Plausibility Probe

\label{sect:qual}
In this plausibility probe, I find support for hypotheses 2-4: maritime access and smuggling provide resources crucial to prolonging insurgency. The LTTE, with access to the sea, fought as an active insurgency for longer than the Naga by virtue of their maritime access to an increased variety and volume of inexpensive weapons. Crucial to the LTTE’s ability to sustain an insurgency was their vertically integrated smuggling system that ranged from China to Eastern Europe and afforded a high degree of control over the cost and reliability of their arms shipments. Conversely, the landlocked Naga insurgency relied on third-party smugglers, which increased their costs and decreased reliability. The LTTE and Naga are in the top percentile of matched cases, making them ideal candidates for tracing the role of maritime smuggling.\cite{king_how_2008}
In this section, I examine the how the maritime LTTE fought as an active insurgency longer than the Naga by virtue of their greater control over a world-wide acquisitions system. First, I provide short conflict histories. Second, I show the LTTE and Naga insurgencies to be comparable insurgencies excepting maritime access. Next, I compare funding and supply systems. Finally, I contrast each organization’s peak capabilities to demonstrate the logistics requirements of each group as supplied by their finance and supply systems.

Background

While the LTTE became one of the most sophisticated non-state armed groups of the 20th Century, the Naga insurgency festered in mountainous India (See Figure \ref{figure:location}). Both the LTTE and Naga insurgencies were ethnic, secessionist conflicts emerging from the end of British colonial rule with external sponsorship. The LTTE’s blue-water supply networks provided sufficient resources to maintain a longer active insurgency. The Naga, despite enduring political goals, rarely fielded sufficient forces to qualify as an insurgency.