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Today's neuroscience is incomplete
The advantage of philosophy over science in regard to consciousness is that it can consider something like "experience" wherefore science has no measure of yet. However, what seems just to be an advantage to philosophy may be a stumbling block for today's neuroscience.
To understand this, we divide consciousness into two part \cite{Chalmers_1998}. The first part is the "easy problems of consciousness" which include the following phenomena: the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli; the integration of information by a cognitive system; the reportability of mental states; the ability of a system to access its own internal states; the focus of attention; the deliberate control of behaviour; and the difference between wakefulness and sleep. On the contrary, the hard problem refers then to the problem of explaining why and how sentient organisms have qualia or phenomenal experience. Qualia can be simply and broadly defined as the 'what it is like' character of mental states \cite{Nagel_1974}. They refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia \cite{sep-qualia}. The difficulty which arise from qualia is that, they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any means other than direct experience and that all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible \cite{dennett1990quining}. In this sense it is impossible to communicate or 'access' qualia directly. Consequently, thought experiments have been designed to help understand qualia.
Others argue that qualia and hence the hard problem can never be explained cite.
If we now assume physicalism and that qualia exist, then it follows that today's neuroscience must be incomplete. Thomas Nagel \cite{Nagel_1974} claims that qualia may need new concepts in neuroscience to be understood. We claim further that qualia is a cornerstone to understand mind.