In order to understand how the indicators laid out in our methods section help support an understanding of a landlord's relationship with tenants, our team calculated these indicators for a variety of different portfolios. These portfolios were mostly selected from the Public Advocate's "Landlord Watchlist," so there is some prior information suggesting that the landlords of these portfolios are already known to treat tenants poorly. We also included the portfolios of Steve Croman and the Kushner Cos.
The radar charts of these portfolios shown in the "Figures" document suggest a wide variety of different landlord profiles. These profiles vary in terms of the financial strategy implied and the stage of this strategy the landlord is in, the set of actions for intimidating tenants the data seems to suggest, and the extent to which one can reasonably believe what is being suggested.
The financial strategies of the portfolios examined seem to fall into a few categories: early-stage predatory equity, late-state predatory equity and unknown. Portfolios that seem to fit the model of a predatory equity investment profile are those who have 40% of buildings or more with loans underwritten by predatory equity banks (e.g. Thomas Steiner) and/or a substantial number of buildings in the portfolio on the list of properties flagged as being advertised as predatory equity investments (e.g. Silvershore Properties). Portfolios in the earlier stages (e.g. Meir Fried) have more rent stabilized units in their portfolios and less of a decline in the amount of rent stabilized units, whereas portfolios in the later stages have seen more of a decline and therefore have less rent stabilized units (e.g. Steve Croman). A portfolio like Deodat Lowtan's does show a precipitous decline in rent stabilized units, but our indicators of predatory equity do not present evidence he is engaged in such a financial scheme. However, it could be the case that further research would demonstrate the presence of such a financial incentive underlying this change in rent stabilized units, as could also be the case that further research would confound the characterizations of early or late stage predatory implied by this research. The intuition presented here is just that: an intuition, to be supported or confounded by further research.
Our indicators measure three types of actions landlords take to intimidate tenants, often to coerce them into leaving rent stabilized units: construction as harassment, evictions without just cause, and illegal deregulation through the misreporting of rent stabilized units. Some landlords (e.g. Deodat Lowtan) seem to engage in all three practices, some in just two (e.g. Kushner Cos), and some only one (e.g. Joel Goldstein). As is the case with the indicators of predatory equity, these intuitive interpretations need to be verified with further research. Nonetheless, the variance both in terms of actions directly impacting tenants and the financial schemes motivating these actions demonstrate the power of our analytic framework to help begin characterizing landlords by their bad behavior, thereby supporting a more specific and effective approach to the regulation, investigation and prosecution of landlords.