This Authorea document template can be used to prepare documents according to a desired citation style and authoring guidelines. Abstracts are not always required, but most academic papers have one and writers should know how to produce a useful abstract. An abstract should be a very short, clear and concise summation of the entire paper.
An abstract should provide enough of a preview that a typical reader will know whether or not they wish to read the paper. It should reveal both the purpose and conclusions of the paper.

Introduction

The format of this template follows a typical journal publication with an introduction, results and conclusion. Examples of an equation, list and citation are also included. 

The purpose of the introduction

Most academic introductions follow an ‘inverted pyramid’ structure: they start broad and narrow down to a specific thesis or research question. The introduction should reveal:
  1. some broad knowledge of the overall topic
  2. references to related and prior work in the field of investigation
  3. succinct overview of the major point of the paper

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
In the corporate governance literature are two theories that get a lot of attention. The first theory is the more famous and dominant paradigm underlying most governance research, the agency theory (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). The other theory that has its founding in the sociology and psychology research, runs counter to the agency theory and is known as the stewardship theory (; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Both theories describe the beliefs, motivation and behaviour of top managers like the CEO in different ways.
 
Theory
In previous literature, the agency perspective is most often used to describe how top managers behave. The agency theory describes top managers and shareholders as agents and principals respectively, whose interests often diverge (Davis et al., 1997). This can cause situations in which agents seek for goals not in line with the desired goals of the shareholders. Agents like the CEO, with high decision making autonomy can directly influence the financial performance of corporate firms (Veprauskaite & Adams, 2013). This can be harmful for the company performance as the CEO is motivated by opportunities that improve its personal gain (Davis et al., 1997). The agency theory assumes that agents will make decisions in order to improve their own utility at the expense of the firm. Due to asymmetric information, the principal’s information about the contribution of the agent is often imperfect (Bosse & Phillips, 2016). Considering this asymmetric information, it will force principals to take precautions in order to avoid self-interested behaviour of agents. Agency prescriptions are the necessary costs to prevent this self-interested behaviour from happening (Davis et al., 1997). The objective according to the agency theory is therefore to align the interest of agents and principals to prevent opportunistic behaviour (Bosse & Phillips, 2016; Davis et al., 1997).  
 
However, the assumption that CEOs act only in self-interest is often in conflict with the actual behaviour of CEOs. The need for a more humanistic model is therefore present as the behaviour of CEOs in the complex organizational life is different from the situation described by the agency theory (Madison, Kellermanns & Ranft, 2015). The stewardship theory describes a more humane situation in which the stewards, in this paper CEOs, are not only opportunistic but are rather motivated by intrinsic factors (Francoeur et al., 2015; Davis et al., 1997).  
 
In contrast with the agency theory does the stewardship theory states that individuals like CEOs identify themselves with the mission of the organization and therefore align their own goals with the goals of the principals and their organization (Francoeur, Melis, Gaia and Aresu, 2015). Stewards believe that collectivistic behaviour has higher utility than individualistic behaviour and as a results they value cooperation higher than defection (Davis et al, 1997). Stewards will therefore behave non-opportunistic and are self-motivated (Francoeur et al., 2015).
 
Steward theory believes in the strong relationship between the principal’s satisfaction and the performance of the organization (Davis et al., 1997). The motivation that drives stewards does not come from tangible, exchangeable commodities like financial benefits. The motivation to perform or engage in activities with the aim to acquire tangible commodities is known as extrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000).  It is rather the intrinsic than the extrinsic motivation causing stewards to undertake tasks (Francoeur et al., 2015; Davis et al., 1997). Ryan & Deci (2000) define intrinsic motivation as “the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable consequence”. Hence, stewards are motivated by aspects like self-determination, self-efficacy and feelings of purpose (Manz, 1990).
 
From a stewardship perspective, the autonomy of CEOs is positively associated with the performance of firms and “should be deliberately extended to maximize the benefits of stewards” (Block, 1996, p. 25). This is because the stewardship theory believes CEOs can be trusted to decide which actions should be taken in order to achieve the goals set by the principals (Davis et al., 1997). Because stewards can be trusted, the governance structures must be set in such a way that the organizational actions taken by the CEO are best facilitated. This is done by giving them high authority and discretion (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). In contrast with the agency theory where autonomy increases the need for monitoring and bonding costs, is the amount of resources needed to guarantee pro-organization behaviour from stewards diminished (Davis et al., 1997). More important, control can diminish the productivity because it undermines the pro-organization behaviour of the CEO due to lowering the steward’s motivation (Argyris, 1964).
 
 
Previous papers investigating the stewardship theory used family firms. Most of the papers used managers or principals like CEO’s or top manager as data source. Only a few used secondary data to investigate if behaviour of CEO’s or top managers is in line with stewardship theory. This is because especially family businesses desire to pursue noneconomic goals. Noneconomic goals are more in line with stewardship theory; economic goals are more in line with agency theory.

Results

This section is only included in papers that rely on primary research. This section catalogues the results of the experiment. The results should be presented in a clear and unbiased way. Most results sections will contain links and citations, e.g., \cite{Feynman_1986}, and equations, e.g. \(e^{i\pi}+1=0\).

Conclusion

The conclusion should reinforce the major claims or interpretation in a way that is not mere summary. The writer should try to indicate the significance of the major claim/interpretation beyond the scope of the paper but within the parameters of the field. The writer might also present complications the study illustrates or suggest further research the study indicates is necessary.