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\begin{document}

\title{The Merit Economy}



\author[1]{Alexander Zatko}%
\affil[1]{Affiliation not available}%


\vspace{-1em}



  
  \date{May 03, 2024}


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\section*{Abstract}

{\label{228455}}

\par\null

A number of studies report, that remuneration - in addition to being a
carrier of exchange value - has also signaling component, perceived by
workers as a measure of their competence, social rank, or appreciation
from society. Empirical and experimental evidence also suggests, that
the signaling function is more reliable predictor of the workers'
economic performance, than its exchange value. The first claim of the
presented paper is that decoupling the two functions into separate
rewards can address certain problems associated with the existing
remuneration mechanism, in particular distribution of exchange value,
leading to income inequality. In the second claim, the common assumption
concerning profit ownership is challenged, by pointing out that profit
is not the result of a worker's effort and therefore its exchange value
should be shared in accordance with Rawls's 2nd principle of justice. At
the same time the motivationally salient signaling component of profit
is not to be distributed, as it is measure of the rewarded worker's
intrinsic abilities. In the second part of the paper, framework of
economic system is proposed, based on these ideas.

\par\null

Keywords: merit economy, self-determination theory, income inequality,
distributive justice, neo

\par\null\par\null

\begin{quote}
''..Now it is true that the needs of human beings may seem to be
insatiable. But they fall into two classes -- those needs which are
absolute in the sense that we feel them whatever the situation of our
fellow human beings may be, and those which are relative in the sense
that we feel them only if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes us
feel superior to, our fellows. Needs of the second class, those which
satisfy the desire for superiority, may indeed be insatiable; for the
higher the general level, the higher still are they. But this is not so
true of the absolute needs - a point may soon be reached, much sooner
perhaps than we are all of us aware of, when these needs are satisfied
in the sense that we prefer to devote our further energies to
non-economic purposes\ldots{}''
\end{quote}

John M. Keynes (1930), Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren

\par\null

Peter Kolarov provided valuable feedback on draft version of this paper.

\par\null

\section*{Discussion}

{\label{718103}}\par\null

The World Economic Forum recently identified growing income inequality
as one of the most pressing problems facing the world economy today,
threatening stability of the social order as well (\citealt{mohammed_outlook_2015};
\citealt{dabla-norris_causes_2015}). The solutions of the problem presented to date have
focused on redistribution of income or wealth through taxation
(\citealt{piketty_capital_2014}, part 4), or on policy changes \citep*{hacker_prosperity_2012},
which for various reasons are encountering opposition. However, analysis
of relationship between worker motivation and reward suggests a new
approach to the problem.

\par\null

A body of research show, that work reward has two functions - economic
and signaling (\citealt{devoe_when_2013}; \citealt{kohn_why_1993};
\citealt{mickel_getting_2008}). The former provides recipients with economic value
that can be exchanged for goods or services (the exchange value), while
the later is perceived by workers as a measure of their competence,
recognition, status, or respect (their ``merit''). Additionally, a
number of studies (\citealt{cohn_social_2014}; \citealt{clark_effort_2010};
\citealt{kohn_why_1993}; \citealt{ariely_large_2009}) suggest, that the signaling
function of reward is a more accurate predictor of worker motivation,
performance or creativity, than the exchange function. Existence of
volunteer economy provides further evidence for the signaling aspect of
reward being more important for worker motivation than its exchange
value. Driven primarily by purely non-material motives
\citep{clary_motivations_1999} volunteer work nevertheless results in producing
significant economic value (\citealt{salamon_measuring_2011} chapter 4.4, sect 3).
The research-identified worker preference for the signaling aspect of
income from own labor, as well as willingness of volunteers to exchange
labor for reward that lacks exchange value can be explained by the
self-determination theory \citep*{deci_intrinsic_1985}. In particular, the desire
to maximize merit, signaled by the amount of monetary reward, or
willingness to perform volunteer work can be seen as behavior directed
toward fulfillment of the three SDT-identified basic needs: autonomy,
competence and relatedness.

\par\null

These observations lead to a new kind of answer to the question of the
origin of income inequality. In the mainstream remuneration mechanism,
the merit measure is inseparable from the exchange value and therefore
any attempt to reward merit, necessarily rewards workers with exchange
value as well. The \citep{devoe_when_2013} study shows, that income
originating from own labor is perceived by the workers as a signal of
their merit, which they try to maximize by increasing effort. The most
rewarded workers are therefore motivated to acquire even more reward,
necessarily accumulating also exchange value. Such concentrations of
wealth from income are over time further amplified by other mechanisms
(\citealt{piketty_capital_2014}, part 3), resulting in growing differences in
wealth distribution.

\par\null

Different attitude of workers towards the two aspects of reward suggest
a novel solution for the income inequality problem -- an economic system
(the ``Merit economy'') based on remuneration mechanism, where the
economic and signaling functions are separated. In such a scheme, the --
for the worker motivation salient - merit reward is kept numerically
equal to marginal product of labor. The motivationally less significant
exchange value of reward can be set to a suitable welfare-maximizing
principle as a result. As argued by (\citealt{rawls_theory_1999}, pp 5-6),
socially optimal distribution should be guided by the 2nd principle of
justice -- the difference principle:

\par\null

\begin{quote}
``\ldots{}Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two
conditions: (a) They are to be attached to positions and offices open to
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (b), they are
to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of
society.''
\end{quote}

The Merit economy -- in agreement with this principle - rewards merit
unequally, reflecting natural differences between workers, while setting
the exchange value of reward to the amount of work effort exerted,
regardless of its marginal productivity. The notion of equality of
effort stems from Rawls' argument that unearned advantages like natural
talents should be considered a common heritage (\citealt{rawls_theory_1999}, pp
87). An hour of work of any kind therefore is rewarded equally and
economic losses produced by labor without (immediate or apparent)
economic value are balanced by surplus generated by more productive
workers. Opportunity is therefore equally available to all, in contrast
to capitalism, where access to resources necessary to address one's
needs is asymmetrically distributed, in favor of the privileged (see for
example \citealt{frank_success_2016}, for role of luck in entrepreneurship).

\par\null

The 2nd requirement of the difference principle, dictating to direct
greatest benefits to the least advantaged members of society is also
addressed. From the law of diminishing marginal utility follows, that
utility from a unit of exchange value received by the least advantaged
members of society is larger that utility gained by the advantaged
members. Therefore, considering that in Merit economy exchange value
reward is granted for labor time~ - the natural measure of exchange
value (\citealt{sraffa_production_1960}, p. 32, \citealt{wright_classical_2011}, p. 13) - utility
of workers exerting comparable effort (working the same number of hours)
will eventually reach a state of virtual equality.

\par\null

\section*{NEO}

{\label{154242}}\par\null

In this section, framework of an economic system (``NEO'') is presented,
incorporating the Merit economy distribution principles. The goal is to
provide just enough information to illustrate how the proposed model
could be implemented.

\par\null

\subsection*{The infrastructure}

{\label{883747}}

In departure from the capitalist system, which relies on its actors to
know and follow the economy rules, most NEO rules are encoded into a
software application ``Rovas,'' running on personal computing devices
owned by the economy actors. Among other functions, Rovas processes work
data provided by workers, payments for all purchases made in NEO,
calculate rewards and distribute them to the proper recipients. Rovas
provides interfaces for manual entry, as well as application programming
interfaces to allow data transfers to and from accounting software
packages used by firms. To ensure robustness, uninterrupted availability
of services and to prevent possibility of unauthorized changes, the
software is deployed on a global, distributed computing platform (for
example Ethereum \citealt{Dannen_2017}) with transactions being recorded
into a tamper-proof, distributed ledger. From governance point of view,
Rovas development follows the open source philosophy.

\par\null

\subsection*{The economy actors}

{\label{355113}}

Any person wanting to participate in NEO can create an account in Rovas.
The registration process - among other requirements - ensures, that each
person has exactly one account. Biometric information is also collected,
to support various usage scenarios where ease of use and/or security
concerns need to be addressed (authentication, payments
authorization\ldots{}).

\par\null

\subsection*{Merit - the signaling
measure}

{\label{963784}}

Based on the conclusions made in the Discussion section, the proposed
remuneration mechanism calls for existence of two types of rewards, with
corresponding measures. The unit of signaling measure is called
``Merit''. Merits are issued when new value is created in the economy -
at the moment when asset is sold -- in an amount that is numerically
equal to the asset purchase price. Merits don't expire and can't be
gifted or exchanged for goods or services, as Merit score is a
reflection of the particular worker's abilities. Merit scores are
attached to the individual accounts in Rovas and are publicly visible,
alongside information about the assets for which they were granted.

\par\null

\subsection*{Chron - the NEO currency}

{\label{742423}}

The carrier of exchange value is a new digital currency called
``Chron.'' Chrons are created by Rovas for labor reported by workers, in
the amount of ten Chrons for each hour. A number equal to the
newly-minted Chrons is marked as liability in a special Rovas account --
the General NEO account. Conversely, Chrons are liquidated when Rovas
receives payments from buyers purchasing assets, by lowering the
negative balance in the General NEO account, by an amount equal to the
purchase price.

\par\null

\subsection*{The NEO Rules}

{\label{423386}}

To describe the Merit economy rules a simplified economic scenario is
assumed, which involves three actors - a worker creating an asset for
sale, a buyer and the remaining economy participants. According to this
scenario a worker creates an asset and when ready to sell it, makes a
record (creates a work/project report) in Rovas, containing among other
information about the number of hours worked. Rovas then creates ten new
Chrons for every hour reported and deposits them into the worker's
account. Next, the worker attempts to sell the asset for as high price
as possible, motivated by desire to receive the merit reward. If a sale
is realized, the buyer sends the payment for the asset directly into
Rovas. At that moment Rovas rewards the worker with Merits, in an amount
numerically equal to the purchase price. The table 1 shows a somewhat
more complex version of the basic scenario, involving several
transactions among three actors.

\par\null

\subsection*{The Advance payment}

{\label{963521}}

As can be seen, NEO workers receive exchange reward before their output
is sold. This rule is a consequence of the two Merit economy principles:
separation of the exchange value of reward from its signaling (merit)
measure and the Rawls' 2nd principle of justice, from which follows that
all effort is to be rewarded by exchange value equally, regardless of
the resulting asset value (the purchase price).

There are several important consequences to this rule:

\begin{enumerate}
\tightlist
\item
  Money supply in the economy is regulated algorithmically, limiting the
  need for monetary policy-controlling institutions.
\item
  The mechanism of advance payment allows workers (prospective buyers)
  to immediately receive payment for goods or services they produce.
  Thus this rule not only allows to monetarily bootstrap the economy,
  but to a significant degree encourages entrepreneurship, by
  guaranteeing that all labor will be reimbursed.
\end{enumerate}

\par\null

\subsection*{Non-labor factors of
production}

{\label{557825}}

Similar to the capitalist system, economic actors in NEO too can use
resources they own as investment in business ventures. Unlike in the
capitalist economy however, NEO workers may be rewarded at most with the
signaling value of the potential profit earned -- the merit reward. The
exchange value of profit belongs to all and is used by Rovas to restore
balance of the general account. Finally, NEO considers any worker
activity and therefore also investing their own resources to be an act
of merit seeking and does not reimburse investors for the value
invested, regardless of whether any profit is made.

\par\null

\subsection*{Merit reward distribution}

{\label{516553}}

If a particular asset is made by more than one worker, Rovas by default
allocates the merit reward among them, according to the share of their
labor time. It can however be expected, that this measure will not in
general be a reliable indicator of individual contributions to the
produced asset's value. For example, some workers may have higher levels
of knowledge or talent, making their labor time contributions more
valuable. In that case, collaborating workers negotiate among themselves
a share of merit reward that reflects their individual contributions.
The workers record such agreed-upon allocations into their work reports
and Rovas uses this information to override the default labor time-based
allocation, when calculating and assigning merit reward. A non-default
distribution of merit reward can occur also in other contexts, for
example, when factors of production are rented instead of purchased.

\par\null

\subsection*{The relatedness
distribution}

{\label{451530}}

According to the self-determination theory \citep*{deci_intrinsic_1985},
interpersonal relatedness - a term defined as a feeling of
``\ldots{}being personally accepted by and significant to others, and
cared for by others and caring of them\ldots{}'' (\citealt*{ryan_self-determination_2000};
\citealt*{lavigne_fundamental_2011}) -~ is together with autonomy and competence a basic
human psychological need, that people are willing to satisfy at a cost
\citep*{weinstein_autonomy_2014}. The very existence of human beings has therefore -
from this point of view - certain economic value, one that a person
would be willing to give up in order to be with another person. A simple
thought experiment suggests, that being presented with an option to
either live completely isolated or to pay for the opportunity to live in
the society, a person would choose the later and would readily give up
everything, except an amount necessary for self-preservation. Human
society therefore has for most people practically unlimited value.

\par\null

For this reason NEO implements mechanism of ``Relatedness distribution''
-- a regularly issued exchange value payment to all economy
participants, compensating them in effect for their ``work'' on
maintaining the universally valued ``commodity'' -- themselves. While
the argument brought up above could lead to a conclusion that all value
generated by all workers -- and therefore the total economy product -
should be equally distributed, an alternative mechanism is proposed,
where the decision to set the distribution amount is left to the economy
participants. In practical terms, the actual Relatedness distribution
amount is determined by averaging values selected by the workers in
their Rovas profile from a set range. For example, with range of 0 to
240 Chrons per day setting value to ``0'' would mean that no exchange
value is to be paid into the Distribution, whereas value of ``240''
would signify that every hour of the day is to be rewarded (as if
everybody worked 24 hours a day). Consequently, the total exchange value
received daily by an economy actor is the sum of the Relatedness
distribution plus a part of the work reward the actor might be claiming
for own labor. The labor part of the exchange value granted is
determined by a rule, constraining the total exchange value received for
a period of 24 hours to no more than 240 Chrons.

\par\null

An actual implementation of the Relatedness distribution mechanism is
not critical for the stability of the NEO model, as in principe the same
outcome can be achieved using rules already available in NEO. In
particular, the advance payment rule can serve this purpose, if the
concept of work as perceived by the majority of the economy actors
shifts its meaning, to include also ``idle'' existence of a person.

\par\null

\subsection*{Defections-preventing
measures}

{\label{733389}}

The NEO advance payment rule allows workers to receive exchange value
reward by merely submitting a work report. For various reasons (privacy
concerns, the current state of technology,\ldots{}), algorithmically
enforcing reportability of only labor actually performed is impossible,
opening the possibility that some actors will report fictional labor. If
not addressed, such behavior could have direct impact on the NEO
economy, due to inflow of Chrons not covered by real value, albeit it
might not be as severe as it might seem. Market economies are
sufficiently robust to sustain certain losses of this type. For example
the US economy loses in not- and under-reported taxes more than 18\% of
total income \citep*{feige_americas_2011}. A more serious harm however might be
caused by changes to the economy actors' behavior, as unpunished
defections erode cooperation \citep*{fehr_altruistic_2002} and diminishing
willingness of workers to participate in the economy, posing a threat to
its viability.

\par\null

To address the problem, NEO implements mechanism based on a propensity
of humans to punish norm defectors at own cost, even if the offense is
not harming them directly (\citealt*{fehr_altruistic_2002}; \citealt*{fehr_third-party_2004}).
Using publicly available information from work reports, the economy
actors can spend their own Chrons as a vote against fraudulent claims.
Based on such actions a Rovas rule performs adjustments to the offending
account, including confiscation of the inappropriately issued payments,
setting the worker Merit score to negative value and other measures.

\par\null

\section*{Examples}

{\label{158538}}\par\null

\subsection*{An entrepreneur creating web
application}

{\label{168045}}

An entrepreneur creates web application with an intention to offer it as
a paid service to the public. She reported into Rovas the number of work
hours worked, the amount of non-labor expenses and other information.
Users can gain access to the new application by paying a fee. The
payments are made by transferring Chrons from their NEO accounts (if
they have one), or by paying with any non-NEO currency, utilizing a
third-party solution, which converts the funds into Chrons.

To provide a more concrete picture of the rewards distribution, let's
suppose the entrepreneur invested 100 hours of labor into creating the
web application - value equivalent to 1,000 Chrons. She also paid 100
Chrons for a software module with specific functionality, needed in the
application. If we assume, that in a given period the application
generated 20,000 Chrons in sales, Rovas distributes rewards in the
following way:

\begin{quote}
* The entrepreneur receives 1,000 Chrons as an advance payment. If she
used her own money to buy the 100 Chron software module, her net gain is
900 Chrons. For each Chron of revenue she is also rewarded with one
Merit - therefore she receives 20,000 Merits.

* The general NEO account is credited with 20,000 Chrons, where it is
used to lower the negative balance, caused by advance payments to all
workers in the economy.
\end{quote}

\subsection*{A group of workers making physical
goods}

{\label{959526}}

A company owned and run by Jane, Mary and Bill produces sandwiches and
resells them through a network of merchants. When starting the business,
they made an agreement to divide any merit reward earned, with Bill
receiving 20\% and Jane with Mary 40\% each - to reflect their
individual value contributions. With the help of technology, they make
100 sandwiches in 1 hour, from 20 Chrons worth of ingredients. Therefore
labor costs are 0.3 and capital costs (amortization of machines,
electricity\ldots{}) 0.1 Chrons per sandwich. The total cost is 0.3 +
0.2 + 0.1 = 0.6 Chrons per sandwich. They set the sandwich price to 1.5
Chrons. Assuming an eight-hour workday, each of the workers earn 80
Chrons for their labor, regardless the number of sandwiches sold. If all
800 sandwiches made during a shift are sold, they collectively also earn
1,200 Merits. These get divided among them according to the agreed-upon
formula: 240 Merits to Bill and 480 Merits to Jane and Mary each. The
workers are responsible for all production costs of 240 Chrons, leaving
them with 10 Chrons for a day's work. If the costs should reach a level
the workers would be unwilling or unable to pay, they would have to seek
outside investors to share the costs (and likely also the Merit
benefits).

\par\null

\subsection*{Volunteering}

{\label{617467}}

There are several levels at which workers might engage in a Merit
economy. The minimal engagement level, where a worker is interested only
in earning Merits and not the exchange value reward, is equivalent to
volunteer work. In this scenario, a worker submits into Rovas a
project/work report, where the information about the number of hours
worked is omitted. Next, in order to earn Merits, the worker makes the
asset available for consumption, using a suitable monetizing scheme. Due
to it's user friendlies and simplicity he/she will likely choose the
pay-what-you-want one. Any payments for purchases of the asset are sent
to Rovas, alongside the unique asset ID generated by Rovas at the time
when the worker submitted his/her project report. Rovas uses the
received information to calculate and issue the Merit reward, while the
exchange value of the purchases funds the General NEO account.

To support the pay-what-you-want scenario Rovas might implement a
mechanism, for making payments for consumption of certain types of
assets easier. The functionality would periodically present economy
actors with a list of assets they consumed during some period of time
and let them use (a portion of) their Chron balance to pay for their
consumption. Distribution of payments for consumption of the listed
entries could be made by the actors themselves manually, or they could
choose to delegate the task to Rovas.

\par\null

\section*{Instituting Neo}

{\label{730332}}\par\null

Unlike most proposals for solving the problem of income inequality,
instituting NEO does not require an act of government. Instead - similar
to volunteer economy from which it evolved -- it can be adopted
organically, with an expectation that volunteers will be also the
economy first adopters. The technological foundations the proposed
system calls for should attract volunteer workers from the IT sector, by
virtue of the technological challenge building the technology behind NEO
presents. They should find it attractive also as users, due to features
like existence of a well-defined measure for reputation in the form of
the Merit score, or the potential for participating on
creating/supporting a global and socially just, algorithmically-driven
economic system. Considering the potential of this type of volunteers
for generating economic value recognized in the the mainstream economy
markets, it is these workers whose output should establish a real
exchange rate between Chron and the mainstream currencies. All Chron
currency holders will thus gain ability to buy products made in the
non-NEO economy.

\par\null

Such development will attract other groups of workers, currently outside
of the over one billion participants (\citealt{salamon_measuring_2011}, p. 244) of
the volunteer economy. In particular, the world least economically
well-off should want to join NEO, as the economy guarantees everybody
opportunity to earn Chrons for work of their choosing. Money earned this
way can be used either to purchase NEO-produced goods or services, or
exchanged for local official currency at the rate determined by the
currency exchange markets. It can be expected, that the number of Neo
participants from this group will depend on the value of Chron against
the local currency and the cost of living expenses.

\par\null

The strength of Chron against other currencies will be determined not
only by the value generated by the NEO economy participants, but likely
also by donations and investments from wealthy donors and governments.
The former might appreciate, that donating or investing resources into
NEO is a more economically efficient option for making a positive change
than donating them via traditional NGOs. Governments as well might
decide, that instead of creating employment opportunities by providing
local or foreign firms with various types of non-systemic incentives a
better use of national resources is to invest them into the NEO economy,
where work is abundant and of the kind chosen by the workers themselves.
One way governments could support NEO is to augment the workers' Chrons
income with payments in local currency, to ensure their total income has
purchase power sufficient to provide for socially acceptable living
standard. Even without help from governments -- at first in the least
developed countries -- the NEO currency should relatively quickly reach
value high enough to lift purchasing power of one hour of NEO labor
above the purchasing power of average hourly wage in the local currency.
It can be expected, that effects of such developments for the local
economies, as well as the global one would be significant.

\par\null

\section*{Conclusion}

{\label{255419}}\par\null

The aim of this work is to bring attention to a known, but in economic
theory and public policy little exploited fact, that work reward has two
distinct functions and that separating them into two separate rewards is
not only practical but also desirable. The ``exchange value'' function
of reward is the more familiar one. It allows workers to acquire life
necessities like food or shelter as well as goods and services, that
address their less essential needs. The second - ``signaling'' -
function provides information about the rewarded worker's abilities and
is also an expression of regard or respect of the rewarding entity
(person or organization) toward the rewarded. Ample evidence exists
suggesting, that the signaling function is behaviorally more important
for human well-being and by implication, for willingness of people to
engage in economic activities. However, the established remuneration
mechanism does not discriminate between the two components and instead
``communicates'' the size of the signaling reward by varying magnitude
of at any moment limited in supply, but motivationally inferior exchange
value reward. This fundamental misunderstanding of nature and the roles
of reward functions leads to a distribution of economic product that is
economically suboptimal and socially harmful.

\par\null

The normative part of the paper acknowledges different roles of the two
functions and proposes a reward/distribution mechanism, where the
exchange value granted to a worker is commensurate with the number of
hours worked, while the separate signaling reward (Merit) is numerically
equal to the market-determined value (price) of the worker's output. The
remaining surplus exchange value is imputed to the society as a whole.
In such a system, the size of the motivationally salient signaling
reward worker can earn remains relatively unconstrained, whereas the
exchange value of reward is limited by universally equal and over time
constant hourly rate. Not unlike the capitalist economy, Merit-seeking
should therefore motivate also NEO workers to generate valuable output
causing growth of the currency (Chrons) value.

\par\null

An important question concerns robustness of the proposed system against
actions, that could threaten its stability. For example, the Merit
economy rules are implemented in software, presenting an opening for
attacks. However, digital ledger technologies that would form the core
of the new economy have been evolving rapidly in the past decade and
therefore are, or soon will be mature enough to serve as a base for the
proposed system. Another type of defection might be attempts to report
and collect payment for work never performed. Such claims can't be
algorithmically verified with current state of technology, but there are
two constructs that should limit such behavior to acceptable levels.
First, the hourly wage is constant and workers can't claim more than 24
hour workdays, establishing an upper limit to any fraudulent claim. That
fact, together with the NEO function that allows actors to verify
existence of assets and punish those who submit false claims, should
provide sufficient defense for most potential attacks.

\par\null

The prospects for the pace and extent of the Merit economy adaptation
might be affected by a number of factors. One of the most important is
validity of its founding idea, that signaling reward is the controlling
parameter of human economic behavior. However, the evidence in favor for
the proposition seems robust. First, there is the very existence of the
volunteer economy -- a real, economic value-generating system, where
workers are rewarded with a pure signaling reward. Behavioral economic
research also confirms dominant role of the signaling component of
reward for worker behavior. An important roadblock for adoption might be
also the numerical form of the Merit reward and in particular the
question, whether it will be as behaviorally effective as the
``natural'' manifestations of signaling (like money in the mainstream
economy or gratitude In the volunteer economy). It can be expected, that
the answer will be negative in general, but in certain domains numerical
representation is actually the only technically available or practical.
For example volunteer workers who work in the IT sector are used to
measure impact of their work in terms of the number of users using their
products or by a reputation score received from the users. As was
already mentioned, these are also the workers who are likely to produce
the most economically valuable output and thus are the most important
for viability of the new economy. Finally, it can be expected, that
advances in technology will make Merit signaling over time available
also in physical form. Wearable electronics, ubiquitous internet access
or augmented reality devices will eventually allow the numeric Merit
scores to become accessible to our biological senses, removing also this
barrier to the adaptation of the Merit economy.

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