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Detecting End-Point (EP) Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attack based on ARP Analysis: A Machine Learning Approach

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Abstract

End-Point (EP) Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack is a well-known threat in computer security. It targets the data flow between endpoints, and the confidentiality and integrity of the data itself. Several techniques have been developed to address this kind of attack. With the current emergence of machine learning (ML) models, we explore the possibility of applying ML in EP MITM detection. Our detection technique is based on address resolution protocol (ARP) analysis. The technique combines signal processing and machine learning in detecting EP MITM attack. We evaluated the accuracy of the proposed technique using linear-based ML classification models. The technique proved itself to be efficient by producing a detection accuracy of 99.72%.

KEYWORDS:
ARP, Internet Protocol, MITM, Machine Learning

1 | INTRODUCTION

End-Point (EP) Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) is an eavesdropping attack, where in a communication session between two client devices A and B, the attacker deceives A by pretending to be B. This enables the attacker to read or modify messages sent from A to B (shown in Figure 1). This attack is possible due to the weakness in the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). ARP is a protocol used by the data link layer to map Internet Protocol (IP) Addresses to MAC addresses[1]. Before encapsulating the network layer packet in a data link layer frame, the host sending the packet needs to know the recipient's MAC address. Given the IP address of a host, to find its MAC address, the source node broadcasts an ARP request packet which asks about the MAC address of the owner of the IP address. This request is received by all nodes inside the local area network (LAN). The node that owns this IP address replies with its MAC address (unicast)[2].

ARP is a stateless protocol and has a lack of security in caching system[3]. It accepts ARP replies without considering if an ARP request was sent. This weakness can be exploited by an attacker to initiate MITM attack. A denial of service (DoS) attack can occur if the attack drops the received packet without forwarding it to the appropriate destination.

Although MITM attack has been known for some time, it is still considered a significant threat[3,4], and have gained much attention over the past years. This can be attributed to the fact that the attack is easy to achieve and very difficult to detect.

A number of techniques have been proposed by researchers in detecting and defending against this security threat. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDs) have been used to detect and prevent MITM in Wired Local Area Networks (LANs)[5]. A unicast ARP request has been proposed as a replacement for broadcast ARP request[6]. Encryption-based ARP that utilizes public key cryptography has also been proposed[7,8]. An approach to prevent ARP cache poisoning by monitoring Domain Name Host



FIGURE 1 MITM Attack

Configuration (DHCP) acknowledgment messages has also been proposed[9]. Other researchers have proposed a voting-based ARP spoofing resistant protocol to address EP MITM attack[10,11,12].

Some proposed techniques are complex to implement on Low-Embedded devices and also others involve the change in the entire protocol. Recently, Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) analysis has been proposed as a means to detect MITM attacks in LANs[13]. This is a very good technique that applies signal processing in detecting MITM attacks. A burst of ICMP request packets are sent to an endpoint. The payload sizes of the ICMP request packets are modulated according to an excitation signal. As a result, the impulse response extracted from the Round Trip Time (RTT) is used to model the network environment in the perspective of two communicating hosts. When a third party intercepts traffic, the harmonic composition of the impulse response between the host changes significantly; which formed the basis of their MITM detection.

Even though the ICMP echo-analysis is a good MITM detection mechanism, it has a few flaws. Since the detection is based on flooding an endpoint with ICMP request packets, it can easily be picked up as a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Besides ICMP packets can be blocked by the attacker which defeats the detection mechanism. Furthermore an ICMP request/reply packet is 98 bytes each[14]. Even though the size of the packet seems insignificant, a burst of such requests/replies can have a significant effect on the systems performance.

1.1 | Proposed Solution

Our proposed solution is based on the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). We chose ARP because it has a maximum packet size of 60 bytes for each ARP request and response. Besides, ARP can be spoofed but not blocked by an attacker since it is a default protocol used in mapping IP addresses to MAC addresses. We modulate a burst of ARP requests using a maximum length sequence (MLS)[15] which is a pseudorandom binary sequence. We determine the RTTs based on the ARP requests and responses. To address the stateless nature of ARP, we modified the address resolution protocol to include a binary sequence and also a sequence number. The binary sequence and the sequence number were embedded in the ARP request and response and enabled us to match a corresponding ARP request to its response. Based on the RTTs we compute the system's response and the energy of the response. Using the system's response and energy response as features we evaluated the detection mechanism based on a number of linear machine learning models.

1.2 | Research Contributions

The contribution of this study is as follows:

- A novel method for detecting MITM attack based on ARP analysis. This method is applicable for both Wired and Wireless LANs.
- A 'stateful' address resolution protocol.

2 | ATTACK MODEL

In this section we describe the MITM attack model used throughout the study. We also enumerate the attacker's requirements, attack vectors and capabilities.

2.1 | Attack Scenario

Figure 2 shows the attack scenario used. Client **A** communicates wireless with Client **B**. Client **C** however intercepts the traffic between client **A** and **B** through ARP poisoning; hence traffic sent from **A** to **B** is routed through **C**. **C** can either perform active or passive monitoring.



FIGURE 2 Attack Scenario

The detection mechanism is based on the fact the time taken for an ARP request to be sent directly from **A** to **B** will vary from the instance where an attacker intercepts the traffic.

3 | ARP ANALYSIS

The address resolution protocol has a default size of 42 bytes as shown in Figure 3.

An 18 bytes padding can be added to the default 42 bytes to obtain a 60 bytes frame (as shown in Figure 4).



FIGURE 3 Sample ARP Request



FIGURE 4 Sample ARP Request with padding

The logical connection between Client **A** and **B** is modeled as a Linear Time Invariant (LTI) system as shown in Figure 5.

We first determined the impulse response of the system by modulating a burst of ARP request packets with a maximum length sequence (MLS). MLS are generated using maximal linear feedback shift registers. The last byte of the padding is encoded with the bit value generated from the MLS. A random sequence number is encoded in the 8 bytes that precedes the last byte. A sample ARP request and reply is shown in Figure 6 and 7 respectively.

At point **A** we were able to determined the RTTs of the burst of ARP requests based on the sequence numbers encoded in the padding payload. Using the RTT for each ARP request/reply packet, we were able to characterize the harmonic response of the channel. Using Parseval's theorem,

$$E_h = \frac{1}{N} = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left| \frac{Y[n]}{X[n]} \right|^2 \tag{1}$$

we computed the energy of the impulse response of the channel; where $\left|\frac{Y[n]}{X[n]}\right|$ is the transfer function of the system's impulse response.



FIGURE 5 Channel Modeling



FIGURE 6 Custom ARP request packet

After determining the harmonic composition of the channel in the normal state, we also determine the system impulse response and energy in the MITM attack state. Figure 8 shows a graph showing the binary sequence and their corresponding RTTs.

Using the mean of the RTTs together with the energy of the system's impulse response as a feature vectors, we built a detection engine using linear-based machine learning (ML) classification models.

4 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Figure 9 shows the RTTs for the two channel states; normal state and MITM attack state.



FIGURE 7 Custom ARP reply packet



FIGURE 8 Round Trip Time

We evaluated the proposed technique using eight (8) linear-based ML classification models; *LinearSVC*, *SVC*, *KNN*, *Decision Tree*, *Logistic Regression*, *Random Forest*, *Gradient Boosting* and *Gaussian Naive Bayes*. The dataset contained 5,300 rows of the feature vectors. 80% of the dataset was used in training and the performance of each model was evaluated on the remaining 20%. Figures 10−13 are the confusion matrices of the linear-based models used in this study.

Linear SVC (Figure 10a) and *Gaussian Naive Bayes* (Figure 13b) have a classification accuracy of 99.72% with a misclassification of 0.28%. *SVC* (Figure 10b) and *Logistic Regression* (Figure 12a) have an accuracy of 99.62%. The percentage accuracy of *Random Forest* (Figure 12b) is 99.44%. An accuracy of 99.34% was produced by *KNN* (Figure 11a), *Decision Tree* (Figure 11b) and *Gradient Boosting* (Figure 13a) classifiers.

A summary of the percentage accuracy of each model is shown in Table 1. *Linear SVC* and *Gaussian Naive Bayes* produced the highest accuracy among all the other models. All the above models had a higher accuracy as compared to[13] whose model produced an average accuracy of 93.27%.



FIGURE 9 RTTs for the two channel states.



(a) Linear SVC **(b)** SVC

FIGURE 10



(a) KNN **(b)** Decision Tree

FIGURE 11

(a) Logistic Regression **(b)** Random Forest

FIGURE 12



(a) Gradient Boosting **(b)** Gaussian Naive Bayes

FIGURE 13

TABLE 1 Summary of Each Model's Accuracy.

Model	Accuracy of Model (%).
Linear SVC	99.72%
Gaussian Naive Bayes	99.72%
SVC	99.62%
Logistic Regression	99.62%
Random Forest	99.44%
KNN	99.34%
Decision Tree	99.34%
Gradient Boosting	99.34%

5 | CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In this study, we have proposed a detection of MITM attack based on ARP analysis. We introduced statefulness into the address resolution protocol by adding a padding layer to the frame and encoding a bit value and a sequence number. The proposed technique achieves an accuracy of 99.72% when modeled using linear-based ML classification algorithms. The study has shown that ARP analysis is a good technique for detecting EP MITM attack.

Future works will explore how this technique can be implemented in enterprise wired and wireless LANs since the attack scenario used was only based on a single point network.

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Authors have no conflict of interest relevant to this article.

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