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\begin{document}

\title{quotes for colsan}



\author[1]{Philipp Chapkovski}%
\affil[1]{University of Zurich}%


\vspace{-1em}



  
  \date{May 10, 2024}


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In the recent experimental study by~\cite{Kimbrough_2015}~the researchers
tried to show how the problem of cooperation with outsiders can be
solved. In this case people have to deal with group reputation instead
of individual one. They played a Trust game between two members of two
groups distinced by color (red or blue), and there were two different
group~ mechanisms to deal with those who do not reciprocate trust:
within-group punishment and sharing the information about defectors to
outsiders. They found a marginal effect of information sharing, but the
introduction of ingroup punishment substantially increased intergroup
reciprocity.~

\cite{Bausch_2013}~made an agent-based model~ analyzing the joint effect
that collective sanctions and peer punishment have on intergroup
cooperation. Again he focuses on the problem of reputation transmission
across the group boundaries, when there is an identification problem.
Communication and reputation building with outside group members are
hindered by the fact that we lack the information about them or it is
hard to identify and prosecute them if they renege on contracts. He
analyses evolution of two mechanisms that tend to cherish group
cooperation: collective sanctions, and ingroup punishment, and he found
out that in isolation collective sanctions do not result in higher
intergroup cooperation but ingroup punished does. By modelling the
interaction between ingroup punishment and collective sanctions Bausch
has shown that collective sanctions do not make the punishment more
efficient.

The authors in~~\cite{Ginsburg_2017}~suggest using collective sanctioning
as a way of controlling recent migrants behavior to the US. If we treat
a host country as an external group that interacts with the invited
group of emigrees,~ collective sanctions should be imposed on the small
group of a trust circle if anyone in a group got caught in illegal
activity. There are two main consequences: positive selection effect and
increased ingroup policing. According to the authors, people who take
the decision in migrating via the trust circle policy, will be cautious
in selecting the partners in such a way that their delinquent behaviour
would not undermine their perspectives after migration. After migration
though they will be more prone to detect and inform on those whose
suspicious behavior they observe.

Apart from rational explanation why people may punish not the offender
but a third party, it makes sense to dig deeper into the psychological
literature that analyse the vicarious retribution or displaced revenge.
Vicarious or third-party retribution is defined as a situation~ when
"\emph{a member of a group commits an act of aggression toward the
members of an outgroup for an assault or provocation that had no
personal consequences for him or her but which did harm a fellow ingroup
member. Furthermore, retribution is often directed at outgroup members
who, themselves, were not the direct causal agents in the original
attack against the person's ingroup}."\cite{Lickel_2006}. Psychologists
to explain the vicaruious retrbituion uses the concept of outgroup
entitativiety, that is the perception of a group as a pure entity
abstracted from the individuals it is composed of. Furthermore people
build a bridge connecting the acts of an outgroup individual and the
guilt of the group members who are not personally involved but just
share the membership with the perpetrator. This bridigng can be typifed
as inferences of indirect commision in the act, and by inferences of
omission. Indirect commision assumes that other members encouraged the
antisocial act, and omission is the failure to prevent the
act~\cite{Lickel_2003}

In addition as recent study in social psychology has shown, the
displaced revenge where the target is not the one who commited an
aggressive act can be as satisfying from the point of view of sense of
justice as direct punishment~\cite{Sj_str_m_2015}

~

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