In the recent experimental study by \cite{Kimbrough_2015} the researchers tried to show how the problem of cooperation with outsiders can be solved. In this case people have to deal with group reputation instead of individual one. They played a Trust game between two members of two groups distinced by color (red or blue), and there were two different group mechanisms to deal with those who do not reciprocate trust: within-group punishment and sharing the information about defectors to outsiders. They found a marginal effect of information sharing, but the introduction of ingroup punishment substantially increased intergroup reciprocity.
\cite{Bausch_2013} made an agent-based model analyzing the joint effect that collective sanctions and peer punishment have on intergroup cooperation. Again he focuses on the problem of reputation transmission across the group boundaries, when there is an identification problem. Communication and reputation building with outside group members are hindered by the fact that we lack the information about them or it is hard to identify and prosecute them if they renege on contracts. He analyses evolution of two mechanisms that tend to cherish group cooperation: collective sanctions, and ingroup punishment, and he found out that in isolation collective sanctions do not result in higher intergroup cooperation but ingroup punished does. By modelling the interaction between ingroup punishment and collective sanctions Bausch has shown that collective sanctions do not make the punishment more efficient.
The authors in \cite{Ginsburg_2017} suggest using collective sanctioning as a way of controlling recent migrants behavior to the US. If we treat a host country as an external group that interacts with the invited group of emigrees, collective sanctions should be imposed on the small group of a trust circle if anyone in a group got caught in illegal activity. There are two main consequences: positive selection effect and increased ingroup policing. According to the authors, people who take the decision in migrating via the trust circle policy, will be cautious in selecting the partners in such a way that their delinquent behaviour would not undermine their perspectives after migration. After migration though they will be more prone to detect and inform on those whose suspicious behavior they observe.
Apart from rational explanation why people may punish not the offender but a third party, it makes sense to dig deeper into the psychological literature that analyse the vicarious retribution or displaced revenge. Vicarious or third-party retribution is defined as a situation when "a member of a group commits an act of aggression toward the members of an outgroup for an assault or provocation that had no personal consequences for him or her but which did harm a fellow ingroup member. Furthermore, retribution is often directed at outgroup members who, themselves, were not the direct causal agents in the original attack against the person's ingroup."\cite{Lickel_2006}. Psychologists to explain the vicaruious retrbituion uses the concept of outgroup entitativiety, that is the perception of a group as a pure entity abstracted from the individuals it is composed of. Furthermore people build a bridge connecting the acts of an outgroup individual and the guilt of the group members who are not personally involved but just share the membership with the perpetrator. This bridigng can be typifed as inferences of indirect commision in the act, and by inferences of omission. Indirect commision assumes that other members encouraged the antisocial act, and omission is the failure to prevent the act \cite{Lickel_2003}
In addition as recent study in social psychology has shown, the displaced revenge where the target is not the one who commited an aggressive act can be as satisfying from the point of view of sense of justice as direct punishment \cite{Sj_str_m_2015}