This portion provided evidence that LTTE logistics sustained an active campaign longer, and fielded larger forces. In the next section, I will describe differences in LTTE and Naga institutional structures, and how they hinge on differences in sustainment strategy.
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Between 2006 and 2009, the LTTE suffered more than 2,000 battle-deaths a year while governing northern and eastern Sri Lanka. The LTTE’s military, intelligence, and political systems were similar to a state because their maritime smuggling network provided significant resources. The military differentiated its services, conducted combined-arms maneuver, and developed robust sustainment and training institutions.
The LTTE’s army developed elite and specialized units, including artillery, mortar, engineering, and anti-armor. The LTTE air force consisted of at least ultra-light aircraft and two Robinson R44 helicopters, though they are believed to have operated several more fixed wing aircraft.\cite{richards_institutional_2014} Robust basic and advanced training courses held both on Sri Lanka and in camps abroad instilled hierarchical control and LTTE ideology. The LTTE’s navy, the Sea Tigers, emerged from the need to transport weapons from Tamil Nadu to northern Sri Lanka. The Sea Tigers also conducted underwater demolitions operations against Sri Lankan navy targets. Ultimately, the LTTE’s navy included armed gunboats, fast attack craft, oil tankers, troop carriers, and cargo vessels.\cite{richards_institutional_2014} Together, the Sea Tigers and intelligence service administered the Sea Pigeon maritime supply service’s licit and illicit trading.
The LTTE intelligence service conducted terrorist operations outside of northeast Sri Lanka, managed the Black Tiger suicide teams, taxed the diaspora population, and produced propaganda.\cite{richards_institutional_2014} LTTE intelligence and propaganda teams were sufficiently sophisticated to broadcast pirate satellite television and radio programming to diaspora populations.
The LTTE’s governance structures were similarly robust. The LTTE initially built parallel systems of government including courts, taxation, schools, and other public services. The Tamil Eelam Bank, perhaps the only insurgent national bank, controlled state-owned enterprises and LTTE employee accounts.
Naga Insurgency
The Naga insurgency reached its peak between 1990 and 1997 when it spread throughout northeast India. Pakistan continued to financially support the insurgency until at least 1994 when Pakistani diplomats provided about $1 million to purchase arms.\cite{sashinungla_nagaland:_2017} During this time, the Naga insurgency engaged in guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks: bombing trains, ambushing police officers, assassinating government officials, robbing banks, and overrunning police stations. Detailed information about the group’s military or political structure during that period is unavailable. By 2003, the two principle Naga factions together had 5,000 guerrillas and small regional political organizations. One faction maintained government-in-exile in Myanmar.
Peak Capability Analysis
The LTTE’s vertically integrated smuggling and financial network sustained forces capable of directly challenging the Sri Lankan state. Maritime transportation was a critical component of the LTTE’s ability to generate sophisticated forces. By moving higher up the value chain, the LTTE was able to purchase a wider variety of items for lower prices than if they relied on another smuggling group.
The LTTE’s greater sophistication comes at high cost. Specialized military services, a worldwide intelligence presence, and population control cost the LTTE about $300 million a year.\cite{_liberation_2016} Revolutionary taxation and low-level criminality, favored by the Naga, cannot support such sophisticated institutions. The LTTE’s coastal location made it possible to establish the robust maritime smuggling network to sustain their movement.