet it is also not
difficult to refute it, which then, admittedly, makes it a legitimate
result of consideration.

\section*{Conclusion}

{\label{296439}}

This analysis of the issue touched upon debatable points in the problem
area, as well as areas in which it is possible to search for answers or
even new questions. Although it is not yet possible to get exact
answers, any new opening in a given problem area can help in the
consideration of the phenomenon as a whole and of its parts and thus
contribute to the processes.

From the current position of the intelligence system, any detection of
factor M may prove crucial. Restoration of ethical principles, such as
employees of the competent agency leaving their private political views
in the confines of their homes even after they cease to be active
officials or stopping the leakage of information that is less a
consequence of omissions and more frequently of political actions, are
just some elements (Gentry 2021) which could protect the system from
irregular politicization.

A number of other suggestions possibly useful in the continuous
correction of actions could certainly be discussed. That is to say, the
reproducibility of problems encountered by the intelligence system and
their modification in the environment are certainly reasons to
continuously question the actions toward the intelligence system and its
actions toward the rest of the system with which it was imported through
formal or informal connections. Last but not least, part of the
solution, inevitably lies in the society and its resilience while
developing critical thinking that can help it in becoming more
constructive audience/actors in the interactive scenarios.

\section*{Reference list}

{\label{reference-list}}

\begin{enumerate}
\tightlist
\item
  Afri\selectlanguage{polish}ć, \selectlanguage{english}Vjekoslav.1987. ``Koncept dru\selectlanguage{polish}š\selectlanguage{english}tvene strukture i strukturalna
  analiza u sociologiji'' ``(Concept of the Social Structure and
  Structural Analysis in the Sociology).'' \emph{Revija za
  sociologiju}17(1-2):49-62. Retrieved from
  https://hrcak.srce.hr/155735.
\item
  Betts, Richard Kevin. 2007. \emph{Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge
  and Power in American National Security} . New York: Columbia
  University Press.
\item
  Floridi, Luciano. 2008. ``Understanding Epistemic Relevance.''
  Erkenntnis (1975-) 69(1) :69-92.
\item
  Gentry, John A. 2021.``Trump-Era Politicisation: A Code of Civil-
  Intelligence Behavior is needed.'' \emph{International Journal of
  Intelligence and CounterIntelligence} 34(4):757-786.
\item
  Gill, Peter and Mark Phythian. 2018. \emph{Intelligence in an Insecure
  World} . Cambridge, UK; Medford, MA: Polity Press.
\item
  Gurvitch, Georges. 1965. \emph{Suvremeni poziv sociologije.} Sarajevo:
  Veselin Masle\selectlanguage{polish}š\selectlanguage{english}a (``La vocation actuelle de la Sociologie/Contemporary
  vocation of the Sociology).
\item
  Giannopoulos, Georgios and Hanna Smith and Marianthi Theocharidou.
  2021. The Landscape of Hybrid Threats, A conceptual model, EUR 30585
  EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, ISBN
  978-92-76-29819-9, doi:10.2760/44985, JRC123305.
\item
  Marrin, Stephen. 2013. ``Rethinking Analytic
  Politicisation.''\emph{Intelligence and National Security}
  28(1):32-54.
\item
  Milanja, Cvjetko. 2012. \selectlanguage{polish}\emph{Konstrukcije kulture: Modeli kulturne
  modernizacije u Hrvatskoj 19. stoljeća (Culture construction: Models
  for cultural modernisation in Croatia of the 19th century)}\selectlanguage{english} . Zagreb:
  Institut dru\selectlanguage{polish}š\selectlanguage{english}tvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar.
\item
  Omand, David. 2020. ``Reflections in Intelligence Analysts and
  Policymakers.'' \emph{International Journal of Intelligence and
  CounterIntelligence} 33(3):471-482.
\item
  Skoko, Bo\selectlanguage{polish}ž\selectlanguage{english}o. 2009. \selectlanguage{polish}\emph{Država kao brend: upravljanje nacionalnim
  identitetom (A State as a brand: Managing national identity.}\selectlanguage{english} Zagreb:
  Matica hrvatska.
\item
  Tu\selectlanguage{polish}đ\selectlanguage{english}man, Miroslav. 2002. \selectlanguage{polish}\emph{Informacijsko ratište i informacijska
  znanost (Information battlefield and information sciences).}\selectlanguage{english} Zagreb:
  Hrvatska sveu\selectlanguage{polish}č\selectlanguage{english}ili\selectlanguage{polish}š\selectlanguage{english}na naklada.
\item
  Threatcasting Workshop hosted at Arizona State University (2019)
  Information warfare and the future of conflict, Technical Report by
  Brian David Johnson, Alida Draudt, Jason C. Brown, Lieutenant Colonel
  Robert J. Ross, Ph.D.
\item
  Weissmann, Mikael and Niklas Nilsson. 2024. ``Current Intelligence and
  Assessments: Information Flows and the Tension between Quality and
  Speed. ''International Journal of Intelligence and
  CounterIntelligence. Retrieved from
  https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2023.2296886 14
  March 2024.
\end{enumerate}

\selectlanguage{english}
\FloatBarrier
\end{document}

