The establishment of MPAs both in national waters and in the high seas
faces a complex polycentric ocean governance system, including
multi-level and multi-jurisdictional governance. Ocean issues are a
transnational and transboundary problem. Current and emerging issues
such as fisheries, aquaculture, biodiversity conservation on the high
seas, MPAs, deep-sea mining, ocean acidification, blue carbon, and
plastics pollution extend across national boundaries and into areas
beyond national jurisdiction. When managing transboundary issues and
formulating public policy, decision makers must not only increasingly
take into account the interests of NGOs and multi-national corporations,
but also consider other important authoritative participants, such as
various levels of government at an international level, the interests of
a growing number of influential states around the world, and obligations
arising from the signing of international agreements and memberships in
intergovernmental organizations. Decision-makers in ocean governance are
working in an environment marked by a proliferation of power centres
affecting policymaking and governance (Cairney 2019). To establish a
global network of MPAs decision makers must not only take into account
the various levels of governance (e.g. national, regional and global)
but also the interests and agendas of intergovernmental organisations
(IGO), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), scientists, and
multinational corporations.
According to Wolfish and Smith (2000) the multiple ‘power centres’
theory can be understood in three ways as shown in Table 2 . The
first approach suggests the existence of three or more dominant states
interacting in the international system. Here ‘power’ is understood as
the means for a state to pursue its interests internationally, typically
through economic influence or military force. For example, China is one
of the World’s most economically powerful states and has one of the
largest fishing fleets in the world. China’s role in oceans governance
is increasing adopts a more assertive stance on national interests in
key areas such as the South China Sea (McGee, Gogarty and Smith, 2017),
the Southern Ocean (Brady 2017) and the Arctic (Geng 2012).
The second approach of Wolfish and Smith (2000) focuses on involvement
of other actors as power centres, such as global and regional
agreements, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), NGOs and private
organisations which influence ocean governance. Here the ‘power’ refers
to the capabilities of the actors to pursue their agenda and interests.
The sources of power will vary according to the type of actors and their
particular aims and may arise from the ability to generate and use
knowledge and media, funding, and from moral influence. IGOs and global
and regional agreements have international membership, scope and
presence and bring member states together to cooperate on particular
issues that have global impacts. Membership often requires state
governments to harmonize their own national policies to conform to
internationally agreed upon norms and standards. However, in this
respect, they are limited by the commitment of member states to comply
with their rules, and by the effectiveness of their enforcement
mechanisms (Wolfish and Smith 2000). Some power centres can stem from
communities of shared knowledge. Success of many international
environmental agreements can be attributed to the involvement of an
environmental epistemic community of scientific and/or policy experts
which set the international agenda and convince their own states to
support international efforts toward the introduction of internationally
agreed management measures/targets (Haas 1989).
The third approach of Wolfish and Smith (2000) focuses on the
interaction of the actors. Within a given issue area, relevant actors
(e.g. governments, NGOs, corporations, scientists) interact to produce a
convergence of expectations and a set of common understandings that give
rise to a set of legitimate norms, values, rules, and procedures. The
power centre does not refer to a political actor, but rather to a sphere
of authority,11A sphere of authority can be defined as ‘an
issue-area in which relevant actors, be they states, non-state actors,
quasi -state institutions, transnational communities, or any
combination thereof, interact and in which one can discern a
convergence of expectations on the rules, norms, principles, and
procedures through which decisions are made and implemented’ (Rosenau
1999: 290). and in this view, ‘power is not synonymous with
capability, but with legitimacy and authority’. The emphasis is on actor
interaction and on the institutions that arise from their interaction,
and thereby focusing on the values underpinning actor behaviour.
Compliance with the decisions tends therefore to be voluntary.
Legitimacy, in turn, is derived from the agreement of participant
expectations on the values, rules, and procedures within a given
issue-area.