Maritime Insurgency and Duration
\label{section:lit}
Non-state maritime operations remain an understudied area; however, recent scholarship has begun to connect piracy and insurgent violence. In 1964, counterinsurgency theorist David Galula argued government forces would prefer to fight an island-based insurgency because of the limited escape routes.\cite{galula} With the decline of interest in insurgency after Vietnam, little research into maritime non-state violence was conducted until the sensational attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and the rise of Somali piracy. Michael Murphy (2008) explored the links between piracy and maritime terrorism, finding that both are local problems with limited implications for global security.\cite{murphy_small_2008} Rohan Gunaratna (2009) observes a progression in non-state maritime operations from smuggling to surface to underwater maritime terrorist attacks.\cite{gunaratna_threat_2008} Both authors highlight the high costs and limited benefits of maritime terrorism. Ursula Daxecker and Brandon Prins (2013 and 2015) connected piracy and piracy sanctuary with state weakness.\cite{daxecker_insurgents_2013-2}\cite{daxecker_new_2015} Their 2017 article argued piracy is an important funding source for rebel groups in Africa and Southeast Asia. They find a significant correlation between piracy and conflict intensity.\cite{hegre_financing_2017} In this article, I extend Daxecker and Prins’ (2017) link between piracy and civil war intensity to consider how non-state armed group maritime operations impact conflict duration.
Although duration is a commonly studied dependent variable in civil war research, there is limited consensus on the key variables. In 1998, Collier and Hoffler pointed to gross domestic product per capita, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, natural resources, and initial population as important factors.\cite{collier_economic_1998} However, by 2002, Sambanis argued there was no consensus on a comprehensive set of factors associated with civil war.\cite{sambanis_review_2002} Fearon (2004) identified a difference between coups and periphery conflicts.\cite{blattman_civil_2010} Examination of economic models for civil war (Collier, Hoeffler, and Sonderbom 2004) found a relationship between economic incentives and war duration.\cite{collier_duration_2004} In a 2010 survey of civil war duration research, Blattman and Miguel organized their summary into economic and social models. Findings on the role of ethnicity and government have been mixed (Fearon and Latin 2004, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2004), but suggest a relationship between these factors and war duration.\cite{fearon_why_2004}\cite{garcia-montalvo_ethnic_2004} Geography underlies these explanations with rugged terrain and forests being well studied. Buhaug et al. (2009) studied the interaction between geography and rebel capability, finding a robust relationship between the explanatory variables and duration.\cite{buhaug_geography_2009} Notably absent from these explanations is any reference to the mechanism of smuggling or water.
Maritime operations provide resources to insurgents and other groups. Insurgencies rely on natural, exploitable, or foreign supplied resources to enhance their ability to resist and therefore extend an insurgency. Smuggling brings supplies from abroad directly to a rebel group and can provide financial resources if the group engages in smuggling for profit. Beyond these maritime smuggling and piracy operations, some rebel groups also engage in maritime terrorism. The connection between maritime terrorism and resources is less clear, though diaspora populations may send money to groups engaging in high profile attacks.
Below, I define those three behavioral components of maritime insurgencies. Insurgents may engage in several of these behaviors and a single maritime insurgent operation may include overlapping activities.
- Maritime Smuggling. In this article, I define maritime smuggling as moving goods or people to support the insurgency or to raise funds.\cite{rumley_security_2016}\cite{sipri_international_2009} The World Customs Organization reported that 33% of firearms seized from smugglers were at sea or river ports and that the average maritime seizure was larger than a land interdiction.\cite{sipri_international_2009} Anecdotal evidence from the same report indicates that firearms are “smuggled to a large extent via the same smuggling routes used to smuggle drugs, often by the same actors transporting other illegal goods or migrants.”\cite{united_nations_office_on_drugs_and_crime_global_2015} For some maritime insurgencies, like the Patani in Thailand, the relationship between insurgency and smuggling is fluid: some smugglers may donate to insurgent groups, some insurgent groups may smuggle for profit.\cite{andrew_holt_thailands_2016} However, other groups rely on professional smugglers. The LTTE’s Sea Pigeons had at least 10 ocean going vessels that made arms deals as far afield as Eastern Europe.\cite{richards_institutional_2014} Conversely, other insurgents appear to receive proceeds from maritime smugglers to support their insurgency.
- Piracy. Maritime violence scholar Martin N. Murphy defines piracy simply as “unlawful depredation at sea involving the use or threat of violence possibly, but not necessarily involving robbery.”\cite{murphy_small_2008} The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention signed in 1982 narrows piracy to depredations that take place on the “high seas” and “outside the jurisdiction of any state.”\cite{un_general_assembly_united_1982} This widely accepted jurisdiction-based definition creates an opportunity: while pirates may be targeted by any nation, these same individuals become armed robbers on boats when they enter territorial waters, subject only to national security forces. In the Strait of Malacca’s complex maritime borders, pirates associated with the Free Aceh Movement exploited Indonesian, Malaysian, and Thai borders to avoid capture.\cite{schuman_how_2009} About one-third of reported piracy events take place in harbors.11Author’s work with Anti-shipping Activity Messages—\cite{national_geospatial_intelligence_agency_anti-shipping_2017}— This paper considers piracy events that take place at sea, inside or outside of territorial waters because these attacks require more advanced maritime capabilities rather than low-cost burglary by dingy.
- Maritime Terrorism. Maritime terrorism is a catchall term for politically motivated maritime violence. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Working Group has offered an expansive definition for the types of events that comprise maritime terrorism: the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities (1) within the maritime environment, (2) using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, (3) against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.\cite{greenberg_maritime_2006}
Unlike land-based insurgencies, maritime insurgencies must have access to the specialized and costly resources of ships and sailors, though the requirements differ by maritime zone. Blue-water fleets operate on the open ocean and require skilled mariners in expensive ships. Littoral or green-water operations demand less as sailors can rely on the coast for navigation and protection from harsh weather. Finally, insurgents on brown-water rivers or lakes require the least skill and rudimentary boats.