In his article ‘10500. Darwinian Algorithm and a Possible Candidate for a “Unifying Theme” of Big History’ David Baker postulates another aspect of the long-sought after ‘unifying theme’ of Big History, in addition to the rise of complexity and energy flows. He looks briefly at the manifestation of
the ‘Darwinian algorithm’, that is to say an algorithm of random variation and non-random selection, in many physical processes in the Universe: cosmology, geology, biology, culture, and even the occurrence of universes themselves. This algorithm also seems to gradually open more forms of variation and more selection paths over time, leading to a higher level of free energy rate density, or what we know as ‘complexity’. In fact the complexity of the object under discussion seems to correspond to the available number of selection paths. The article also reflects on what the Darwinian algorithm and
the rise of complexity could possibly mean for the humanity and the future
of the cosmos.

It is worth making some editorial comments on David Baker’s paper. This is an interesting and audacious article trying to find a common evolutionary mechanism not only within, but beyond Big History as well. Baker starts his article with analyzing the selection of universes within which there could appear some physical laws and parameters allowing the universes to evolve. Baker explores the selection mechanism among an enormous number (potentially 10500 – a fabulous number even for modern cosmology) of universes in the ‘multiverse’. Of course, the idea that there exist other universes besides ours is still an absolutely unconfirmed, though outstanding, hypothesis. But consideration of hypotheses is one of the main activities in science. In our opinion, the algorithm, which Baker analyzes, could hardly be called Darwinian in proper sense with respect to cosmic evolution and a fortiori with respect to the selection of universes and physical laws. He rather speaks about the evolutionary selection in general – that is not the selection of the fittest, but rather the selection of those capable to evolve – which is much wider than the Darwinian selection. The matter is that in biology we always have limited resources (even in the absence of direct competition) and constantly changing conditions. If the resources were not limited and if conditions did not change constantly, there would be no selection. The Darwinian selection means the survival of the fittest. How could this be applicable to universes? Would not it be more correct to speak about a random cosmic selection which later in the course of evolution could evolve into non-random (though not directed) Darwinian selection? Or at least would not it be more appropriate to call the cosmic selection proto-Darwinian? No matter how one interprets such cosmic selection, we cannot but appreciate the author’s endeavor to point out selection as one of the most important evolutionary mechanisms at all stages of Big History.

Dmitry A. Skladnev, Sergey P. Klykov and Vladimir V. Kurakov the important subject of biological evolution in the paper titled ‘Complication of Animal Genomes in the Course of the Evolution Slowed Down after the Cambrian Explosion’. They also propose an original mathematical model which takes into account a multiphase character of development and importance of multidirectional trends in evolution. The authors argue that for the first time the growth rate of minimal animal genome size is shown to have slowed down in the course of the evolution from prokaryotic forms to mammals after the Cambrian explosion. From the biological viewpoint, the authors explain the exponential change of minimal genome size which occurred in the beginning of the evolutionary process and slowed down after the period of the Cambrian explosion; they also present certain parameters of evolutionary processes resulting from their model application. According to the proposed model, the S-shaped curve with distinct inflexion point adequately describes the increase of minimal genome size.

Arthur Saniotis, Maciej Henneberg and Jaliya Kumaratilake present the article ‘An Evolutionary and Anthropological Examination of Brain/Mind and Novelty’. This article provides an overview on how the brain/mind works in relation to novelty from evolutionary and anthropological perspectives. They maintain that the human brain functions evolved to support the survival of our ancestors as omnivores in natural environments that were of complex and varied nature. This evolution, of necessity, had to support the development of extensive memory systems and of an ability to imitate behaviors of others. Novelty as an expression of creative thought probably evolved along with the increasingly complex social processes of earlier human ancestors. Novel thought was especially expedited by the evolution of complex societies, which allowed for increasing of the individual specialization. The paper locates brain/mind novelty in terms of evolution, pattern and evolutionary learning. The authors conclude that novelty is contingent on social systems, and that current human societies need to challenge habituatal ways of thinking in order to reduce social and ecological problems.

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The final section (Discussion. Evolution: Pro et Contra) is devoted to a discussion. As we declared in the first issue of our Almanac, we want to encourage as much an open discussion as possible about evolutionary studies, in hope that sometime in the future a new diversity of approaches may lead to the emergence of a new unifying approach. In the present volume the subject of the discussion has turned out to be the very essence of evolutionism rather than particular aspects of the evolutionary theory (whatever important they could be). The discussion is opened with Gregory Sandstrom’s article (‘Peace for Evolution’s Puzzle: The Arrival of Human Extension’) that can be regarded as generally antievolutionist.

One of the initial reviewers of this article, Edmundas Lekevičius notes that Sandstrom tries to present (as he claims) a positive alternative to evolutionism as a universal ideology that can be applied to social sciences and humanities (as Sandstrom believes) without sufficient justification. He is inclined to leave Darwinian evolution to biologists only, and he is strongly against its application to social studies, for example, in the form of Sociobiology. His position is based on the following points.

He believes that both Darwinism and neo-Darwinism consider struggle and competition as the primary cause of evolution and as its driving force (note that this critique is rather obsolete dating to the late 19th – early 20th century), whereas in social systems cooperation turns out to be more important (here Sandstrom relies on Kropotkin’s article that must be regarded as very one-sided and besides rather out-dated by present). It is just cooperation that secures
socioeconomic progress. The society develops, but does not evolve in the sense in which evolution is understood by the biologists. The development of society is reversible, whereas the development in nature is irreversible. Sandstrom also believes (without serious reasons) that the notion of ‘natural selection’ is not applicable to the social/human realm.

Though the author claims to offer a theory that could serve as an alternative to evolutionism, he has actually failed to produce such an alternative. He insists rather persistently on the substitution of the term ‘human evolution’ with the notion of ‘human extension’. In this respect, Edmundas Lekevičius notes the following: ‘I am not ready to call such a substitution “a new methodology” or a new paradigm. The author pays too much attention to this purely linguistic aspect of the issue under discussion’. Together with Lekevičius, we can also draw the readers’ attention to the fact that the author did not even try to give at least a couple of examples of inadequate application of the Darwinian approach in Sociology and Economics. As a result, in his article he had to fight an entirely imaginary enemy.

It might have looked natural for the Evolution Almanac to reject such an article. However, we believe that at present the Evolutionary Studies are sufficiently strong not to avoid the participation in discussions on the relevance of classical evolutionary approaches for modern social sciences. We will not go in detail in the critique of Sandstrom’s approach, as the famous evolutionist Henri J. M. Claessen has expressed not only his position, but also the position of the editors and many our authors in his reply to Sandstrom that is published in the final part of the present Almanac.