A Comparison of Comparison
The term ‘agent’ leads the discussion to the contemporary, economic and institutional theory — Principal-agent (‘P-A’) theory, which offers an empirically valid perspective in studies of cooperative structures (Eisenhardt, 1989). Before looking into the possibility of adopting the theory to comparative analysis, Yang’s (2014) discussion on comparing policies offered insights to analyse control in education:
“Policy is thus a process fraught with choices, and involves adopting certain courses of action while discarding others. It is the product of compromises between multiple agendas and influences, over struggles between interests in context. These struggles are generally conducted through discourses where conflicting points of view are heard or unheard by the policy-makers.” (Yang, 1994)
Comparing education policy becomes “more than ever necessary for the improvement of educational policy” (Hallak, 1991) with the increasing interdependence between nation-states, globally mobile workforce, rise of localism and individualism, and other geo-political changes. Yang (1994) demanded more attention to other units of analysis instead of a single focus on nation-states, such as sub-nations, institutions or even individuals as shown in the Bray and Thomas cube (1995). A  meso- or micro- analysis to avoid researchers glossing over the changing global forces and “yield more meaningful interpretations than aggregate, cross-national ones” as such analysis “elucidate the strengths of state-level comparisons” (Manzon, 1994).
The study of control in power relations shares similarities to the study of policy as Yang (1994) defined. However it does not emphasise on any particular policy statements and world standards, instead it sees the differences of objectives and interests among agents and studies the interaction, sometimes conflicts.
The P-A theory arises whenever a person or organisation (‘principal’) contracts another (‘agent) to perform services or supply goods (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agents are considered to have an informational advantage over the principal and this is one of the reasons of contracting agents on specific tasks. For example, school boards appoint school heads to manage schools as school heads can provide professional knowledge of how to run a school, manage members of teaching staff, set operational policies and etc. Meanwhile, school heads are still the agent of the school board. The Articles of Agreement for the Operation of Hong Kong International School (‘HKIS’) (LCMS and HKIS, 2013) between the school board and The Lutheran Church — Missouri Synod (‘LCMS’) clearly shows the power relations:
“The Head of School of HKIS shall be officially called/appointed by the Board for International Missions of the LCMS in consultation with the Board of Managers of the Association. He/she is a missionary of the LCMS. The Head of School shall be directly responsible to the Board of Managers of the School, but he/she shall also maintain an ultimate responsibility to the Board for International Missions of the LCMS.” (2013, p.5)
The theory has been used by scholars in accounting, economics and political fields to examine organisational behaviours of decision-makers and agents. However, some scholars, such as Perrow (1986) saw the theory dehumanising, and even ‘dangerous’. However the question is: Can we segregate the study of education from business and economic concepts in the neoliberal era?
“I am aware that a discussion on the economic value and business management of education will seem presumptuous to many school people. Those who value schooling highly, which includes most of those who are a part of the educational establishment, are likely to look upon an effort such as this as an intrusion which can only debase the cultural purposes of education. In their view education lies beyond the economic calculus, because they believe that education is much more than a matter of costs and returns. To speak of schooling as an investment is to imply that it is something material.” (Schultz, 1963, p.viii)
This is an example of application of P-A theory on Flemish not-for-profit primary and secondary schools. Du Bois et al (2009) interviewed the board chairpersons (‘principals’) and headmasters (‘agents’) in order to understand the organisations’ governance effectiveness through a detection of systematic differences between the two parties. A total sample of 503 primary heads, 187 secondary school heads, and 171 board chairpersons from those schools was interviewed. They were asked to share their views on seven educational objectives identified from literatures, such as ‘number of registered students’, ‘accessibility of education’ and ‘job satisfaction of teachers and headmasters’ (2009, p.5). The researchers compared the results and among the objectives, the preferences of both groups on four objectives differ significantly including this one: “while the board is prepared to give up pupil and job satisfaction in favour of the other objectives, these two objectives score very high on the priority list of the headmasters” (2009, p.11).
However agency problem arises when there is a discrepancy between the principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989), for example opposite views on the school objectives in which lead the setting of a school’s vision and mission, and the goals which direct daily operations of a school. Comparative analysis will be useful to identify the discrepancy and explore the reasons behind the co-operation. Meanwhile no conclusion can yet be drawn if agency problem is a real problem in education. Armour, Hangman and Kraakman (2009) identified potential legal contradiction in the power relations between principal and agents and the legal spirit to control conflict of interest through corporate laws. (2009, p.2) This is another valuable aspect to be studied by policymakers.