This Authorea document template can be used to prepare documents according to a desired citation style and authoring guidelines. Abstracts are not always required, but most academic papers have one and writers should know how to produce a useful abstract. An abstract should be a very short, clear and concise summation of the entire paper.
An abstract should provide enough of a preview that a typical reader will know whether or not they wish to read the paper. It should reveal both the purpose and conclusions of the paper.
Introduction
The format of this template follows a typical journal publication with an introduction, results and conclusion. Examples of an equation, list and citation are also included.
The purpose of the introduction
Most academic introductions follow an ‘inverted pyramid’ structure: they start broad and narrow down to a specific thesis or research question. The introduction should reveal:
- some broad knowledge of the overall topic
- references to related and prior work in the field of investigation
- succinct overview of the major point of the paper
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
In the corporate governance literature
are two theories that get a lot of attention. The first theory is the more
famous and dominant paradigm underlying most governance research, the agency
theory (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). The other theory that has its founding
in the sociology and psychology research, runs counter to the agency theory and
is known as the stewardship theory (; Donaldson & Davis,
1991). Both theories describe the beliefs, motivation and behaviour of top
managers like the CEO in different ways.
Theory
In
previous literature, the agency perspective is most often used to describe how
top managers behave. The agency theory describes top managers and shareholders as
agents and principals respectively, whose interests often diverge (Davis et
al., 1997). This can cause situations in which agents seek for goals not in
line with the desired goals of the shareholders. Agents like the CEO, with high
decision making autonomy can directly influence the financial performance of
corporate firms (Veprauskaite &
Adams, 2013). This can be
harmful for the company performance as the CEO is motivated by opportunities
that improve its personal gain (Davis et al., 1997). The agency theory assumes
that agents will make decisions in order to improve their own utility at the
expense of the firm. Due to asymmetric information, the principal’s information
about the contribution of the agent is often imperfect (Bosse & Phillips,
2016). Considering this asymmetric information, it will force principals to
take precautions in order to avoid self-interested behaviour of agents. Agency
prescriptions are the necessary costs to prevent this self-interested behaviour
from happening (Davis et al., 1997). The objective according to the agency
theory is therefore to align the interest of agents and principals to prevent
opportunistic behaviour (Bosse & Phillips, 2016; Davis et al., 1997).
However, the assumption that CEOs act
only in self-interest is often in conflict with the actual behaviour of CEOs. The
need for a more humanistic model is therefore present as the behaviour of CEOs in
the complex organizational life is different from the situation described by
the agency theory (Madison, Kellermanns & Ranft, 2015). The stewardship
theory describes a more humane situation in which the stewards, in this paper
CEOs, are not only opportunistic but are rather motivated by intrinsic factors
(Francoeur et al., 2015; Davis et al., 1997).
In contrast with the agency theory does
the stewardship theory states that individuals like CEOs identify themselves
with the mission of the organization and therefore align their own goals with
the goals of the principals and their organization (Francoeur, Melis, Gaia and
Aresu, 2015). Stewards believe that collectivistic behaviour has higher utility
than individualistic behaviour and as a results they value cooperation higher
than defection (Davis et al, 1997). Stewards will therefore behave
non-opportunistic and are self-motivated (Francoeur et al., 2015).
Steward theory believes in the strong
relationship between the principal’s satisfaction and the performance of the
organization (Davis et al., 1997). The motivation that drives stewards does not
come from tangible, exchangeable commodities like financial benefits. The
motivation to perform or engage in activities with the aim to acquire tangible
commodities is known as extrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). It is rather the intrinsic than the extrinsic
motivation causing stewards to undertake tasks (Francoeur et al., 2015; Davis
et al., 1997). Ryan & Deci (2000) define intrinsic motivation as “the doing
of an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable
consequence”. Hence, stewards are motivated by aspects like self-determination,
self-efficacy and feelings of purpose (Manz, 1990).
From a stewardship perspective, the
autonomy of CEOs is positively associated with the performance of firms and “should
be deliberately extended to maximize the benefits of stewards” (Block, 1996, p.
25). This is because the stewardship theory believes CEOs can be trusted to
decide which actions should be taken in order to achieve the goals set by the
principals (Davis et al., 1997). Because stewards can be trusted, the
governance structures must be set in such a way that the organizational actions
taken by the CEO are best facilitated. This is done by giving them high
authority and discretion (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). In contrast with the agency
theory where autonomy increases the need for monitoring and bonding costs, is
the amount of resources needed to guarantee pro-organization behaviour from
stewards diminished (Davis et al., 1997). More important, control can diminish the
productivity because it undermines the pro-organization behaviour of the CEO due
to lowering the steward’s motivation (Argyris, 1964).
Previous papers investigating the
stewardship theory used family firms. Most of the papers used managers or
principals like CEO’s or top manager as data source. Only a few used secondary
data to investigate if behaviour of CEO’s or top managers is in line with
stewardship theory. This is because especially family businesses desire to
pursue noneconomic goals. Noneconomic goals are more in line with stewardship
theory; economic goals are more in line with agency theory.
Results
This section is only included in papers that rely on primary research. This section catalogues the results of the experiment. The results should be presented in a clear and unbiased way. Most results sections will contain
links and citations, e.g.,
\cite{Feynman_1986}, and equations, e.g.
\(e^{i\pi}+1=0\).
Conclusion
The conclusion should reinforce the major claims or interpretation in a way that is not mere summary. The writer should try to indicate the significance of the major claim/interpretation beyond the scope of the paper but within the parameters of the field. The writer might also present complications the study illustrates or suggest further research the study indicates is necessary.