A Comparison of Comparison
The term ‘agent’ leads the discussion to the contemporary, economic and
institutional theory — Principal-agent (‘P-A’) theory, which offers an
empirically valid perspective in studies of cooperative structures
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Before looking into the possibility of adopting the
theory to comparative analysis, Yang’s (2014) discussion on comparing
policies offered insights to analyse control in education:
“Policy is thus a process fraught with choices, and involves adopting
certain courses of action while discarding others. It is the product of
compromises between multiple agendas and influences, over struggles
between interests in context. These struggles are generally conducted
through discourses where conflicting points of view are heard or unheard
by the policy-makers.” (Yang, 1994)
Comparing education policy becomes “more than ever necessary for the
improvement of educational policy” (Hallak, 1991) with the increasing
interdependence between nation-states, globally mobile workforce, rise
of localism and individualism, and other geo-political changes. Yang
(1994) demanded more attention to other units of analysis instead of a
single focus on nation-states, such as sub-nations, institutions or even
individuals as shown in the Bray and Thomas cube (1995). A meso- or
micro- analysis to avoid researchers glossing over the changing global
forces and “yield more meaningful interpretations than aggregate,
cross-national ones” as such analysis “elucidate the strengths of
state-level comparisons” (Manzon, 1994).
The study of control in power relations shares similarities to the study
of policy as Yang (1994) defined. However it does not emphasise on any
particular policy statements and world standards, instead it sees the
differences of objectives and interests among agents and studies the
interaction, sometimes conflicts.
The P-A theory arises whenever a person or organisation (‘principal’)
contracts another (‘agent) to perform services or supply goods
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Agents are considered to have an informational
advantage over the principal and this is one of the reasons of
contracting agents on specific tasks. For example, school boards appoint
school heads to manage schools as school heads can provide professional
knowledge of how to run a school, manage members of teaching staff, set
operational policies and etc. Meanwhile, school heads are still the
agent of the school board. The Articles of Agreement for the Operation
of Hong Kong International School (‘HKIS’) (LCMS and HKIS, 2013) between
the school board and The Lutheran Church — Missouri Synod (‘LCMS’)
clearly shows the power relations:
“The Head of School of HKIS shall be officially called/appointed by the
Board for International Missions of the LCMS in consultation with the
Board of Managers of the Association. He/she is a missionary of the
LCMS. The Head of School shall be directly responsible to the Board of
Managers of the School, but he/she shall also maintain an ultimate
responsibility to the Board for International Missions of the LCMS.”
(2013, p.5)
The theory has been used by scholars in accounting, economics and
political fields to examine organisational behaviours of decision-makers
and agents. However, some scholars, such as Perrow (1986) saw the theory
dehumanising, and even ‘dangerous’. However the question is: Can we
segregate the study of education from business and economic concepts in
the neoliberal era?
“I am aware that a discussion on the economic value and business
management of education will seem presumptuous to many school people.
Those who value schooling highly, which includes most of those who are a
part of the educational establishment, are likely to look upon an effort
such as this as an intrusion which can only debase the cultural purposes
of education. In their view education lies beyond the economic calculus,
because they believe that education is much more than a matter of costs
and returns. To speak of schooling as an investment is to imply that it
is something material.” (Schultz, 1963, p.viii)
This is an example of application of P-A theory on Flemish
not-for-profit primary and secondary schools. Du Bois et al (2009)
interviewed the board chairpersons (‘principals’) and headmasters
(‘agents’) in order to understand the organisations’ governance
effectiveness through a detection of systematic differences between the
two parties. A total sample of 503 primary heads, 187 secondary school
heads, and 171 board chairpersons from those schools was interviewed.
They were asked to share their views on seven educational objectives
identified from literatures, such as ‘number of registered students’,
‘accessibility of education’ and ‘job satisfaction of teachers and
headmasters’ (2009, p.5). The researchers compared the results and among
the objectives, the preferences of both groups on four objectives differ
significantly including this one: “while the board is prepared to give
up pupil and job satisfaction in favour of the other objectives, these
two objectives score very high on the priority list of the headmasters”
(2009, p.11).
However agency problem arises when there is a discrepancy between the
principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989), for example opposite views on
the school objectives in which lead the setting of a school’s vision and
mission, and the goals which direct daily operations of a school.
Comparative analysis will be useful to identify the discrepancy and
explore the reasons behind the co-operation. Meanwhile no conclusion can
yet be drawn if agency problem is a real problem in education. Armour,
Hangman and Kraakman (2009) identified potential legal contradiction in
the power relations between principal and agents and the legal spirit to
control conflict of interest through corporate laws. (2009, p.2) This is
another valuable aspect to be studied by policymakers.