The LTTE supply systems delivered arms in greater quantities and reliability than the Naga. Figure \ref{figure:logistics} contrasts idealized LTTE and Naga insurgent logistics systems. The LTTE’s oceangoing supply system accessed a greater variety of arms in quantity, and reduced costs and improved security by eliminating middlemen. In mountainous eastern India, the Naga sat near the end of illegal smuggling networks. Each of the Naga’s five arrows in Figure \ref{figure:logistics} represents supply frictions with significant transaction costs. While the LTTE streamlined logistics, the Naga relied on costly and less reliable third parties.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

The LTTE’s ocean-going fleet, the Sea Tigers, served as a vertically integrated acquisitions arm. The LTTE developed the Sea Tigers as a response to the withdrawal of Indian support in 1991. This supply failure led the LTTE to vertically integrate.\cite{williamson_vertical_1971} The LTTE’s fleet of ”about a dozen vessels of 1,000 to 1,500 tons dead weight tonnage” could purchase arms directly from manufacturers in Europe and Asia at low prices.\cite{vijay_sakhuja_dynamics_2006} LTTE avoided high-cost middlemen who sell arms to most insurgent groups and engaged in ”gun-running, drug, and human smuggling.” Weapons and material were then smuggled from ocean-going vessels to shore on smaller Sea Tiger naval craft after rendezvous at sea. Peter Chalk, an LTTE scholar, described Sea Pigeon activities as follows:
”Ninety five per cent of the time the vessels transport legitimate commercial goods …for the remaining five per cent they play a vital role in supplying explosives, arms, ammunition and other war-related materiel to the LTTE theatre of war” \cite{vijay_sakhuja_dynamics_2006}
Ultimately, the LTTE’s reliance on eight to twelve ocean-going vessels doomed the organization. The previous tactic of attempting to blockade all landing sites on Sri Lanka was a Sisyphean task for the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN). With American and Indian support, the SLN destroyed the Sea Pigeon supply vessels. With the LTTE unable to rearm and resupply, Sri Lankan army attacked and destroyed the LTTE.\cite{richards_institutional_2014}

Naga Insurgency

News articles and Indian government counterinsurgency strategy indicate that the Naga relied on external arms smugglers. As early as 1968, the Times of India highlighted the danger of smuggled Chinese arms.\cite{the_times_of_india_news_service_delhis_1968} A more recent 2005 report of the arrest of a Burmese smuggler indicated he was transporting forty ”mortars, AK-47 rifles, short guns, and launchers.”\cite{_burmese_2005} This steady trickle of arms barely sustained an insurgency.
Beyond smuggling, the Indian counterinsurgency strategy of targeting border crossings, sanctuary in neighboring countries, and maritime smuggling into Myanmar and Bangladesh indicated the importance of this terrestrial trade. Since 1980, India developed a border fence along the border with Bangladesh to curb smuggling. Additionally, India provided intelligence to neighboring countries to target insurgent camps. In 2004, India’s Border Security Force provided ”a fresh list of 210 camps of various insurgent outfits” for destruction in Bangladesh.\cite{_bsf_2017} India has also unilaterally targeted insurgent camps, such as in 2015 when Indian special operators raided an insurgent camp in Myanmar.\cite{rohan_joshi_indias_2015} Finally, India’s navy and coast guard have sought to curb maritime smuggling into Myanmar and Bangladesh. A 1999 article in Jane’s Intelligence Review described a poorly coordinated Indian operation to target maritime smugglers thought to be delivering arms for ground transport through Myanmar or Bangladesh.\cite{bedi_turf_1999}

Supply Analysis

Vertically integrated LTTE supply networks delivered arms and material sufficient to challenge the Sri Lankan government. The Naga’s supply system stretched long distances, but the Naga only controlled the final leg. The lack of control puts the Naga at the mercy of high-cost suppliers and forced them to communicate with external parties, increasing the probability of intercept by Indian forces.

Peak Capability

I proposed that maritime insurgencies are associated with longer duration because of maritime smuggling and logistic network control. So far, I have shown that the LTTE and Naga were insurgencies that began under comparable conditions, excepting maritime access. I then showed that the LTTE’s vertically integrated maritime smuggling network provided a greater variety of resources from suppliers with superior control. Here, I will show that maritime resources allowed the LTTE to sustain an active campaign longer, field larger forces, and develop specialized military and political institutions.
Before diving into LTTE and Naga capabilities, I present one table and one figure to demonstrate the difference between group capabilities. Figure \ref{figure:duration} shows that the LTTE actively contested Sri Lankan governance for more total time and for a greater proportion of the conflict. The greater length of the conflict, number of episodes, and average episode duration suggest that the LTTE had greater logistical requirements.