

Jihadism without borders

The rise of foreign fighters, affiliated terrorists and lone wolves outside civil wars

Corresponding author: Clara Egger, IRIO department, Faculty of Arts, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Oude Kijk in't Jatstraat 269712 EK Groningen, The Netherlands, c.m.egger@rug.nl, +31 50 36 32445

Raul Magni-Berton, Univ. Grenoble Alpes. Sciences Po Grenoble, PACTE, BP 48, 38040 Grenoble, France, raul.magniberton@iepg.fr

Simon Varaine, Univ. Grenoble Alpes. Sciences Po Grenoble, PACTE, BP 48, 38040 Grenoble, France, simon.varaine@iepg.fr

Abstract (142 words)

The globalization of jihad has taken various patterns ranging from the lone involvement in deadly attacks at home, violence as an affiliated terrorist or joining a foreign insurgency. Yet, the likelihood of violent engagement and the patterns it takes considerably vary across countries. This article aims to explain such cross-national variation. We emphasize how the level of perpetrator's agency over two decisions - mobilization and target selection – is reflected in socio-economic conditions and foreign military interventionism that differ across countries. Consistently with our hypotheses, our analysis – focusing on global jihadism in support of ISIS (2014-2016) - shows that differences in the socio-economic conditions of Sunni Muslims explain the variation in jihadist mobilization, while varying levels of anti-ISIS foreign military interventionism explains variation in the selection of lone and affiliated terrorists targets. We further generalize these findings for non-ISIS jihadist domestic attacks (1992-2006).

Keywords : jihadism, foreign fighting, ISIS, terrorism, domestic terrorism, military intervention

Word count: 10488

Introduction

Since 2001, jihadism¹ has been consequential in shaping patterns of political violence globally (Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze 2014; La Free and Dugan 2017). The globalization of jihad has accompanied a trend of civil wars internationalization (Von Einsiedel, Bosetti, Cockayne et al 2017) in the Muslim world, increasingly leading third parties – be they government or individuals – to take up arms to support or oppose jihadist belligerents. Since the end of the Cold War, individual engagement in jihadism has taken three main patterns. A first pattern sees noncitizens of conflict states becoming foreign fighters who join a jihadist insurgency during a civil war (Malet 2013: 9). The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the particularly successful jihadist groups when it comes to recruiting foreign fighters. Recent estimates state that the organization is recruiting combatants in at least 85 different countries, most of them belonging to the Middle-East but also from countries as diverse as Russia, France, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand or Indonesia (Benmelech and Klor 2018). A second pattern leads individuals to become affiliates of a transnational terrorist organization which operates in one country (either engaging in training activities or in a civil war) and selects individuals to fight outside – and sometimes far from - their base of operations (Bapat 2006: 222). Third, a growing range of lone wolves has perpetrated deadly attacks outside the civil war battlefield without receiving any logistical support from a terrorist organization they claim to support (Hamm and Spaaij 2017). Beside recruiting fighters in support of its territorial claims – the reconstitution of the Caliphate - ISIS has also considerably exported its struggle. Since the start of the Iraqi civil war in 2014, at least thirty-five countries were targeted by terrorist attacks, either by ISIS affiliated terrorists or lone wolves (Miller et al. 2016), leading the group to be one the most active and deadliest (START 2019).

¹ Jihadism is a contested concept. We use this term in its narrow sense stating that “armed confrontation with political rivals is a theologically legitimate and instrumentally efficient method for socio-political change” (for a discussion see Sedgwick 2015: 36).

The fact that countries are unequally affected by patterns of globalization of jihad suggests that diverse logics are at stake. In the case of violence in support of ISIS, some countries - such as, for example, France - are repeatedly targeted while attacks are rarer in other countries (such as Italy). In some instances, perpetrators share the same nationality than their victims and act in their own country (Orson 2017). In others, they come from a foreign country and target nationals in another country. Foreign fighters flows also vary. Tunisia – the first provider of ISIS foreign fighters - has hosted some 6000 fighters since 2014 while Morocco, a close country with a population three times bigger than Tunisia, only hosted 1200 (Benmelech and Klor 2018: 5). Some countries experience all three patterns of violence (affiliated terrorists, foreign fighters and lone wolves) while others are affected by a single pattern.

The multifaceted globalization of jihad raises two unanswered questions. How can cross-national diversity in patterns of violence be explained? Does each pattern of violence follow a distinct logic or is there a link between them? While growing evidence has been collected about the causes of each pattern (see for example McCauley 2019, Nesser 2019, Orson 2017), two distinct logics have been identified. The first stresses international strategic factors where the globalization of jihad is fueled by the opposition to targeted states' foreign policy (Savun and Philipps 2009, Choi and Piazza 2017). The second emphasizes the role of minority grievances leading politically excluded or repressed groups to violently oppose (national) governments Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen 2006, Ghatak, Gold and Prins 2019). We argue that the comparative analysis of diverse patterns of globalization of jihad allows distinguishing the conditions under which one logic takes precedence over the other and instances where both have a combined influence.

Following Hegghammer (2013), our theoretical argument assumes that individuals rationally opt for either terrorism or foreign fighting. Yet, each pattern of violence is characterized by different levels of perpetrator's agency regarding two decisions : mobilization and target

selection. The more predominant the individual agency, the better the action is explained by the perpetrator's individual grievances. Joining a foreign insurgency is a typical example of this pattern. In contrast, strategic factors become predominant when individuals delegate their agency over target selection to a terrorist organization. Affiliated terrorism is the most typical example. The case of lone wolves attacks is more ambiguous, because they do not delegate their agency, but they align with the perceived strategy of the organization they support. We demonstrate that strategic factors robustly predict lone wolves attacks, even though individual grievances are also associated with them.

Our empirical demonstration relies on a comparative analysis focusing at the macro (country) level. We argue that variation in the drivers of decisions taken at the micro (individual) level is reflected in cross-national variation in macro indicators related to the intensity of grievances (visible in domestic socio-economic contexts) and diverse foreign policy approaches (level of military interventionism). Based on this strategy, we develop two empirical studies. We first statistically analyze the causes of various patterns of globalization of jihad (affiliated terrorists, foreign fighters and lone wolves) in support to ISIS during the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars (from December 2014 to December 2016). Second, we assess the broader implications of this result, following a two-staged approach focusing on ISIS-affiliated terrorists but also on all instances of domestic jihadist terrorism in the period 1992-2006. Our results show that even when attacks are perpetrated by national citizens in their home country, the target is selected based on foreign policy considerations.

Our paper contributes to better conceptualizing the causes of political violence by distinguishing patterns of violence that are explained by the grievances of the perpetrator, by the international strategy of the organization she supports or by a mix of both. Bringing clarity to such debates has strong implications for counter-terrorist strategies (LaFree, Dugan, and Miller 2014). Existing policies focusing on altering the conditions in which potential terrorists

live through economic, educational and anti-discriminatory measures only have an impact if violence is due to such causes. They are however ineffective when it comes to terrorism due to international causes which would be better addressed through a change in the foreign policy of the target state (McCauley 2019).

The paper is organized as follows. We first present our theoretical argument regarding the causes of different patterns of globalization of jihad in section 1. Section 2 and 3 are dedicated to our two empirical case studies. In the concluding section, we discuss the implications of our results regarding current conceptualizations of terrorism.

Theoretical Framework: Explaining Jihadism Beyond Borders

This section starts with developing a conceptual framework of the individual drivers leading jihadists to engage in diverse patterns of violence. We then explain how such drivers can be translated into macro-level indicators to building testable hypotheses, drawing from existing literature on the causes of jihadism.

Mobilizations and Target Selection: Conceptualizing Individual Agency in the Globalization of Jihad

Violence is sometimes adopted by unaffiliated perpetrators, either a single-actor (Spaaij 2011, Becker 2014) or a “bunch of guys” (Sageman 2004), and sometimes perpetrated on behalf of an organization (Hoffman 2008, in the case of ISIS see Orson 2017; Miller et al. 2016). This distinction is crucial: in the first case - *lone wolves* attacks - , the characteristics of the perpetrators are relevant to identify the selected pattern of violence while in the second case, *affiliated terrorists*, the strategy of the organization overcomes individual choices. To further analyze the implications of this distinction, we conceptualize a specific pattern of violence as resulting from a two-staged process. Stage 1 deals with the *mobilization* of an individual into jihadism whereas stage 2 deals with *target selection* for a specific attack. We argue that

combining these two dimensions – the level of individual agency in the decision and the stage of the process (mobilization vs. target selection) shape the choice for various patterns of jihadism

Leaving aside cases where individuals are constrained by an organization to engage in violence against their will, we argue that the outcome of the first stage (mobilization) is an individual decision shaped by the perpetrator's personal experience in her country of origin. This follows existing scholarship on jihadism pointing material deprivation and political grievances as initial causes of individual mobilization (Murshed and Pavan 2011, King and Taylor 2011, Doosje, Loseman and van den Bos 2013). Once an individual has opted for violence, she can decide to achieve the second stage (target selection) without relating to an organization aligned with her goals. In this case, violence always is the result of the perpetrator's agency: it is shaped by individual mobilization causes and by the perpetrator's own target selection strategy.

The situation changes when an individual decides to develop ties with a transnational organization – in our case, ISIS – after mobilizing in violence. Three types of ties can be distinguished. First, an individual may *join the transnational organization* and renounce to her agency over the target selection stage. A typical case is foreign fighting. Individuals take up arms because of the individual life experiences and join a transnational organization, which will then select the target of attacks for them. In this case, the initial decision to engage in foreign fighting is only explained by mobilization causes, as, when leaving her country, the individual is not implementing any specific strategy.

Second, in *lone wolf attack*, an individual set up an action based on an organization's perceived strategy but without joining it. The individual maintains agency over decision-making in the two stages of the process but uses a foreign organization's strategy as a source

of inspiration in the target selection stage². In the case of ISIS, this pertains to unaffiliated individuals claiming their attack in support of the organization. Although the attack fits the strategy of the organization, the latter did not play a role in its logistical planning. The number of lone wolves attacks is hence explained both by individual mobilization causes and on by the strategy of the terrorist organization.

Third, *affiliated terrorist attack* gives no influence to mobilization causes. It consists in instances where a transnational organization sets up an attack and selects the right perpetrator within its ranks based on strategic considerations such as its political goals or success maximization³. In this case, mobilization causes are not relevant to explain the attack as they are filtered by the target selection strategy of the organization. For example, if ISIS plans an attack in Denmark but not in Austria, Danish fighters will preferably be deployed to perpetrate terrorist attacks in their home country, because they can access Denmark more easily than foreigners and have a better knowledge of it, while Austrians will be kept on the Iraqi or Syrian battlefield. This choice is independent from the number of Danes and Austrians enrolled in the organization.

Figure 1: Causes of Different Patterns of Violence

² Note that, according to Becker (2014), the target selection by lone wolves differs from those performed by affiliated terrorists in their within-country dimension (for example, civilian vs. military target). Lone wolves appear much less able to set up an ambitious deadly attack. However, in their cross-country dimension, only strategical or ideological reasons motivate lone wolves, exactly as affiliated terrorists do. Becker (2014) point out that “most lone wolves chose targets that clearly corresponded with the class of “enemies” that they identified using their ideology” (p. 965). Yet, he does not discuss how such ideology may be shaped by groups a lone wolf feels close to.

³ This selection has already been identified at the theoretical level but never empirically tested (Hegghammer 2013, 10)




Figure 1 applies to ISIS struggle the general mechanism we focus on. Two processes can lead to a terrorist attack. The first process (on the left) entails two steps. In a first step, individuals self-select to join ISIS. While the organization's recruitment propaganda may play a role in this decision, our model argues that insurgent groups do not necessarily target specific countries in their recruitment propaganda: they appeal to a transnational community to hide the domestic nature of their struggle (Malet 2013)⁴. This is even more likely to be the case for

⁴ The untargeted recruitment propaganda of ISIS is not a central assumption. Two other possibilities can be considered. First, the recruitment propaganda is more intense where people are more likely to be convinced. In this case, our analysis does not fundamentally change, because it assumes that ISIS knows that socio-economic conditions are responsible for the success of their recruitment. Therefore, they amplify this impact by focusing on already favorable contexts. Second, the recruitment propaganda is not undertaken in countries in which ISIS prefers lone wolves to commit attacks. This happened when ISIS lost its capacity to organize training and attacks and the borders with Syria were strongly controlled. Insofar as this is a generalized strategy, we should find that the number of foreign fighters departing from a country is *negatively* associated with the number of ISIS attacks

a group such as ISIS whose objective is to create a transboundary caliphate to host Sunni Muslims wherever they come from. During the second step, a few fighters are selected by the organization to perform terrorist attacks, giving precedence to target selection strategy of the group over individual choices. In contrast, in the second process (on the right), individuals simultaneously choose to engage in political violence and to select their target based on ISIS perceived strategy. Both their individual characteristics and the chosen organization's strategy shape the likelihood of such attacks.

Translating Mobilization and Target Selection Causes at the Macro Level : Drivers of Cross-national Variation in ISIS Global Jihad

Our hypotheses assume the level of individual agency in the mobilization and target selection process can be reflected in macro-level indicators to explain cross-national variation in patterns of ISIS violence. To do so, we select in existing scholarship the most robust predictors.

Existing research emphasizes the role of grievances and opportunity costs that individuals experience in their country of residence. Domestic socio-economic contexts vary in their likelihood to generate such grievances. A large body of scholarship has established that the presence and intensity of political and economic discriminations against minority groups at the country level is a breeding ground for individual violence (Piazza 2011; Piazza 2012; Ghatak and Prins 2017; Ghatak 2016; see also Mitts 2019). As ISIS claims to act on behalf of Sunni Muslims, we especially select on discriminations targeting Sunni minorities. We hence expect cross-national variation in foreign fighters flows and in the number of lone wolves' attacks to be explained by cross-national differences in the level of such discriminations.

in this country. As detailed in the result section, this is not the case, hence we can exclude that such systematic propaganda strategy was undertaken, or at least successful.

The second identified predictor of individual violence is opportunity costs, meaning that individuals with little economic perspectives are more likely to mobilize into violence (Caruso and Schneider 2011). To translate this finding at the macro level and apply it to the the specific case of ISIS violence, we examine the relationship between patterns of jihadist violence and country-level rate of unemployment among Muslim youth, a factor already found as positively associated with the number of foreign fighters (Gouda and Marktanner 2019; Verwimp 2016).

At the target selection stage, the underlying strategy through which ISIS selects its target needs to be unpacked. The literature on target selection is thin but supports the idea that militants groups' ideologies influence the selection of the group's enemies (Drake 1998, Asal Rethemeyer Anderson et al. 2009). We build on sizeable evidence to specifically investigate how transnational terrorist groups strategically target countries in retaliation for military interventions in asymmetrical warfare. Terrorist attacks in military intervening countries seek to affect their resolve to continue their intervention (Linebarger, Enterline, and Liebel 2017) and backlash on states involved in politico-strategic military interventions (Piazza and Choi 2018; Neumayer and Plümper 2009; Braithwaite 2015; Du Bois and Buts 2016), especially when organized by ad hoc military coalitions (Buts and Du Bois 2017). We hence claim that ISIS labels as a legitimate "enemy" each country which military intervenes against the groups' positions in Iraq and Syria. As a result, we expect that, shall cross-national variation in targeting result from the strategy of ISIS, we should observe that countries military intervening against the group are more affected by terrorist attacks than non-intervening ones. This leads to the formulation of three hypotheses, explaining why countries are differently affected the globalization of ISIS jihad.

H1. Cross-national variation in foreign fighters flows is only associated with variation in Sunni discriminations and opportunities and not with variation in anti-ISIS military interventionism of their home country.

H2. Cross-national variation in lone wolves attacks is jointly associated with cross-national variation in Sunni discriminations and opportunities in their home country and with military interventionism against ISIS.

H3. Cross national variation in affiliated terrorist attack is only associated with variation in countries' military interventionism against ISIS and not with variation in Sunni discriminations and opportunities.

Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses.

Table 1: Causes of cross-national variation in patterns of ISIS violence

	Foreign fighters (H1)	Lone wolves attacks (H2)	Affiliated terrorists attacks (H3)
Conceptual causes	Mobilization causes	Mobilization causes + Target selection causes	Target selection causes
Operational causes	<i>Sunnis discriminations and opportunities</i>	<i>Sunnis discriminations and opportunities + Military intervention against ISIS</i>	<i>Military intervention against ISIS</i>

Implications for Jihadist Domestic Terrorism

Our theoretical argument has implications for existing debates on the domestic and transnational dimensions of jihadist attacks. In most studies, the identity relationship between the venue, target, and perpetrators is used to identify instances of domestic terrorism, which are generally considered to derive from purely domestic causes (Berkebile 2017; Enders, Sandler, and Gaibullov 2011). Yet, we argue that using this criterion hides two very different types of attacks. We label the first as *affiliated terrorist attack*. In this case, the nationality of

the individual perpetrator is contingent and chosen by the organization. Therefore, to understand the causes of the attack, the organization should be taken as the “real” perpetrator and not the individual directly involved in the attack. When the organization is transnational, the attack cannot be considered as purely domestic in its dimensions and causes. The second type of attack is perpetrated by lone wolves, who are not affiliates of a specific organization. According to our argument, the number of attacks from jihadist lone wolves in a country partly depends on a domestic socio-economic conditions, and for this reason, they entail a domestic dimension. However, many jihadist lone wolves align with the strategy of a transnational organization to select their target (Mueller 2019). As a result, their attacks also reflect the specificity of such a strategy. In both cases – affiliated terrorist and lone wolves – the target is selected consistently with the strategy of a transnational organization. For that reason, we follow studies that rather focus on the nationality of the perpetrating organization (Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze 2011; LaFree, Dugan, and Miller 2014) to explain the rationale of the attacks while extending it to instances of terrorism perpetrated by unaffiliated individuals. In fact, our argument invites to consider as transnational every attack with foreign ties or transnational ramifications⁵. While the precise definition of such foreign ties often lacks clarity (see LaFree, Dugan, and Miller 2014, 149), the simple fact that the attack is accomplished in support of a foreign jihadist group suggests that the target is selected based on foreign policy considerations.

This conclusion is consistent with what perpetrators themselves claim (McCauley 2019). The asymmetrical warfare logic of jihadist terrorism is apparent in justifications of domestic attacks. Combining data on the expressed motivations of jihadists in America from the 2001 to 2017, Mueller concludes that the driving force is “outrage at American policy” and not

⁵ This criteria originates from the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) database, the reference data source within the literature on transnational terrorism (Neumayer and Plümper 2009; Krueger 2008; Piazza and Choi 2018).

hostility to American culture, society and values (2019, 10). This remark applies beyond the US case. During the Hypercacher supermarket siege, French-citizen Amedy Coulibaly affirmed: “What we are doing is totally legitimate. You attack the caliphate, you attack the Islamic State, you are attacked. You cannot attack and have nothing in return” (our translation). In the same token, British Michael Adebolajo justified his killing of a British soldier in 2013, saying: “The only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are daily killed by British soldiers”. This leads to the formulation of a fourth hypothesis, aiming to generalize our results beyond the specific case of ISIS.

H4: Cross-national variation in the number of jihadist attacks characterized by an identity relationship between the venue, target, and individual perpetrators reflects variation in countries’ military interventionism in majority Muslim countries.

Study 1: Patterns of ISIS Globalization of Jihad (December 2014-2016)

Study 1 focuses on patterns of jihadist violence in support of ISIS during the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars. Our objective is to investigate how variation in these patterns is explained by variation in levels of military interventionism against ISIS and variation in socio-economic conditions affecting Sunni minorities.

Research Design

We build a cross-sectional (not cross-temporal) dataset including 155 observations (one by country). Indicators pertain to the intensity of each pattern of ISIS violence for each country as well as to national indicators of socio-economic conditions and military interventionism. The main reason for using a simple cross-sectional design is the lack of reliable longitudinal

data regarding key variables in the analysis⁶. Note that Study 2 specifically addresses the limitations of this simple design by using longitudinal data.

We first operationalize our dependent variables by estimating the incidence of the three patterns of ISIS violence in a given country. Regarding foreign fighting in Iraq and Syria we rely on data from the Soufan Group assembled by Benmelech and Klor (2018), which estimate a count of foreign fighters joining ISIS from all countries. The Soufan Group claimed to rely on official government estimates wherever possible but also from other reliable sources (Soufan Group 2015). The data inevitably suffer from limitations such as estimates biases but also the lack of government official counts for some countries. However, to our knowledge, this source provides the most systematical and accurate estimates of foreign fighters flows, and is the reference database for cross-national comparisons of foreign fighters flows (Benmelech and Klor 2018, Gouda and Marktanner 2019).

For terrorist attacks related to ISIS, we use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (START 2017). The GTD is the most extensive event database on terrorist attacks worldwide (LaFree, Dugan, and Miller 2014) and allows identifying the organization responsible for the attack. In the case of ISIS, an auxiliary dataset has been recently released to further disentangle attacks related to the group (Miller et al. 2016). This dataset, updated until December 2016, enables distinguishing between attacks *directed* by ISIS – which corresponds to our conceptual category of affiliated terrorists attacks - and attacks perpetrated by unaffiliated individuals *inspired* by ISIS – what we refer to as lone wolves attacks⁷. We compute data on the number

⁶ To our knowledge, there is no existing longitudinal data on ISIS foreign-fighters flows by country. Similarly, no data have been systematically collected about the temporal variation in military intervention against ISIS by country and about the discrimination of Sunni Muslim populations by country.

⁷ The strengths of the GTD however come with a price. The coding method - which relies on international press releases and public sources - generates uncertainties regarding the affiliation and claim of the perpetrators in some attacks. As contested claims remain marginal and randomly distributed, we decided to use the original

of these attacks by target country since December 2014. We chose this period because most military interventions against ISIS' core territorial positions in Iraq and Syria started in Autumn 2014⁸. As we aim to test the causal effect of military interventionism, it is necessary to analyze attacks organized after the start of the strikes against ISIS.

Table A1 in appendix lists the date and location of the 44 lone wolves attacks identified for our study period⁹. Our own research based on public sources shows that three quarters are generally classified as domestic (based on an identity relationship between the venue, target, and perpetrators). Since H2 expects cross-national variation in the number of lone wolves attacks to be positively associated to both military interventionism against ISIS and to grievances and opportunity costs, we exclude – for methodological reasons - cases involving foreign perpetrators. By excluding minority transnational attacks, we restrict the analyses to attacks considered as domestic to determine to what extent international target selection causes influence them.

Affiliated terrorists attacks implies that the leadership of ISIS took an active part in the planning of the attack. Table A2 in appendix lists the date and location of the 113 attacks identified for our study period. In two thirds of the cases, attacks cannot easily be categorized as the identity of the perpetrator is unknown – most of them involve events resulting from a spill-over of the Syrian civil war to Lebanon and Turkey. 12% of the remaining cases are perpetrated by national citizens and can be defined as domestic. The other cases either involve

dataset in our analyses. However, we conducted research based on public sources for each attack (see tables A1 and A2 in the appendix) and identified attacks where the link with ISIS is contested. The conclusions of the paper are unchanged when excluding these cases.

⁸ As we aim to explain cross-national variation in global jihadism in support of ISIS, we exclude attacks occurring in the headquarters territories of ISIS as attacks in Syria and Iraq.

⁹ We excluded four attacks inspired by ISIS, but which were claimed by other organizations: al-Shabaab, Hamas, Jund Ansar Allah and Kilafah Islamic Movement (see Miller et al., 2016).

foreign perpetrators (10%) or combine both national and foreign perpetrators (12%). Our argument implies that cross-national variation in affiliated terrorist attacks only reflects variation in countries' military interventionism against ISIS and not countries' socio-economic characteristics, even when such attacks are classified as domestic. Yet, the low number of domestic attacks in our sample prevents us from conducting a rigorous statistical analysis restricted to domestic affiliated terrorist attacks. Hence, to test H3, our main analyses focus on the total number of ISIS affiliates attacks in a country while we merely comment on our sample of domestic attacks.

Our independent variables capture identified target selection and mobilization causes, as well as control factors.

To gauge a country's level of military interventionism against ISIS, we first identify all the governments that provided military support to the anti-ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria. We use the data collected by the US State Department in November 2014, which lists all countries that military contributed (or officially committed to do so) to the anti-ISIS war (Drennan 2014). The coverage of the source is likely to be reliable, as the Obama administration coordinated military efforts against ISIS at that time. The source also includes information on the military interventions of non-coalition partners such as Iran. The main advantage of this source, from a methodological point of view, is that it allows identifying countries that engaged in the conflict at the beginning of our study period. Indeed most countries listed by the US State Department committed to contributions in September 2014. However, this list is limited by its rather large definition of military support, which combine various degrees of military intervention: it may either consist in providing military equipment, as for Albania which has supported Kurdish forces since August 2014, training counter-insurgency forces, as for Spain's support to the Iraqi Army since October 2014, or directly launching airstrikes against ISIS territorial positions.

To specify the focus, and as various ISIS-related perpetrators specifically refer to countries involved in airstrikes in their retaliation claims, we then specifically identify the countries that launched airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq or Syria, based on McInnis (2016) and public sources (see table A3 in the appendix). The United States were the first coalition member to launch airstrikes against the group in August 2014, followed by France, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Kingdom in September. Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark started conducting airstrikes in October, Canada in November and Morocco in December. Turkey later joined airstrikes operations in July 2015. Outside of the coalition members, Iran was the first country involved in strikes against ISIS in Iraq, deploying troops in June 2014 and conducting airstrikes at least since December of the same year. Finally, Russia started airstrikes against ISIS in Syria in support to the Syrian government in September 2015.

Based on this information, we build our main explanatory variable in three categories: countries that did not commit to provide military support to the coalition against ISIS (0), countries that committed to provide military support to the coalition (1), and countries that directly launched airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq or Syria (2).

Regarding mobilization causes, we first include the share of Sunnis based on the estimates of Correlates of War World Religion Data (Maoz and Henderson 2013). To test for Sunni opportunity costs, we gather data on youth unemployment rate estimates from World Bank. As we have no data on the unemployment rate of Sunni populations, we follow Gouda and Marktanner (2019) by computing the interaction between these two variables, a factor they found to correlate with the number of foreign fighters joining ISIS. To analyze the influence of Sunnis discriminations, we follow previous studies on the terrorism-discrimination nexus (Piazza 2011; Piazza 2012; Choi and Piazza 2017; Ghatak and Prins 2017; Ghatak, 2016) by relying on the Minorities at Risk Database (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The main

advantage of the dataset is that it allows distinguishing levels of discrimination suffered from different religious minorities by country, rather than computing an aggregated national score of discrimination. However, the major limitation is that the data is time-constant, the last update dating back from 2006. Hence, it does not take into account recent national variation in minority discriminations. Based on Piazza (2012), we construct a binary variable coded 1 for countries in which at least one Sunni minority face some level of political, economic, linguistic or religious discrimination. Other countries, either having no Sunni minority at risk or in which Sunni minorities do not face discrimination, are coded 0.

Lastly, we control for factors that have been shown to affect political violence in general. We first include the logged Population size and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that positively correlate with the number of domestic (Piazza 2012), transnational attacks (Choi and Luo 2013) as well as foreign fighters flows (Benmelech and Klor 2018). Besides, we control for regime type based of the standard Polity IV score (Polity IV 2018), ranging from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy). Regimes types have been found to have mixed influence on terrorism. On the one hand, democratic regimes allow freedom of association, making the organization of an insurgency less costly, and have an institutional setting in which terrorism may be more visible and efficient, thanks to higher levels of press freedom and higher audience influence on policy (Chenoweth 2013). On the other hand, democracies are also more inclusive and offer legal channels to voice political grievances (Gaibullov, Piazza, and Sandler 2017). Finally, we control for the distance to Iraq, where most of ISIS territorial positions were located during the study period, in thousands of kilometers (Mayer and Zignago 2011). This partly captures the logistical cost of fighting that should negatively affect the number of attacks directed by ISIS and flows of foreign fighters.

We merge all independent variables values for 2014, the beginning of our study period, except for the data on the share of Sunnis (last half decade estimate of 2010) and for the

variable on Sunni minority discriminations which is time-constant. All variables are described in table A4 in the appendix.

Empirical Results

We start with investigating whether the three identified patterns of violence in support of ISIS are correlated. Using linear correlations, we find that the number of affiliated terrorist attacks in a country neither correlates with the number of lone wolf terrorist attacks ($r = -.01$, $p = .85$) nor the number of foreign fighters departing from a country ($r = -.02$, $p = .84$). The number of lone wolf terrorists in a country slightly correlates with the number of foreign fighters departing from the country ($r = .16$, $p = .05$). Consistently with our argument, this suggests that different factors explain varying levels in countries' exposure to patterns of ISIS globalization of jihad.


How do the three patterns relate to the military intervention against ISIS and socio-economic conditions? Figure 2 displays the geographical location of terrorist attacks related to ISIS in the GTD, distinguishing between ISIS affiliated terrorists attacks and lone wolves attacks perpetrated in support of the organization. It also highlights countries involved in military interventions against ISIS, be they countries military supporting the coalition (in light blue) or countries launching airstrikes in Iraq or Syria (in dark blue). This map suggests that ISIS international attacks mainly target countries involved in military interventions against the group, especially countries conducting airstrikes which particularly suffer from terrorist attacks¹⁰. In contrast, nearly all the non-intervening countries are not targeted. The only

¹⁰ The exceptions are The Netherlands, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Morocco and The United Arab Emirates. Actually, one could guess that these exceptions reflect the conservativeness of our inclusion criteria data rather than contradict our argument. Indeed, after the end of our study period, Iran suffered from a series of affiliated terrorist attacks in 2017 and at least two ISIS inspired lone wolves attacks took place in The Netherlands in 2018 (5 May 2018 in The Hague and the 31 August in Amsterdam). Besides, Saudi Arabia suffered from a high

exceptions are Georgia, Indonesia and Malaysia. In the last two cases, this could suggest that the share of Sunni Muslims in a country increases the risk of ISIS related attacks.

number of attacks (29) perpetrated by ISIS affiliated groups during our study period. Similarly, the Sinai Province of ISIS was responsible for the bombing of a Russian passenger flight on 31 October 2015, killing 227 people, just a month after Russia started its airstrikes in Syria. To our knowledge, the only two countries conducting airstrikes in Iraq and Syria that were not attacked by ISIS and inspired lone wolves are The United Arab Emirates and Morocco. In the latter case, a lone wolf attack took place in December 2018, but targeted a group of Danish and Norwegian tourists.

Figure 2: Terrorist attacks related to ISIS (December 2014-2016)



To test the effect of military interventionism compared to domestic socio-economic causes, we conduct regression analyses. As all of our dependent variables are over dispersed, we rely on negative binomial regression models, a standard method in terrorism studies (Piazza and Choi 2018; Neumayer and Plümper 2009; Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze 2011) and studies on foreign fighters (Benmelech and Klor 2018; Krueger 2008). Table 2 presents estimates for the determinants of different patterns of ISIS violence. For each pattern of violence, we estimate three models: one including foreign policy target-selection causes, one including socio-economic mobilization causes and one including both. All models include control variables. Models I to III explain the number of foreign fighters leaving a country. Models IV to VI explain the number of lone wolves attack in a country. Finally, models VII to IX analyze the number of ISIS affiliated terrorists attacks in a country.

Table 2: Unstandardised coefficients from negative binomial regression of patterns of ISIS violence

Outcome Variables	Number of foreign fighters			Number of attacks					
	I	II	III	by lone wolves			by affiliated terrorists		
	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX			
Target selection causes									
Military intervention against ISIS (no as reference)									
Military support of the coalition	-1.779 (1.199)		-0.752 (0.962)	1.228 (1.161)		1.024 (1.277)	2.971* (1.313)		2.406 (1.312)
Airstrikes in Iraq or Syria	1.690 (1.000)		0.144 (0.877)	2.631* (1.048)		2.259* (1.098)	4.887** (1.540)		4.388** (1.464)
Mobilization causes									
Share of Sunni population		3.537* (1.458)	3.671* (1.455)		16.19* (7.965)	13.21 (8.436)		4.458 (4.242)	4.223 (3.148)
Youth unemployment rate		-2.677 (2.723)	-2.147 (2.685)		3.709 (4.310)	0.0801 (4.967)		-2.000 (8.810)	-3.079 (6.187)
Share of Sunni population *		10.39	9.556		-56.72	-44.89		-4.350	-8.008
Youth unemployment rate		(6.817)	(6.719)		(33.15)	(34.00)		(16.64)	(12.39)
Sunni discriminated minority		1.642** (0.612)	1.723** (0.620)		2.178** (0.811)	1.705* (0.840)		1.907 (1.305)	1.208 (1.201)

Controls									
logged Population	0.609**	0.480**	0.485**	0.785**	0.827***	0.564*	0.288	0.0623	-0.192
	(0.201)	(0.151)	(0.161)	(0.262)	(0.238)	(0.264)	(0.382)	(0.499)	(0.412)
logged GDP per capita	0.819*	1.448***	1.453***	0.795	3.654**	2.480	-0.164	1.415*	0.374
	(0.334)	(0.187)	(0.227)	(0.596)	(1.199)	(1.355)	(0.514)	(0.560)	(0.539)
Democracy score	0.136*	0.137**	0.143*	0.283	0.355	0.516	0.119	0.111	0.214*
	(0.0609)	(0.0517)	(0.0566)	(0.218)	(0.231)	(0.356)	(0.109)	(0.118)	(0.108)
Distance to Iraq	-0.592***	-0.267***	-0.274**	-0.0259	0.188	0.0940	-0.821*	-0.755*	-0.783
	(0.101)	(0.0798)	(0.0846)	(0.0927)	(0.106)	(0.110)	(0.387)	(0.375)	(0.400)
Constant	-10.56*	-18.12***	-18.31***	-26.52***	-59.86***	-44.39*	-5.072	-15.50	-3.545
	(4.472)	(3.011)	(3.550)	(7.778)	(16.63)	(18.08)	(8.076)	(8.164)	(7.147)
ln(alpha)	2.407***	1.892***	1.884***	-0.377	-0.961	-1.153	1.725**	2.208***	1.076
	(0.149)	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.933)	(1.387)	(1.030)	(0.539)	(0.521)	(0.692)
Pseudo R-squared	0.0373	0.0843	0.0850	0.409	0.457	0.516	0.245	0.222	0.288
Observations	155	155	155	155	155	155	155	155	155

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Note: Iraq and Syria excluded from the sample

Results relative to the number of foreign fighters (I to III) support H1. The level of military interventionism against ISIS has no effect on the number of foreign fighters leaving a country: compared to non-intervening countries, governments supporting the coalition and launching airstrikes against ISIS do not experience higher foreign fighters flows. In contrast, the presence of a discriminated Sunni minority has a significant positive effect on foreign fighters flows. The share of Sunni in the population also does, but we do not find a significant effect of the interaction between the youth unemployment rate and the share of Sunni population. In sum, as expected by H1, only variation in mobilization causes explains cross-national variation in foreign fighters flows.

Models IV to VI show that, consistently with H2, military interventionism has a positive effect on lone wolves attacks. The effect is only significant for countries launching airstrikes. As in the case of foreign fighters, the presence of a Sunni discriminated minority significantly increases the number of lone wolves attacks, while the interaction between the share of Sunni and youth unemployment rate has no effect. The coefficient of the share of Sunni is significant only when military interventionism is not controlled for. These results support H2 holding that lone-wolves attacks are jointly due to mobilization and target selection causes.

In line with H3, models VII to IX show that military interventionism against ISIS, especially airstrikes, has a significant positive effect on the number of ISIS affiliated terrorists attacks, while domestic socio-economic causes do not have any significant effect. Neither the interaction between the share of Sunni population and youth unemployment rate nor the presence of a Sunni discriminated minority are related to attacks by ISIS affiliates. In line with H3, cross-national variation in affiliated terrorists attacks is only related to variation in target selection causes.

Note that results from models VII to IX hold even when we run the models on the very limited number of attacks (13) identified as domestic. These attacks took place in Turkey,

Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Belgium and Germany. Except for Malaysia, all these countries launched airstrikes against ISIS or, in the case of Lebanon and Germany, supported the anti-ISIS coalition. Despite being perpetrated by national citizens, several attacks have a rather explicit link with the international interventionism of the target country. For example, the attack in Brussels airport occurred 20 days after the Belgian Prime Minister decided to intensify air warfare by extending strikes to Syria. The police investigation revealed that the perpetrators belonged to a terrorist cell in Belgium, involved in the organization of the November 2015 Paris' attacks and planning an attack on the Amsterdam airport. Both France and The Netherlands were engaged in airstrikes against ISIS at that time. Attacks in Jordan took place after Jordan strengthened its air campaign against ISIS early 2015 and served as a rear-operating base for the anti-ISIS international coalition.

Finally, most control variables display expected coefficients. The population size and GDP positively affect foreign fighting and lone wolves attacks, but not affiliated terrorists attacks. The level of democracy is positively associated with affiliated terrorists attacks in model IX, consistently with the view that terrorist groups target more democratic countries to get a larger audience and influence policy responses (Chenoweth 2013). Finally, the distance to Iraq has a significant negative effect on the number of foreign fighters and, only in models IX and X, the number of affiliated terrorists attacks. This is consistent with the higher logistical cost for individuals to join ISIS from distant countries and for ISIS to organize attacks in distant countries.


We then conduct several robustness checks. We first estimate our models with an alternative dependent variable, the number of casualties (killed and injured people) induced by affiliated terrorists and lone wolves attacks (see table A5 in the appendix). Estimates confirm the effect of military interventions on both types of terrorism, albeit the estimates do not reach

conventional significance threshold in all models. In contrast to the main results, socio-economic causes have no significant effect on the number of casualties.

Second, we use a wider definition of anti-ISIS military interventionism, by testing the effect of military strikes against ISIS and affiliated organizations. We add to our country count of ISIS affiliated terrorists attacks the number of attacks directed by organizations affiliated to ISIS (for the complete list of affiliated groups, see Miller et al. 2016). We code as interveners all the previously identified countries involved in airstrikes in Iraq or Syria and add to this list other countries involved in foreign military strikes against groups affiliated to ISIS during our study period. Cameroon, Chad, Benin and Niger launched military strikes against Boko Haram in Nigeria and Egypt conducted airstrikes against the Tripoli Province of the Islamic State in Libya in February 2015 (see table A6 in the appendix). Note that, in addition to Iraq and Syria, we now additionally exclude from the sample countries in which groups inspired by ISIS are territorially implanted (Nigeria, Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen) to only unpack the international activity of such groups.

Figure 3 shows the geographical distribution of affiliated terrorists and lone wolves attacks. It also highlights countries involved in strikes against ISIS or affiliated groups. The map suggests that attacks are more frequent in intervening countries. Regression estimates (detailed in table A7 in the appendix), based on the above-presented main models are consistent with our previous findings. Results from the full models show that countries involved in strikes against ISIS and affiliated groups significantly experience more attacks, both from lone wolves as well as organized by ISIS and affiliated organizations terrorists. In contrast, the number of foreign fighters joining ISIS is not related to military interventions against ISIS and affiliated groups. Besides, the other variables display coefficients similar to our main results.

Figure 3: Terrorist attacks related to ISIS and groups that declared allegiance to ISIS (December 2014-2016)



Study 1 allows drawing several conclusions. In line with previous studies (Benmelech and Klor 2018; Gouda and Marktanner 2019), variation in foreign fighters flows is predicted by variation in the social experiences of individuals in their country of residence. Besides, variation in ISIS affiliated terrorism is mainly predicted by the organization's target selection strategy, even when perpetrators are national citizens. This result is coherent with the view that the characteristics of the organization, rather than the ones of individual perpetrator, is key to capture the transnational dimension of terrorism (Kis-Katos Liebert, and Schulze 2011; LaFree, Dugan, and Miller 2014). Furthermore, we show that target selection causes – related to foreign policy considerations - have an influence on attacks from national citizens, even when the perpetrators have no direct link with ISIS.

The main limit of study 1 is the possibility of a reverse causality mechanism, meaning that countries launched airstrikes in response to ISIS attacks on their soil. This is however unlikely as few countries suffered from attacks before December 2014. ISIS affiliated terrorists attacks occurred in Belgium, Lebanon and Turkey before their military interventions, even if the last two countries already hosted several anti-ISIS activists and fighters at that time. ISIS inspired lone wolves attacks have been recorded in the United States, Australia and Canada before their airstrike campaigns: In the Australian case, the first attack took place the 23rd of September, a few days after the Australian government announced the deployment of aircrafts in Iraq. Similarly, in Canada, lone wolves attacks occurred in late October 2014, after the Parliament approved of sending aircrafts in Iraq. Thus, the United States are the only case in which some lone wolves attacks actually occurred before military intervention.

Study 2: Jihadist Domestic Terrorism (1992-2006)

In light of these results, Study 2 serves two purposes. First, it seeks to test whether target selection causes – related to military interventionism - have an influence on jihadist terrorism perpetrated by national citizens, beyond ISIS specific case. More specifically, we analyze the

effect of military interventions in Muslim majority countries on jihadist domestic terrorism to test hypothesis 4. Second, Study 2 aims to assess the direction of the causal relationship between military interventionism and jihadist domestic terrorism. The study is based on GTD data from 1992, when the first noticeable wave of jihadist terrorism is recorded after the end of the first Gulf War (Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze 2014) to 2006, the time of ISIS establishment under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Starr-Deelen 2018).

Research Design

We build a dataset combining indicators of the intensity of domestic jihadist terrorism for each country and year and indicators of socio-economic conditions and military interventionism for each country and year. The analyzed dataset is both cross-sectional and cross-temporal, meaning that one observation is a given country at a given year. The dataset gathers 156 countries over a 15 years period.

The GTD does not directly distinguish between transnational and domestic terrorism. For that reason, Enders, Sandler and Gaibullov (2011) separated domestic from transnational attacks in the GTD, based on the commonly used criteria of the identity of nationality between perpetrator, venue and target. As most recent empirical research on domestic terrorism is based on this dataset (see for instance Piazza 2011; Ghatak and Prins 2017; Ghatak 2016; Ghatak and Gold 2017; Choi and Piazza 2016), we use its updated version (Gaibullov and Sandler 2019). The GTD does not include information on the ideological orientation of terrorist attacks. To identify jihadist domestic terrorism we rely on the name of the perpetrating group in the GTD combined with a research based on public sources about the group's ideology. We mostly conduct research on the website of the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC 2019) which is, to our knowledge, the most extensive database on terrorist organizations (their history, ideology, targets, etc.), covering more than 4,500 groups. The GTD includes a great number of small groups, on which information about the

ideology is not always available. For that reason, we exclude minor terrorist groups that perpetrated five attacks or less over 1992-2006. Table A3 lists the identified jihadist groups for the study period. This process leads us to identify 372 attacks. We sum the count of attacks per country and year to construct our dependent variable.

To measure military interventionism, we follow Piazza and Choi (2018) and use the International Military Intervention Dataset (Pickering and Kisangani 2009), which lists all cases in which national military forces were moved into foreign countries from 1947 to 2005. Military interventions fall in two categories depending on their motives (Kisangani and Pickering 2007). On the one hand, politico-strategic interventions are launched for a least one of the following issues: diplomatic issues, domestic political issues, regime change issues, rebel pursuit issues, strategic issues and territorial issues. On the other hand, socio-economic interventions refer to at least one of the following issues: humanitarian issues, social or economic issues. As Piazza and Choi (2018) find that only politico-strategic interventions are associated with transnational terrorism, we specifically analyze these instances. We focus on interventions in majority Muslim countries, i.e. targeting countries where more of 50% of the population is Muslim at the year of the intervention according to the latest estimates of the World Religion Data (Maoz and Henderson 2013). Based on this data, we construct a country-year dummy coded 1 for countries military involved in one or more politico-strategic intervention in Muslim countries, and 0 otherwise. We expect this variable to be positively related to jihadist domestic terrorism.

We use the same socio-economic causes than in study 1, except that we focus on Muslim populations in general rather than on Sunni populations¹¹. We only make two changes regarding the control variables. We do not include a measure of territorial distance since our

¹¹ Indeed, study 2 is about jihadist terrorism, which also includes Shia Muslim terrorist groups such as Hizballah.

dependent variable gathers attacks from groups implanted in different areas. Moreover, as Study 2 focuses on terrorist attacks performed by groups that were territorially implanted in various countries facing civil wars, we control for a dummy variable indicating the occurrence of a civil war in a given country-year based on the Major Episodes of Political Violence database (Marshall 2017). Major episodes of political violence “involve at least 500 "directly-related" fatalities and reach a level of intensity in which political violence is both systematic and sustained (a base rate of 100 directly-related deaths per annum)” (Marshall 2017: 7). An episode of political violence is considered as a civil war when it involves rival political groups at the intra-state level.

After merging all country-year indicators, we lag all independent variables by one year to ensure that the explanatory factors occurred before the dependent variable. All variables are described in table A8 in the appendix.

Results

Table 3 presents estimates from negative binomial regression models of the number of domestic jihadist attacks in a given country and year. Most studies on terrorist attacks do not include country and year fixed effects in the statistical models (Krueger 2008; Neumayer and Plümper 2009; Braithwaite and Chu 2018; Findley, Piazza, and Young 2012). We minimally include continent fixed effects, and further test our models including year fixed effects¹². As in Study 1, we firstly test three models: target selection causes only (model I), mobilization causes only (model II), and both (model III).

¹² We also tested the inclusion of country fixed effects (excluding time-constant predictors) but models do not converge as the distribution of our dependent variable is highly truncated at zero.

Table 3: Unstandardised coefficients from negative binomial regression of domestic jihadist terrorism

Outcome	Number of domestic jihadist attacks					
Variables	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Target selection causes						
Military politico-strategic intervention in Muslim majority countries (t-1)	1.255*		1.339**			1.111*
	(0.514)		(0.515)			(0.540)
Military politico-strategic intervention in non-Muslim majority countries (t-1)				-0.219		
				(0.583)		
Military politico-strategic intervention in Muslim majority countries (t+1)					0.0820	
					(0.561)	
Mobilization causes						
Share of Muslim population (t-1)		-0.411	-1.036	-0.358	-0.0110	-0.726
		(0.975)	(1.028)	(0.985)	(1.018)	(0.997)
Youth unemployment rate (t-1)		-0.0946	-0.313	-0.0761	0.121	-0.0553
		(2.438)	(2.489)	(2.451)	(2.434)	(2.426)
Share of Muslim population (t-1) *		6.739	8.478*	6.525	4.845	6.870
Youth unemployment rate (t-1)		(3.945)	(4.059)	(3.994)	(4.112)	(3.959)
Muslim discriminated minority (t-1)		1.061**	1.016*	1.077**	0.760	1.121**
		(0.408)	(0.412)	(0.410)	(0.429)	(0.419)
Controls						

logged Population (t-1)	1.108*** (0.162)	0.865*** (0.154)	0.835*** (0.155)	0.873*** (0.156)	0.907*** (0.168)	0.778*** (0.150)
logged GDP per capita (t-1)	1.161*** (0.170)	0.892*** (0.172)	0.844*** (0.174)	0.897*** (0.173)	0.912*** (0.196)	0.841*** (0.174)
Democracy score (t-1)	0.000935 (0.0319)	0.0592 (0.0402)	0.0493 (0.0411)	0.0588 (0.0402)	0.0594 (0.0408)	0.0540 (0.0391)
Civil war (t-1)	2.144*** (0.472)	1.424** (0.547)	1.434** (0.548)	1.435** (0.547)	1.672** (0.539)	1.615** (0.562)
Continent fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	-29.51*** (3.588)	-24.44*** (3.435)	-23.56*** (3.446)	-24.59*** (3.464)	-25.03*** (3.802)	-22.40*** (3.378)
ln(alpha)	2.524*** (0.175)	2.321*** (0.190)	2.320*** (0.188)	2.320*** (0.190)	2.158*** (0.208)	2.167*** (0.199)
Pseudo R-squared	0.207	0.220	0.228	0.220	0.231	0.241
Observations	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214	1,904	2,214

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Models I and III confirm that the number of jihadist domestic attacks is positively related to politico-strategic military interventions in Muslim countries. Besides, domestic socio-economic determinants significantly predict the number of jihadist domestic attacks. Whilst it does not reach the conventional significance threshold in model II, the interaction between the youth unemployment rate and the share of Muslim population is significantly and positively associated with the number of jihadist domestic attacks in model III. Furthermore, the presence of a discriminated Muslim minority significantly increases the number of jihadist domestic attacks, both in model II and III. These findings support the view that jihadist domestic terrorism is related to both foreign policy and domestic socio-economic causes.

We then further analyze the causal mechanism linking politico-strategic intervention and jihadist domestic terrorism. Model IV shows that countries involved in politico-strategic intervention in non-Muslim majority countries do not experience more jihadist domestic attacks. This suggests that the effect of politico-strategic intervention in Muslim countries is not due to the effect of military interventions in general. Moreover, model V excludes a reverse causal mechanism, i.e. that countries which experienced jihadist domestic terrorism are more likely to launch politico-strategic interventions in Muslim countries in retaliation. Indeed, there is no significant relationship between future politico-strategic intervention in Muslim countries and the number of jihadist domestic attacks¹³. Finally, model VI generally confirms the robustness of our main results when including year fixed effects in the model. Among the main explanatory variables, both politico-strategic interventions in Muslim

¹³ One could wonder whether this insignificant relationship could rather be explained by the sample reduction in model V, due to the lack of data on future intervention after 2004. Yet, we exclude this possibility because past politico-strategic interventions still have a significant effect on jihadist domestic terrorism on the same sample than model V, excluding observations after 2004.

countries and the presence of a Muslim discriminated minority significantly increase the number of jihadist domestic attacks.

Estimates related to control variables generally go in the expected direction. Both the population size and the GDP per capita have a positive effect on jihadist domestic terrorism. The effect of democracy is not significant. Finally, the occurrence of a civil war has a significant positive effect.

We present several robustness checks in table A9 of the appendix. We firstly test our models using socio-economic intervention in Muslim countries instead of politico-strategic intervention. Our results remain similar but the relationship does not reach the conventional significance threshold in the full model including year fixed effects. Secondly, we run estimates using the number of casualties due to domestic jihadist attacks as an alternative dependent variable. Estimates confirm the robustness of our main findings: politico-strategic interventions in Muslim countries have a positive significant impact on jihadist domestic attacks. Regarding socio-economic causes, the interaction term between youth unemployment and the Muslim population share has no significant effect on the number of casualties, while the presence of a Muslim discriminated population performs better.

Discussion and Conclusion

Research on the causes of individual engagement in the globalization of jihad has so far separately studied the three most common patterns of violence, namely affiliated terrorism, foreign fighting and lone wolves terrorism. From the point of view of the jihadist organization supporting or inspiring such violence, these patterns are, however, linked. In particular, the organization has to decide of the pattern which support the best its strategy. It can either disseminate a recruitment campaign (appealing for foreign fighters) or rather a terror campaign (appealing for lone wolves attacks). The first strategy enables the organization to

better control violent engagement and maximizes its impact – including the selection of the perpetrator among its affiliates based on its target selection. In contrast, the second strategy – although less controllable – is less costly and demands less investment. In both cases, the success of these strategies is conditioned to the specific socio-economic characteristics of each country. Our results shows that cross-national variation in the size of the Sunni population, its level of discrimination, and, to a lesser extent, its level of unemployment explains cross-national variation in foreign fighters flows and in the number lone wolves attacks.

Besides recruitment, the organization has to target legitimate enemy. Jihadi groups and inspirational figures have extensively commented on the criteria leading a target selection process to be legitimate (Hegghammer 2013: 8). When looking at deadly attacks perpetrated outside the battlefield, our analysis shows that countries involved in foreign military strikes against majority Muslim countries are specifically targeted. This is true whatever the recruitment strategy used: appealing to lone wolves attacks or recruiting foreign fighters first to then train them and finally deploy selected affiliated terrorists. However, differences in targeting only reflect variation in countries' foreign policy positioning – and as such, all countries could virtually be targeted by affiliated terrorists. This is not true in the first strategy as we show that appeals to lone wolves are more successful in countries where there are many discriminated Muslims. Yet, this does not mean that the impact and degree of precision of such attacks is the same. Since our level of analysis is situated at the country level, both strategies appear very similar. But other micro-analyses reveal that lone wolves attacks differ as their material and victims are more accessible (Becker 2014).

Our results converge with the motivational factors identified for the terrorist attacks related to Al-Qaeda in Spain and the Netherlands in 2004 (Nesser 2006). Military interventionism in Iraq appears to be the major driving cause of the Madrid bombings, directly perpetrated by

Al-Qaeda. In contrast, among the bunch of lone wolves that murdered the Dutch artist Theo Van Gogh, the effect of both socio-economic conditions in the Netherlands and military interventionism combined (Nesser 2006: 338).

Analyzing patterns of jihadist violence through the lens of jihadist organizations allows understanding why, where and when individual opt for a specific course of action. In particular, we can infer from our results that the less costly recruitment strategy (appealing to lone wolves attacks) predominates when the cost of affiliated terrorists' attacks is too high. In line with this argument, our results demonstrate that the distance of a country from the organization's headquarters is associated with less affiliated terrorists' attacks, but it does not affect the number of lone wolves' attacks. Moreover, the choice of the right strategy does not only depend on the characteristics of the targeted country, but also on those of the organization itself. The less costly strategy is preferred when the organization is weakened. Data from the GTD support this interpretation. The number of terrorist attacks directly perpetrated by ISIS out of Iraq and Syria continuously declined while the group was defeated on territorial grounds. After a peak of 97 attacks in 2016, 41 attacks were perpetrated in 2017 and 8 in 2018 (START 2019). In comparison, lone wolf attacks remained quite stable: 38 attacks by jihadi-inspired extremists occurred in 2016, 28 in 2017 and 29 in 2018 (START 2019).

This lead us to discuss our second key finding, namely that jihadist domestic terrorism – defined by an identity relationship between the venue, target, and perpetrators – is not immune from a strong international dimension. Domestic terrorist attacks are used in retaliation for military interventions in Muslim countries. This result – consistent with what homegrown extremists themselves claim – sheds new light on the international dimension of terrorism. Whether they are lone wolves or affiliated terrorists, perpetrators attack target countries engaged in foreign military strikes against majority Muslim countries.

Our findings have threefold implications. First, they reveal that existing literature suffers from a categorization issue. While the concept of “domestic terrorism” has been forged to account for the domestic causes of terrorism, jihadist domestic terrorism cannot be fully accounted for without taking into account the foreign policy of the targeted country. We even show that in some instances – when homegrown individuals have been selected by the organization – domestic drivers can even be ruled out from the analysis. These instances, however, are poorly documented, and we cannot provide more than empirical clues in favor of this relationship. However, the fact that individuals mobilize in violence and join a foreign insurgency is a properly domestic phenomenon. Our analysis shows that variation in foreign fighters flows per country – a measure for choosing to join the organization rather than directly implementing the organization’s strategy – is only predicted by variation in domestic characteristics, and not by differences in foreign policy positioning. Overall our analysis shows that, to hold explanatory power, any classification of terrorist attacks should account both for the characteristics of the perpetrator and of the organization hiring or inspiring the perpetrator. When attacks are set up by unaffiliated individuals, socio-economic factors combined with a variety of motives related to the perpetrator’s own strategy are relevant. When the perpetrator aligns her preferences with those of a transnational organization – in our case case of ISIS or transnational jihadist organizations – foreign policy determinants also explain these attacks. In contrast, when the attacks are directly set up by the organization, only the latter’s strategy matters to explain cross-national variation in the number, venue and victims of the attack.

Second, our findings shed new light on the stay versus go dilemma that jihadists face when selecting their fighting theater (Hegghammer 2013). They suggest that the main reason leading individuals to stay is the fact that their country is at war against ISIS - or more generally intervene in Muslim countries. Hence, when opting for a theater, fighters opt for the

battlefront where they feel the most useful to advance the goals of the organization they support, even without any evidence of organized coordination. Our results also allows capturing the conditions under which the perpetrator's individual agency shape the pattern of violence in a predominant way.

Lastly, our analysis advocates for fundamentally rethinking existing counter-terrorism strategies. Current strategies to address domestic terrorism emphasize the role of national social and anti-discriminatory policy to address the root causes of violent radicalization (European Council 2018, Burgoon 2006). In contrast, existing policies to tackle foreign fighting and transnational terrorism have a strong international component, aiming to strengthen international cooperation in borders control and countering of ISIS online propaganda and recruitment campaigns (Council of the European Union 2014). Our findings contribute to explain the ineffectiveness of such strategies and suggest that altering international policies is more likely to tackle homegrown jihadism.

References

- Asal, Victor H, R. Karl Rethemeyer, Ian Anderson , Allyson Stein , Jeffrey Rizzo and Matthew Rozea. 2009. "The Softest of Targets: A Study on Terrorist Target Selection", *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 4:3, 258-278, DOI: 10.1080/19361610902929990
- Becker, Michael. 2014. "Explaining Lone Wolf Target Selection in the United States", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37:11, 959-978, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.952261
- Bapat, Navin A. 2006. "State bargaining with transnational terrorist groups" *International Studies Quarterly* 50.1: 213-229.
- Benmelech, Efraim, and Esteban F. Klor. 2018. "What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2018): 1-24.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1482214>

- Berkebile, Richard E. 2017. "What Is Domestic Terrorism? A Method for Classifying Events From the Global Terrorism Database." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29 (1): 1–26.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.985378>.
- Bois, Cind Du, and Caroline Buts. 2016. "Military Support and Transnational Terrorism." *Defence and Peace Economics* 27 (5): 626–43.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.972087>.
- Braithwaite, Alex, and Tiffany S. Chu. 2018. "Civil Conflicts Abroad, Foreign Fighters, and Terrorism at Home." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62 (8): 1636–60.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717707304>.
- Braithwaite, Alex. 2015. "Transnational Terrorism as an Unintended Consequence of a Military Footprint." *Security Studies* 24 (2): 349–75.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2015.1038192>.
- Buts, Caroline, and Cind Du Bois. 2017. "Military Deployment and International Terrorism: Do Location and Mission Type Matter?" *Defence and Peace Economics* 28 (6): 621–33.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2016.1186406>.
- Caruso, Raul, and Friedrich Schneider. 2011. "The socio-economic determinants of terrorism and political violence in Western Europe (1994–2007)." *European Journal of Political Economy* 27 : S37–S49. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.02.003>
- Chenoweth, Erica. 2013. Terrorism and democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16, 355–378. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polis>
- Choi, Seung Whan, and James A. Piazza. 2017. "Foreign Military Interventions and Suicide Attacks." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61 (2): 271–97.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715576575>.

Choi, Seung Whan, and Shali Luo. 2013. "Economic Sanctions, Poverty, and International Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis." *International Interactions*, 39 (2): 217–45.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2013.768478>.

Doosje, Bertjan, Annemarie Loseman, and Kees van den Bos. 2013. "Determinants of Radicalization of Islamic Youth in the Netherlands: Personal Uncertainty, Perceived Injustice, and Perceived Group Threat." *Journal of Social Issues* 69 (3): 586–604.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12030>.

Drake, Charles J.M. 1998. "The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10:2, 53-85.

Drennan, Justine. 2014. "Who has contributed what in the coalition against the Islamic State". *Foreign policy*, 12.

Enders, Walter, Todd Sandler, and Khusrav Gaibulloev. 2011. "Domestic versus transnational terrorism: Data, decomposition, and dynamics." *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (3) : 319-337.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War", *Oxford Economic Papers* 50 (4); 563.

Council of the European Union. 2014. "The challenge of foreign fighters and the EU's response". Factsheet, October 9,

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21866/factsheet_foreign-fighters_en.pdf

European Council. 2018. "EU counter-terrorism strategy", EU Fight against terrorism. Last modified October 25, 2018, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/>

Findley, Michael G., James A. Piazza, and Joseph K. Young. 2012. "Games Rivals Play: Terrorism in International Rivalries." *Journal of Politics* 74 (1): 235–48.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611001551>.

Gaibullov, Khusrav, James A. Piazza, and Todd Sandler. 2017. "Regimes types and terrorism", *International organization*, 71 (3): 491-522.

Gaibullov, Khusrav, and Todd Sandler .2019. "What we have learned about terrorism since 9/11". *Journal of Economic Literature*, 57(2), 275-328. DOI: 10.1257/jel.20181444

Ghatak, Sambuddha and Aaron Gold. 2017. "Development, Discrimination, and Domestic Terrorism: Looking beyond a Linear Relationship." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34 (6): 618–39. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215608511>.

Ghatak, Sambuddha, and Brandon C. Prins. 2017. "The Homegrown Threat: State Strength, Grievance, and Domestic Terrorism." *International Interactions* 43 (2): 217–47.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2016.1128431>.

Ghatak, Sambuddha, Aaron Gold, and Brandon C. Prins. 2019. "Domestic terrorism in democratic states: Understanding and addressing minority grievances." *Journal of conflict resolution* 63 (2): 439-467.

Ghatak, Sambuddha. 2016. "Challenging the State: Effect of Minority Discrimination, Economic Globalization, and Political Openness on Domestic Terrorism." *International Interactions* 42 (1): 56–80. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1048857>.

Gouda, Moamen, and Marcus Marktanner. 2019. "Muslim Youth Unemployment and Expat Jihadism: Bored to Death?." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 42 (10): 878-897.

Hamm Mark S., and Ramon Spaaij. 2017. *The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hegghammer, Thomas. 2013. "Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists' Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting." *American Political Science Review* 107 (1): 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000615>.

King, M., & Taylor, D. M. (2011). The radicalization of homegrown jihadists: A review of theoretical models and social psychological evidence. *Terrorism and political violence*, 23(4), 602-622.

Kisangani, Emizet F., and Jeffrey Pickering. 2007. "Diverting with benevolent military force: Reducing risks and rising above strategic behavior". *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(2), 277-299. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00452.x>

Kis-Katos, Krisztina, Helge Liebert, and Günther G. Schulze. 2011. "On the origin of domestic and international terrorism." *European Journal of Political Economy*, 27, S17-S36. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.02.002>

Kis-Katos, Krisztina, Helge Liebert, and Günther G. Schulze. 2014. "On the Heterogeneity of Terror." *European Economic Review* 68 (May): 116–36. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.EUROECOREV.2014.02.009>.

Krueger, Alan B. 2008. *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, Mogens K. Justesen, and Robert Klemmensen. 2006. "The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism." *Public Choice* 128 (1-2): 289-315.

LaFree, Garry, and Laura Dugan. 2017. "Evolution of Global Terrorism: The Growing Lethality of Attacks" In *Peace and Conflict 2017* edited by David Backer, Ravinder Bhavnani and Paul Huth, Oxon: Routledge, Chapter 9.

LaFree, Gary, Laura Dugan , and Erin Miller. 2014. “International and Domestic Terrorism”.
In Putting terrorism in context: Lessons from the Global Terrorism Database. London:
Routledge.

Linebarger, Christopher, Andrew J. Enterline, and Steven R. Liebel. 2017. “Shaken or
Stirred? Terrorism and Third-Party State Resolve in Civil War Interventions.” *Conflict
Management and Peace Science*,(December) 073889421774087.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894217740874>.

Malet, David. 2013. *Foreign Fighters : Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts*. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

Maoz, Zeev, and Errol A. Henderson. 2013. “The world religion dataset, 1945–2010: Logic,
estimates, and trends.” *International Interactions*, 39(3), 265-291.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2013.782306>

Marshall, Monty G. 2017. “Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict
Regions, 1946-2016”, Center for Systemic Peace <www.systemicpeace.org>

Mayer, Thierry, and Soledad Zignago.2011. Notes on CEPII’s distances measures: The
GeoDist database.

McCauley, Clark R. (2019). “Explaining Homegrown Western Jihadists: The Importance of
Western Foreign Policy”. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCIV)*, 12, 643.

McInnis, Kathleen. J.2016. “Coalition contributions to countering the Islamic State.”
Congressional Research Service, Wahsington: The Library of Congress.

Mickolus, Edward F., Todd Sandler, Jean M. Murdock and Peter A. Flemming. 2014.
International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE). Data Codebook.

- Miller, Erin, Sheehan Kane, William Kammerer, and Brian Wingenroth. 2016. *Patterns of Islamic State-related terrorism, 2002-2015*. START.
- Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. <http://www.mar.umd.edu/> on
- Mitts, T. (2019). From isolation to radicalization: anti-Muslim hostility and support for ISIS in the West. *American Political Science Review*, 113(1), 173-194.
- Mueller, John E. (Ed.). (2019). "Terrorism since 9/11: the American cases." *The Educational Publisher*, <http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/since.html>
- Murshed, Syed Mansoob, and Sara Pavan. 2011. "Identity and Islamic Radicalization in Western Europe." *Civil Wars* 13 (3): 259–79.
- Nesser, P. (2006). Jihadism in Western Europe after the invasion of Iraq: Tracing motivational influences from the Iraq war on Jihadist terrorism in Western Europe. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29(4), 323-342.
- Nesser, Petter. 2019. "Military Interventions, Jihadi Networks, and Terrorist Entrepreneurs: How the Islamic State Terror Wave Rose So High in Europe". *CTC Sentinel*, 12(3), 15-21.
- Neumayer, Eric, and Thomas Plümper. 2009. "International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (4): 711–34.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123409000751>.
- Orson, Kyle. 2017. *Foreign Terrorist Attacks by the Islamic State: 2002-2016*. London: The Henry Jackson Society, <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/FINAL-Foreign-Terrorist-Attacks-Paper.pdf>
- Piazza, James A. 2011. "Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism". *Journal of Peace Research*, 48(3), 339-353. <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343310397404>

- Piazza, James A. 2012. "Types of minority discrimination and terrorism". *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 29(5), 521-546.
<https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0738894212456940>
- Piazza, James A., and Seung Whan Choi. 2018. "International Military Interventions and Transnational Terrorist Backlash: Research Note." *International Studies Quarterly* 62 (3): 686–95. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy026>.
- Pickering, Jeffrey., and Emizet F. Kisangani, E. 2009. "The International Military Intervention dataset: An updated resource for conflict scholars". *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(4), 589-599.
- Polity IV (2018), Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018 <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>
- Rosendorff, Peter B., and Todd Sandler. 2005. "The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (2): 171–82.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704272834>.
- Sageman, Marc. 2004. *Understanding terror networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Savun, Burcu, and Brian J. Phillips. 2009. "Democracy, foreign policy, and terrorism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53 (6):878-904.
- Sedgwick, Mark. 2015. "Jihadism, narrow and wide: The dangers of loose use of an important term" *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9.2.
- Soufan Group. (2015). Foreign fighters: An updated assessment of the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq. *The Soufan Group*.

Spaaij, Ramon. 2011. *Understanding lone wolf terrorism: Global patterns, motivations and prevention*. Dordrecht :Springer Science and Business Media.

Starr-Deelen, Donna. G. 2018. "The Rise of ISIS". In *Counter-Terrorism from the Obama Administration to President Trump*, Dordrecht: Springer: 19-26.

START (2017). Global Terrorism Database, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>.

START (2019). Global Terrorism Database, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>.

TRAC. 2019. "Groups." *Tracking terrorism*, May 20.

<https://www.trackingterrorism.org/groups>.

Verwimp, Philip. 2016. "Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq and the socio-economic environment they faced at home: A comparison of European countries". *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6): 68-81.

Von Einsiedel, Sebastian, Louise Bosetti, James Cockayne, Cale Salih, & Wilfred Wan. 2017. Civil War trends and the changing nature of armed conflict. United Nations. *UNU-CPR occasional paper*, 10.

Jihadism without borders

The rise of affiliated terrorists, foreign fighters and lone wolves outside civil wars

Appendix

Table of Content

Study 1.....	52
Table A1: ISIS lone wolf attacks in the GTD (December 2014-2016).....	52
Table A2: ISIS affiliated terrorist attacks in the GTD (December 2014-2016).....	55
Table A3: Countries Involved in Airstrikes Against ISIL in Iraq or Syria Before December 2016.....	62
Table A4: Study 1 Main Variables Description	64
Table A5: Countries Involved in External Military Strikes Against Groups Affiliated to ISIL Before December 2016.....	64
Table A6: Study 1 Robustness Check - Casualties Related to ISIS	66
Table A7: Study 1 Robustness Check - ISIS and groups that declared allegiance to ISIS	68
Study 2.....	70
Table A8: Study 2 Main Variables Description	70
Table A9: Study 2 Robustness Checks	71

Study 1

Table A1: ISIS lone wolf attacks in the GTD (December 2014-2016)

Date	City	Country	Nb casualties	Perpetrated by national(s)?	Reference
December 15, 2014	Sydney	Australia	7	Yes	https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-22/lindt-cafe-sydney-siege-gunman-man-haron-monis/8375858
December 18, 2014	Morganton	US	1	Yes	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/justin-sullivan
December 20, 2014	Joue-les-Tours	France	4	Yes	https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/qui-est-bertrand-nzohabonayo-l-agresseur-de-joue-les-tours-21-12-2014-1891481_23.php
January 7, 2015	Paris	France	1	Yes	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/chérif-kouachi/ / https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/saïd-kouachi
January 8, 2015	Paris	France	2	Yes	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/chérif-kouachi/ / https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/saïd-kouachi
January 9, 2015	Paris	France	8	Yes	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/chérif-kouachi/ / https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/saïd-kouachi
February 14, 2015	Copenhagen	Denmark	3	Yes	https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/copenhagen-shootings-suspected-gunman-omar-abdel-hamid-el-hussein-was-a-danish-national-with-a-10047741.html
February 14, 2015	Copenhagen	Denmark	4	Yes	https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/copenhagen-shootings-suspected-gunman-omar-abdel-hamid-el-hussein-was-a-danish-national-with-a-10047741.html
April 19, 2015	Paris	France	1	No	https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/04/24/01016-20150424ARTFIG00367-que-risque-sid-ahmed-ghlam-sur-le-plan-penal.php
May 3, 2015	Garland	US	3	Yes	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/elton-simpson/ / https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/nadir-soofi/ / https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abdul-malik-abdul-kareem

June 26, 2015	Saint-Quentin-Fallavier	France	3	Yes	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35166691
October 2, 2015	Parramatta	Australia	2	Yes	https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/australia-faces-tough-choices-on-immigration-and-terrorism/
November 4, 2015	Merced	US	5	Yes	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35838588
December 2, 2015	San Bernardino	US	33	Mixed	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/syed-rizwan-farook/ / https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/tashfeen-malik
December 5, 2015	London	UK	3	Yes	https://www.thedailybeast.com/san-bernardino-inspired-british-attempted-beheader
January 7, 2016	Paris	France	1	No	https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/sallah-ali-ce-que-l-on-sait-du-terroriste-du-commissariat-de-paris-08-01-2016-2008024_23.php
January 7, 2016	Philadelphia	US	2	Yes	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/edward-archer
January 11, 2016	Marseille	France	1	Yes	https://www.timesofisrael.com/french-teen-who-attacked-jewish-teacher-with-machete-gets-7-years-in-jail/
January 11, 2016	Sungai Petani	Malaysia	0	Yes	https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2016/01/12/kedahan-arrested-for-holding-woman-at-knife-point-is-style/
February 5, 2016	Hanover	Germany	0	Yes	https://www.thelocal.de/20170126/16-year-old-isis-sympathizer-gets-to-six-years-jail-for-stabbing-officer
February 18, 2016	Rochdale	UK	1	Yes	https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/24/rochdale-imam-jalal-uddin-killer-fled-to-turkey-court-hears
April 16, 2016	Essen	Germany	3	Yes	https://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e43da.html
June 12, 2016	Orlando	US	103	Yes	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/omar-mateen
June 13, 2016	Magnanville	France	3	Yes	https://time.com/4367986/iarossi-abballa-isis-paris-killed-police/
July 14, 2016	Nice	France	520	No	https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/mohamed-lahouaiej-bouhlel-le-tueur-de-l-attentat-de-nice_1814155.html
July 18, 2016	Wurzburg	Germany	6	No	https://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e43da.html
July 24, 2016	Ansbach	Germany	16	No	https://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e43da.html
July 26, 2016	Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray	France	4	Yes	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abdel-malik-petitjean/ / https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/adel-kermiche

August 10, 2016	Strathroy	Canada	2	Yes	https://globalnews.ca/news/2876837/aaron-driver-what-we-know-about-the-canadian-terror-suspect-killed-in-ontario/
August 28, 2016	Medan	Indonesia	2	Yes	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-security-church-idUSKCN1140DD
September 1, 2016	Copenhagen	Denmark	4	Yes	https://www.thelocal.dk/20160901/christiania-shooter-is-isis-sympathizer
September 4, 2016	Paris	France	0	Yes	https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/terrorisme/20180911.OBS2128/tentative-d-attentat-pres-de-notre-dame-ornella-et-ines-une-romance-djihadiste.html
September 10, 2016	Minto	Australia	1	Yes	https://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Australian-terrorist-planned-to-kill-kippah-wearing-Jewish-students-590883
September 17, 2016	Seaside Park	US	0	Yes	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ahmad-khan-rahami
September 17, 2016	New York City	US	29	Yes	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ahmad-khan-rahami
September 17, 2016	New York City	US	0	Yes	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ahmad-khan-rahami
September 18, 2016	Elizabeth	US	0	Yes	https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ahmad-khan-rahami
October 8, 2016	Unknown	Kuwait	1	No	https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/kuwait-arrests-isis-member-over-us-truck-ramming-attack-1471954
November 26, 2016	Ludwigshafen	Germany	0	Yes	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38343124
November 28, 2016	Columbus	US	12	No	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38136658
December 5, 2016	Ludwigshafen	Germany	0	Yes	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38136658
December 19, 2016	Berlin	Germany	1	No	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38415287
December 19, 2016	Berlin	Germany	60	No	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38415287
December 23, 2016	Milan	Italy	2	No	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38415287
Total			854		

Note: Iraq and Syria excluded from the sample

Table A2: ISIS affiliated terrorist attacks in the GTD (December 2014-2016)

Date	City	Country	Nb casualties	Perpetrated by national(s)?	Reference	Doubt link with ISIL
January 6, 2015	Istanbul	Turkey	3	Unknown	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30707871	Yes
January 10, 2015	Tripoli	Lebanon	47	Yes	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-attack/islamic-state-carried-out-lebanon-cafe-attack-minister-idUSKBN0KK0KS20150111	
January 19, 2015	Arsal	Lebanon	1	Unknown	http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/173567	
January 20, 2015	Arsal	Lebanon	0	Unknown	http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jan-22/284959-gunmen-release-2-of-3-kidnapped-arsal-residents.ashx?utm_source=Magnet%26utm_medium=Entity%20page%26utm_campaign=Magnet%20tools	
January 23, 2015	Ras Baalbek	Lebanon	48	Unknown	https://civilsociety-centre.org/timeliness/4929#event-a-href-sir-two-syrians-injured-gunfire-qaatwo-syrians-injured-in-gunfire-in-qaa-a	
January 30, 2015	Arsal	Lebanon	0	Unknown	http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jan-30/285821-isis-kidnaps-arsal-man.ashx	
March 18, 2015	Arsal	Lebanon	1	No	http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Mar-30/292698-arsal-man-kidnapped-in-apparent-tit-for-tat-act.ashx	
March 30, 2015	Arsal	Lebanon	0	No	http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/173604	
April 12, 2015	Arsal	Lebanon	0	No information		
April 13, 2015	Arsal	Lebanon	0	No information		
April 17, 2015	Arsal	Lebanon	1	No information		
April 20, 2015	Aritis	Turkey	1	Unknown	https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/index.html	
May 18, 2015	Adana	Turkey	6	Unknown	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/turkey-pro-kurdish-party-rocked-twin-bomb-attacks-	Yes

					150519034134519.html	
May 18, 2015	Mersin	Turkey	0	Unknown	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/turkey-pro-kurdish-party-rocked-twin-bomb-attacks-150519034134519.html	Yes
June 5, 2015	Diyarbakir	Turkey	53	Unknown	https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-election-blast/gas-cylinder-bomb-caused-blast-at-turkish-election-rally-sources-idINKBN0OM08S20150606	
June 5, 2015	Diyarbakir	Turkey	52	Unknown	https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-election-blast/gas-cylinder-bomb-caused-blast-at-turkish-election-rally-sources-idINKBN0OM08S20150606	
July 20, 2015	Suruc	Turkey	135	Yes	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33619043	
July 23, 2015	Unknown	Turkey	4	Unknown	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33641315	
August 10, 2015	Istanbul	Turkey	1	Yes	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/senior-dhkp-c-militant-captured-in-istanbul-140963	Yes
August 21, 2015	Arras	France	3	No	https://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/24/europe/france-train-attack-what-we-know-about-suspect/	
September 1, 2015	Kilis	Turkey	1	Unknown	https://news.yahoo.com/turkish-soldier-killed-another-missing-fire-territory-syria-200039635.html	
October 10, 2015	Ankara	Turkey	350	Yes	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/19/ankara-suicide-bomber-was-brother-of-suspect-in-previous-attack-turkey-says	
October 17, 2015	Damistan	Bahrain	0	Unknown	http://www.byislam.com/en/bahraini-scholars-issue-statement-over-attacks-on-muharram-mourners/	
October 17, 2015	Hamala	Bahrain	0	Unknown	http://www.byislam.com/en/bahraini-scholars-issue-statement-over-attacks-on-muharram-mourners/	
October 30, 2015	Sanliurfa	Turkey	2	Unknown	https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/11/514882-murder-two-syrian-citizen-journalists-condemned-unesco-chief	
November 5, 2015	Arsal	Lebanon	12	Unknown	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34735117	
November 9, 2015	Muwaqqar	Jordan	13	Yes	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-jordan-insight-idUSKCN0T029720151111	
November 12, 2015	Beirut	Lebanon	142	No	https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Nov-12/322821-isis-claims-responsibility-for-beirut-southern-suburb-attack-statement.ashx	
November 12, 2015	Beirut	Lebanon	143	No	https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Nov-12/322821-isis-claims-responsibility-for-beirut-southern-suburb-attack-statement.ashx	
November 13, 2015	Paris	France	19	Mixed	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512	

November 13, 2015	Paris	France	310	Mixed	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512
November 13, 2015	Paris	France	41	Mixed	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512
November 13, 2015	Paris	France	29	Mixed	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512
November 13, 2015	Saint Denis	France	35	Mixed	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512
November 13, 2015	Saint Denis	France	35	Mixed	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512
November 13, 2015	Saint Denis	France	36	Mixed	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512
November 13, 2015	Paris	France	45	Mixed	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512
November 14, 2015	Oguzeli district	Turkey	4	Unknown	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey/four-islamic-state-fighters-shot-dead-by-turkish-soldiers-media-idUSKCN0T406P20151115
December 1, 2015	Istanbul	Turkey	5	Unknown	https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/blast-hits-istanbul-metro-bomb-suspected
December 27, 2015	Gaziantep	Turkey	1	Unknown	https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/01/10/turkey-3-arrested-over-killing-syrian-journalist.html
January 8, 2016	Arsal	Lebanon	2	Unknown	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bsjh2HPpVIA
January 12, 2016	Istanbul	Turkey	26	No	https://www.questia.com/newspaper/1P2-39180317/arrest-is-made-in-deadly-istanbul-attack
January 14, 2016	Arsal	Lebanon	1	Unknown	https://www.middleeastpressreleases.com/one-injured-in-arsal-blast/
January 18, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	3	No	https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/governor-syrian-rocket-hitting-turkish-school-stray-missile/506614
January 28, 2016	Karkamis	Turkey	0	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/isil-militants-open-fire-on-turkish-soldiers-near-syrian-border-94485
February 3, 2016	Karkamis	Turkey	0	Mixed	https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/02/03/daesh-fires-mortars-into-turkeys-southeastern-gaziantep-province
February 3, 2016	Karkamis	Turkey	0	Mixed	https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/02/03/daesh-fires-mortars-into-turkeys-southeastern-gaziantep-province
February 3, 2016	Karkamis district	Turkey	0	Mixed	https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/02/03/daesh-fires-mortars-into-turkeys-southeastern-gaziantep-province
February 3, 2016	Karkamis district	Turkey	0	Mixed	https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/02/03/daesh-fires-mortars-into-turkeys-southeastern-gaziantep-province
February 26, 2016	Hanover	Germany	1	Yes	https://www.dw.com/en/from-hanover-to-is-the-case-of-safia-s/a-36094144

March 8, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	0	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/two-killed-two-wounded-as-rocket-projectiles-from-syria-hit-turkeys-kilis-96180	
March 8, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	3	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/two-killed-two-wounded-as-rocket-projectiles-from-syria-hit-turkeys-kilis-96180	
March 8, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	0	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/two-killed-two-wounded-as-rocket-projectiles-from-syria-hit-turkeys-kilis-96180	
March 8, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	0	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/two-killed-two-wounded-as-rocket-projectiles-from-syria-hit-turkeys-kilis-96180	
March 19, 2016	Istanbul	Turkey	41	Yes	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-blast-bursa-claim-idUSKCN0XS1F9	Yes
March 22, 2016	Zaventem	Belgium	153	Yes	https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/22/471391497/what-we-know-terrorist-bombing-at-brussels-airport?t=1568403176454	
March 22, 2016	Brussels	Belgium	152	Mixed	https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/22/471391497/what-we-know-terrorist-bombing-at-brussels-airport?t=1568403176454	
March 22, 2016	Unknown	Turkey	0	Mixed	https://www.foxnews.com/world/turkey-detains-13-suspects-amid-fear-of-new-attacks	
April 4, 2016	Gaziantep	Turkey	0	Unknown	https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtid=201604050049&print=yes	Yes
April 5, 2016	Unknown	Turkey	1	Unknown	https://www.todayonline.com/world/one-turkish-soldier-wounded-islamic-state-fires-army-outpost-near-border-agency	
April 7, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	1	Unknown	https://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story_s.aspx?storyid=1094693504&title=Two-rocket-projectiles-from-Syria-hit-Turkish-border-town-wound-two&src=RSS	
April 7, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	2	Unknown	https://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story_s.aspx?storyid=1094693504&title=Two-rocket-projectiles-from-Syria-hit-Turkish-border-town-wound-two&src=RSS	
April 10, 2016	Gaziantep	Turkey	1	Unknown	https://en.unesco.org/news/director-general-condemns-killing-syrian-journalists-naji-jeff-zakaria-ibrahim-and-batoul	
April 11, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	12	Unknown	https://www.rt.com/news/339222-kilis-turkey-syria-rocket/	
April 12, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	8	Unknown	https://www.rt.com/news/339222-kilis-turkey-syria-rocket/	
April 13, 2016	Unknown	Turkey	0	Unknown	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-rocket/rocket-fired-from-inside-syria-wounds-five-in-turkish-border-town-governor-idUSKCN1UH2D7	

April 18, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	8	Unknown	www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-19/four-dead-as-rockets-hit-teachers'-dormitory-in-turkish-town/7336574
April 18, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	0	Unknown	www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-19/four-dead-as-rockets-hit-teachers'-dormitory-in-turkish-town/7336574
April 18, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	2	Unknown	www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-19/four-dead-as-rockets-hit-teachers'-dormitory-in-turkish-town/7336574
April 18, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	0	Unknown	www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-19/four-dead-as-rockets-hit-teachers'-dormitory-in-turkish-town/7336574
April 19, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	1	Unknown	https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2016/04/19/house-in-kilis-on-fire-after-being-hit-by-rockets-from-syria
April 19, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	1	Unknown	https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2016/04/19/house-in-kilis-on-fire-after-being-hit-by-rockets-from-syria
April 19, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	1	Unknown	https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2016/04/19/house-in-kilis-on-fire-after-being-hit-by-rockets-from-syria
April 22, 2016	Unknown	Turkey	9	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/16-wounded-as-two-rocket-projectiles-fired-from-syria-hit-turkeys-kilis-98241
April 24, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	8	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/16-wounded-as-two-rocket-projectiles-fired-from-syria-hit-turkeys-kilis-98241
April 24, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	11	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/16-wounded-as-two-rocket-projectiles-fired-from-syria-hit-turkeys-kilis-98241
April 24, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	8	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/16-wounded-as-two-rocket-projectiles-fired-from-syria-hit-turkeys-kilis-98241
April 28, 2016	Karkamis	Turkey	0	Unknown	https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/five-mortar-shells-land-along-se-turkish-border-/563121
May 1, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	2	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/two-rocket-projectiles-hit-turkeys-kilis-98498
May 1, 2016	Gaziantep	Turkey	38	Unknown	https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/782576/explosion-in-southern-turkey-kills-policeman-13-wounded
May 1, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	2	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/two-rocket-projectiles-hit-turkeys-kilis-98498
May 1, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	2	Unknown	https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/782576/explosion-in-southern-turkey-kills-policeman-13-wounded
May 2, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	1	Unknown	https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/new-cross-border-rocket-attack-kills-one-in-se-turkey/565300
May 2, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	2	Unknown	https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/new-cross-border-rocket-attack-kills-one-in-se-turkey/565300
May 5, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	0	Unknown	https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/four-people-injured-in-southern-turkey-rocket-attack/566858

May 5, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	1	Unknown	https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/four-people-injured-in-southern-turkey-rocket-attack/566858	
May 5, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	3	Unknown	https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/four-people-injured-in-southern-turkey-rocket-attack/566858	
May 6, 2016	Istanbul	Turkey	1	Yes	https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkish-journalist-survives-assassination-attempt-before-receiving-5-year-sentence-for-revealing-a7017816.html	Yes
May 27, 2016	Unknown	Turkey	0	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-army-hits-isis-targets-in-syria-says-104-militants-killed-99780	
May 27, 2016	Elbeyli district	Turkey	5	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-army-hits-isis-targets-in-syria-says-104-militants-killed-99780	
May 27, 2016	Unknown	Turkey	0	Unknown	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-army-hits-isis-targets-in-syria-says-104-militants-killed-99780	
June 12, 2016	Sanliurfa	Turkey	1	Unknown	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-activist/syrian-activist-shot-by-islamic-state-fighters-in-southeast-turkey-idUSKCN0YZ100	
June 21, 2016	Ar-Ruwayshid district	Jordan	21	Unknown	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-bomb/car-bombs-kill-at-least-six-in-syrian-camp-near-jordan-border-idUSKCN18B2JM	
June 21, 2016	Istanbul	Turkey	0	Unknown	https://en.trend.az/world/turkey/2548658.html	
June 27, 2016	Qaa	Lebanon	13	No	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon/eight-suicide-bombers-target-lebanese-christian-village-idUSKCN0ZD09C	
June 27, 2016	Qaa	Lebanon	17	No	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon/eight-suicide-bombers-target-lebanese-christian-village-idUSKCN0ZD09C	
June 27, 2016	Qaa	Lebanon	11	No	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon/eight-suicide-bombers-target-lebanese-christian-village-idUSKCN0ZD09C	
June 28, 2016	Istanbul	Turkey	283	No	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36670576	
June 28, 2016	Puchong	Malaysia	8	Yes	https://www.channelnewsasia.com/404	
August 20, 2016	Gaziantep	Turkey	149	Unknown	https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-wedding-bomb-latest-child-suicide-attack-erdogan-isis-a7202381.html	
August 23, 2016	Karkamis	Turkey	0	Unknown	https://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/08/23/turkey-strikes-isis-syria-tensions-rise-border-town.html	
August 29, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	5	Unknown	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/rockets-syria-strike-turkey-kilis-160424172703622.html	
September 19, 2016	Unknown	Turkey	0	Unknown	https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2016/09/19/2-daesh-suicide-bombers-detained-in-southeastern-turkey	

September 22, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	2	Unknown	http://nna-leb.gov.lb/en/show-news/68677/Rocket-fired-from-Syria-hurts-in-Turkey-officials	
September 22, 2016	Kilis	Turkey	6	Unknown	http://nna-leb.gov.lb/en/show-news/68677/Rocket-fired-from-Syria-hurts-in-Turkey-officials	
October 16, 2016	Rukban	Jordan	24	Unknown	https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/ISIS-Threat/ISIS-suspected-as-suicide-bomber-kills-3-at-refugee-camp-on-Syria-Jordan-border-470257	
October 16, 2016	Arsal	Lebanon	1	Unknown	https://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/d/breaking-news/285951/lebanese-army-soldier-shot-dead-in-arsal/en	
October 17, 2016	Sokhumi	Georgia	1	Unknown	https://www.dw.com/en/man-blows-himself-up-at-tv-station-in-abkhazia/a-36062319-0	Yes
November 4, 2016	Diyarbakir	Turkey	114	Unknown	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-blast-kurds-idUSKBN1310F4?il=0	Yes
December 4, 2016	Bqaa Sifrin	Lebanon	2	Unknown	http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/221572	
December 18, 2016	Karak	Jordan	43	Yes	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-jordan-claim/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-for-shootout-at-jordanian-castle-statement-idUSKBN1491GN	
December 18, 2016	Qatraneh	Jordan	2	Yes	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-jordan-claim/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-for-shootout-at-jordanian-castle-statement-idUSKBN1491GN	
December 18, 2016	Karak	Jordan	0	Yes	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-jordan-claim/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-for-shootout-at-jordanian-castle-statement-idUSKBN1491GN	
Total			2795			

Note: Iraq and Syria excluded from the sample

Table A3: Countries Involved in Airstrikes Against ISIS in Iraq or Syria Before December 2016

Countries involved in airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq or Syria before the end of the study period (December 2016)

Country	First airstrikes	Reference
US	August 2014	https://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/iraq-options/index.html?hpt=hp_t1
Bahrain	September 2014	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-usa-strikes/u-s-and-arab-allies-launch-first-strikes-on-militants-in-syria-idUSKCN0HI03A20140923
France	September 2014	https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/chammal/actualites/irak-premieres-frappes-francaises
Jordan	September 2014	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-usa-strikes/u-s-and-arab-allies-launch-first-strikes-on-militants-in-syria-idUSKCN0HI03A20140923
UK	September 2014	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/raf-tornado-jets-fly-ready-for-attack-role-over-iraq
United Arab Emirates	September 2014	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-usa-strikes/u-s-and-arab-allies-launch-first-strikes-on-militants-in-syria-idUSKCN0HI03A20140923
Saudi Arabia	September 2014	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-usa-strikes/u-s-and-arab-allies-launch-first-strikes-on-militants-in-syria-idUSKCN0HI03A20140923
Australia	October 2014	https://web.archive.org/web/20141006120200/http://news.defence.gov.au/2014/10/02/australian-air-task-group-commences-operational-missions-over-iraq/
Belgium	October 2014	https://www.mil.be/nl/artikel/zevenduizend-vlieguren-boven-irak-en-syrie
Denmark	October 2014	https://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/the-effort-against-isil.aspx
Netherlands	October 2014	https://nltimes.nl/2014/09/24/dutch-parliament-commits-soldiers-f-16s-fight-isis-iraq
Canada	November 2014	https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-mission-canadian-cf-18s-drop-laser-guided-bombs-over-iraq-1.2821425
Iran	December 2014	https://www.haaretz.com/iranian-jet-seen-hitting-isis-targets-in-iraq-1.5338876
Morocco	December 2014	http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2014/12/146456/moroccan-f-16-carry-out-airstrikes-against-isis/
Turkey	July 2015	http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-airstrikes-target-isil-in-syria-85853
Russia	September 2015	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/russian-carries-air-strikes-syria-150930133155190.html

Note: Iraq and Syria excluded from the sample

Table A4: Study 1 Main Variables Description

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Number of attacks by affiliated terrorists	155	.703	5.72	0	68
Number of attacks by lone wolves	155	.213	1.13	0	9
Number of foreign fighters	155	174	625	0	6000
Military intervention against ISIL	155	.271	.627	0	2
Share of Sunni population	155	.212	.326	0	.99
Youth unemployment rate	155	.165	.122	.00345	.535
Sunni discriminated minority	155	.239	.428	0	1
logged Population	155	16.2	1.57	13.2	21
logged GDP per capita	155	8.57	1.5	5.75	11.7
Democracy score	155	4.43	5.93	-10	10
Distance to Iraq	155	5.77	3.81	.56	15.6

Note: Syria and Iraq are excluded from the sample

Table A5: Countries Involved in External Military Strikes Against Groups Affiliated to ISIS Before December 2016

Country	First strikes	Reference
Benin	February 2015	https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2015/0207/Nigeria-postpones-elections-focuses-on-major-offensive-against-Boko-Haram
Cameroon	February 2015	https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2015/0207/Nigeria-postpones-elections-focuses-on-major-offensive-against-Boko-Haram

Chad	February 2015	https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2015/0207/Nigeria-postpones-elections-focuses-on-major-offensive-against-Boko-Haram
Egypt	February 2015	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/16/egypt-air-strikes-target-isis-weapons-stockpiles-libya
Niger	February 2015	https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2015/0207/Nigeria-postpones-elections-focuses-on-major-offensive-against-Boko-Haram
US	November 2015	https://www.thedailybeast.com/us-kills-leader-of-isis-in-libya

Note: Nigeria, Libya, Yemen, Sudan and Afghanistan excluded from the sample

Table A6: Study 1 Robustness Check - Casualties Related to ISIS

Unstandardised coefficients from negative binomial regression analyses

Variables	Number of casualties due to attacks					
	by affiliated terrorists			by lone wolves		
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Target selection causes						
Military intervention against ISIL (no as reference)						
Military support of the coalition	1.394		4.277	5.280*		6.250
	(1.881)		(4.322)	(2.613)		(4.391)
Airstrikes in Iraq or Syria	5.554**		8.422	5.285*		6.938
	(1.943)		(4.400)	(2.543)		(3.682)
Mobilization causes						
Share of Sunni population		23.40	42.84		9.802	12.68
		(39.05)	(35.91)		(12.50)	(11.33)
Youth unemployment rate		-2.541	13.59		-6.516	1.712
		(12.85)	(13.52)		(25.22)	(19.47)
Share of Sunni population * Youth unemployment rate		-45.15	-9.101		4.166	-20.75
		(199.3)	(190.4)		(46.48)	(40.39)
Sunni discriminated minority		2.946	3.201		1.567	-1.333
		(2.302)	(1.929)		(2.783)	(3.233)
Controls						
logged Population	1.071**	1.290*	1.352**	0.882	0.0956	0.347

	(0.362)	(0.533)	(0.480)	(0.820)	(1.290)	(1.096)
logged GDP per capita	-0.168	6.556	10.26	0.904	3.322*	0.790
	(0.847)	(4.513)	(6.009)	(0.934)	(1.354)	(1.248)
Democracy score	1.314	1.761	4.739	0.0808	0.558	0.485
	(0.697)	(1.252)	(2.695)	(0.233)	(0.430)	(0.427)
Distance to Iraq	-0.0434	0.0619	0.0141	-0.336	-1.099	-0.591
	(0.141)	(0.198)	(0.150)	(0.359)	(0.868)	(0.736)
Constant	-32.23**	-110.4	-191.7	-23.76	-33.70	-18.95
	(11.26)	(63.34)	(101.4)	(14.35)	(22.30)	(20.71)
ln(alpha)	0.703	1.383**	0.0254	3.692***	3.658***	3.398***
	(0.574)	(0.470)	(0.505)	(0.416)	(0.396)	(0.414)
Pseudo R-squared	0.410	0.365	0.510	0.113	0.125	0.143
Observations	155	155	155	155	155	155

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Note: Iraq and Syria excluded from the sample

Table A7: Study 1 Robustness Check - ISIS and groups that declared allegiance to ISIS

Unstandardised coefficients from negative binomial regression analyses

Oucome	Number of foreign fighters			Number of events								
				By lone wolves			by affiliated terrorists from ISIS and groups that declared allegiance			by affiliated terrorists from groups that declared allegiance		
Variables	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	VII	VIII	IX
Target selection cause												
Strikes aganst ISIL or ISIL affiliated groups	1.843 (0.950)		0.334 (0.790)	1.872* (0.738)		2.508* (1.127)	1.722 (1.305)		2.629* (1.045)			
Strikes against ISIL affiliated groups										2.526 (2.359)		5.811* (2.513)
Mobilization causes												
Share of Sunni population		3.866* (1.686)	3.914* (1.664)		15.94 (13.37)	25.50 (15.89)		-0.506 (2.077)	-0.612 (2.194)		-0.638 (4.089)	-0.413 (3.275)
Youth unemployment rate		1.195 (2.654)	1.235 (2.586)		1.713 (4.466)	-1.828 (8.310)		-2.919 (5.084)	-5.153 (5.589)		-15.49 (15.87)	-16.05 (11.08)
Share of Sunni population * Youth unemployment rate		8.218 (7.282)	7.585 (7.348)		-33.85 (76.86)	-76.30 (69.51)		6.503 (8.996)	11.76 (9.661)		19.74 (21.82)	31.46 (16.12)
Sunni discriminated minority		2.286*** (0.626)	2.256*** (0.629)		1.299 (0.790)	1.933* (0.958)		2.106* (0.956)	2.733** (0.931)		3.705* (1.488)	3.715** (1.376)
Controls												
logged Population	0.427 (0.248)	0.312 (0.181)	0.289 (0.184)	0.874** (0.277)	1.022*** (0.283)	0.787** (0.280)	1.381*** (0.285)	0.963** (0.333)	0.703* (0.327)	1.700*** (0.439)	0.917 (0.554)	0.986 (0.506)

logged GDP per capita	0.381 (0.235)	1.476*** (0.196)	1.434*** (0.217)	1.074 (0.549)	4.057** (1.456)	4.378* (2.048)	-0.101 (0.330)	0.0500 (0.293)	-0.253 (0.288)	0.571 (0.343)	0.0349 (0.474)	0.107 (0.392)
Democracy score	0.0578 (0.0497)	0.0755 (0.0563)	0.0748 (0.0553)	0.168 (0.231)	0.310 (0.267)	0.454 (0.284)	-0.00257 (0.0849)	-0.0992 (0.0772)	0.00537 (0.0872)	-0.00303 (0.105)	-0.0963 (0.139)	-0.0187 (0.113)
Territorial contiguity with ISIL and ISIL affiliated groups positions	2.860*** (0.806)	0.286 (0.832)	0.358 (0.844)	-36.70 (1.148e+08)	-39.10 (5.284e+07)	-28.82 -152,656	3.354*** (0.839)	3.010*** (0.914)	2.033* (0.927)			
Territorial contiguity with ISIL affiliated groups positions										2.287 (1.438)	3.786** (1.426)	-0.555 (1.868)
Constant	-7.224 (4.189)	-17.58*** (3.329)	-16.89*** (3.624)	-29.38*** (8.012)	-65.48** (20.67)	-67.82* (28.40)	-23.08*** (6.347)	-17.19* (6.768)	-11.22 (6.696)	-33.80*** (9.264)	-16.39 (12.13)	-18.81 (10.88)
ln(alpha)	2.516*** (0.150)	1.975*** (0.163)	1.973*** (0.163)	-0.00786 (0.829)	-0.554 (1.300)	-1.046 (0.922)	2.303*** (0.251)	2.192*** (0.253)	2.060*** (0.251)	2.999*** (0.290)	2.689*** (0.290)	2.512*** (0.295)
Pseudo R-squared	0.0280	0.0758	0.0760	0.400	0.475	0.573	0.117	0.127	0.146	0.0901	0.132	0.150
Observations	151	151	151	151	151	151	151	151	151	151	151	151

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Note: Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, Libya, Somalia, Afghanistan and Yemen excluded from the sample

Study 2

Table A8: Study 2 Main Variables Description

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Number of domestic jihadist events	2214	.0944	.816	0	27
Military politico-strategic intervention in Muslim majority countries	2214	.0623	.242	0	1
Share of Muslim population	2214	.253	.357	0	1
Youth unemployment rate	2214	.173	.121	.00403	.657
Muslim discriminated minority	2214	.26	.439	0	1
logged Population	2214	16	1.58	12.7	21
logged GDP per capita	2214	7.53	1.62	4.17	11.3
Democracy score	2214	3.01	6.63	-10	10
Civil war	2214	.0501	.218	0	1

Table A9: Study 2 Robustness Checks

Unstandardised coefficients from negative binomial regression analyses

Outcome	Number of domestic jihadist attacks					Number of casualties due to jihadist domestic attacks			
Variables	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
Target selection cause									
Military politico-strategic intervention in Muslim majority countries (t-1)						7.657*** (2.218)	5.126* (2.397)		
Military socio-economic intervention in Muslim majority countries (t-1)	1.356* (0.629)	1.491* (0.616)			1.322 (0.682)			7.914** (2.446)	3.457 (2.469)
Military socio-economic intervention in non-Muslim majority countries (t-1)			-0.987 (0.760)						
Military socio-economic intervention in Muslim majority countries (t+1)				1.188 (0.652)					
Mobilization causes									
Share of Muslim population (t-1)		-0.646 (1.000)	-0.196 (0.983)	0.346 (1.022)	-0.384 (0.976)	-4.766 (3.440)	-1.947 (3.271)	-4.460 (3.437)	-1.647 (3.494)
Youth unemployment rate (t-1)		0.131 (2.524)	0.343 (2.419)	0.323 (2.471)	0.255 (2.467)	2.931 (6.544)	-4.258 (7.385)	3.480 (6.783)	-4.977 (7.938)
Share of Muslim population (t-1) * Youth unemployment rate (t-1)		7.372 (4.045)	5.678 (3.959)	3.948 (4.142)	6.049 (3.960)	17.65 (12.74)	23.10 (14.56)	16.44 (12.76)	24.42 (14.92)
Muslim discriminated minority (t-1)		1.111** (0.419)	1.090** (0.410)	0.809 (0.427)	1.197** (0.425)	1.951 (1.053)	5.320*** (1.060)	1.770 (1.067)	5.494*** (1.140)

Controls									
logged Population (t-1)	1.131*** (0.164)	0.852*** (0.157)	0.898*** (0.157)	0.889*** (0.167)	0.787*** (0.150)	2.800*** (0.569)	2.063*** (0.436)	3.093*** (0.603)	2.142*** (0.460)
logged GDP per capita (t-1)	1.192*** (0.171)	0.884*** (0.175)	0.906*** (0.173)	0.949*** (0.200)	0.873*** (0.173)	0.769 (0.498)	1.548*** (0.422)	1.033* (0.503)	1.805*** (0.410)
Democracy score (t-1)	0.00803 (0.0321)	0.0601 (0.0407)	0.0514 (0.0408)	0.0590 (0.0403)	0.0641 (0.0389)	0.0252 (0.150)	-0.153 (0.122)	0.0213 (0.155)	-0.156 (0.132)
Civil war (t-1)	2.103*** (0.479)	1.454** (0.552)	1.479** (0.540)	1.843*** (0.549)	1.608** (0.569)	-4.836** (1.829)	-0.356 (1.950)	-5.060** (1.890)	0.0552 (1.957)
Continent fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Year fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant	-30.06*** (3.635)	-24.27*** (3.499)	-25.18*** (3.511)	-25.13*** (3.824)	-23.08*** (3.432)	-52.36*** (11.34)	-50.86*** (9.678)	-58.91*** (11.95)	-52.83*** (10.29)
ln(alpha)	2.557*** (0.173)	2.341*** (0.188)	2.310*** (0.191)	2.152*** (0.205)	2.185*** (0.198)	4.681*** (0.144)	4.558*** (0.144)	4.690*** (0.143)	4.593*** (0.144)
Pseudo R-squared	0.206	0.227	0.221	0.236	0.240	0.0910	0.102	0.0905	0.0988
Observations	2,214	2,214	2,214	1,904	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

¹Because of convergence problems, models VII and XI do not include continent fixed effects.

