A famous thought experiment by Jackson \cite{jackson1982epiphenomenal} aims to show that qualia are irreducible, non-physical entities. In this experiment, Mary, a scientist who knows everything about colours, has ever only seen her world in monochrome. She wonders to herself, how it may be, if she could see colours. When she finally can see colours, she experiences colours and makes important discoveries, despite the fact, that she had known everything about colours. If what it is like for someone to experience colour is one and the same as some physical quality, then Mary would have known that before she can even see it. But because she doesn't know, then one may conclude that qualia is irreducible, non-physical. If instead, qualia is physical, then it follows, that the assumption about how information in the brain is processed, is false or incomplete. Are we missing something in the thought experiment about Mary? If yes, then qualia may need new concepts in neuroscience to be understood, which had been claimed by Nagel \cite{Nagel_1974} years before.