Conclusion
\label{sect:conc}
Insurgencies since the end of the Cold War have lasted significantly longer when they have engaged in maritime operations, especially smuggling. In this paper, I set out to demonstrate a relationship between insurgent maritime operations and conflict duration. In the quantitative section, I found maritime insurgencies to be 79.0% less likely to end on a given day than an equivalent insurgency that does not use the water. The lack of a similar relationship between coastal insurgencies that did not engage in maritime smuggling provided further evidence that maritime smuggling is the key mechanism to insurgent group duration. The plausibility probe, which compared the ocean-going LTTE to the landlocked Naga, highlighted the importance of maritime, green-water smuggling networks in sustaining insurgencies. While the cases focused on South Asia, the cross-country analysis and global flow of illicit arms suggest this article’s external validity is worldwide.
For the academic community, this paper develops and tests a novel theory for why insurgent groups take to sea. Previous work identified the problem of maritime violence and contributing factors, but did not test these factors against duration. Future work in this area might consider whether different coastal conditions are more suitable for maritime insurgencies, or to study global maritime smuggling to develop a greater understanding of factors that allow insurgencies to participate and supply themselves. Micro studies could utilize natural disasters, like the 2004 tsunami that struck Aceh in Indonesia, as natural experiments to test the importance of maritime smuggling to insurgency strength. Additionally, other studies could disaggregate maritime smuggling from bulk arms shipments or group strength to determine the relative effect of each.
If maritime logistics are the lynchpin in maritime insurgent strength, security practitioners should target maritime smuggling networks as a way to starve insurgent forces of resources rather than playing whack-a-mole. The Armed Forces of the Philippines fights rebels on the streets of the Marawi in the Philippines, but mostly ignores the maritime dimension that sustained the three month insurrection. Close by, insurgents ferried arms in and wounded fighters out of the city across Lake Lanao.\cite{_islamist_2017} On a regional level, porous maritime borders between the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia allow groups to find safe haven as national forces crack down. Regional initiatives, like the Tilateral Maritime Patrol between the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, hold promise but suffer from collective action problems and regional rivalries.\cite{prashanth_parameswaran_whats_2017} Ultimately, this problem is land based. Solutions must deny maritime insurgents safe-haven and regulate maritime activity ashore.