

Society and possible transformative influence of the politicization of the intelligence system

Dora Gelo Čolić¹

¹Affiliation not available

April 24, 2024

Abstract

The targets of hostile actions towards specific society may be: knowledge, national identity, social and political structure, critical infrastructure and defense and security sector, etc. and it is expected that the range of targets will expand in the future and that the number of possible targets is open and infinite, that is, it is incomprehensibly broad. In this sense, the analysis will be limited to only a few targets whose mutual relations will be simulated in the context of content and scope. Their relation to the politicization of the intelligence system will also be examined as well as politicization itself through the available literature review. Emphasis is given to the potential scenarios resulting from the hostile action, as well as to the possible moments when they could be prevented with the minimal damage to the protected society. For the purpose of this paper, in order to research potential models, decision-making system has been analysed and distinction is made between regular and irregular politicization of the process.

Keywords: politicization, society resilience, political structure, communication, transformative influence, decision-making system

Introduction

Although it is not yet possible to get exact answers, any new opening in a given problem area can help in the consideration of the phenomenon as a whole and of its parts and thus contribute to the processes. The question is how to begin to analyze the subject under consideration. It might be prudent to begin with the following question: what is the politicization of the intelligence system? But one could also begin with the question: what consequences it produces on the decision-making system?

The targets of hostile actions are knowledge, national identity, social and political structure, critical infrastructure and defense and security sector, etc. and it is expected that the range of targets will expand in the future and that the number of possible targets is open and infinite, that is, it is incomprehensibly broad but still inseparable from the concerned society. One could easily conclude that performers of these actions could not survive without their audience/actors in interactive scenarios they initiated.

This analysis will be limited to only a few targets whose mutual relations will be simulated in the context of content and scope. Their relation to the politicization of the intelligence system will also be examined as well as politicization itself through the available literature review.

Emphasis is given to the potential scenarios resulting from the hostile action, as well as to the possible moments when they could be prevented with the minimal damage to the protected society. For the purpose of this paper, in order to research potential models, decision-making system has been analysed and distinction

is made between regular and irregular politicization and the consequences they project on the decision-making system.

This preliminary communication takes in account also information flow and its relevance in possible models by discussing how epistemic relevance could be the key factor in improving outcome of communication and following that overall outcome in regards to concerned society.

National identity

Since it is a concept that is hard to define, there are numerous descriptions of its content, the viewpoints from which it is observed and ultimately the disciplines that deal with it. Given the context of this analysis, I shall observe its functional dimension because that is precisely the dominant target of the attacks by the influence operations. National identity is a cohesive factor of the society in the sense of collectivization of interests, branding of the nation and consequently the state (Skoko 2009), which is closely related to the achievement of political and economic goals. On the other hand, national identity is associated with a sense of group belonging which is in opposition to an individual ‘who does not belong’ and in this sense, it may seem as a weak link to the author of the influence operation, which often corresponds to reality.

‘The Croatian example illustrates that the (elite) ideology was adopted if it was attractive to other groups, in the sense of national and cultural identity, if it succeeded in imposing a responsibility that could have equal constitutive power, if there were no alternative ideologies, in the sense of it being constitutively crucial, if the “imposed discourse” was accepted as the only one because any other would imply unwanted coercion, if the ideology was “planted” as if it came from the people, which was accomplished here in the sense of the “general, common thing” and if the ruling discourse of the elite possessed the media and ways to launch that discourse in the sense that it had found the most appropriate modes of representation. In the case of raising awareness of the Croatian subject, such ideology, with its excellence, choice, quality, and persuasiveness, was “made to order”, so it could have had a strong effect.’ (Milanja 2012:162)

Knowledge and social and/or political structure

If an open knowledge corpus and a controlled knowledge corpus exist (Tudman 2008), it is expected that both corpora will be the target. The open knowledge corpus is more available than the controlled knowledge corpus when viewed from the perspective of availability. However, in the context of operation planning, open knowledge could be significantly harder to influence in a substantial sense because in its essence, it has a high level of general acceptance and rootedness in a particular group which also includes accustomedness to certain knowledge.

Similar to the concept of national identity, there are various theoretical meanings of the concept social structure. The best way (Afrić 1987) to begin the explanation is to enumerate concepts that are believed to be the opposite of a structure: chaos, amorphousness, idiosyncratic human behavior without any regularity, etc. In contrast to these concepts, typical characteristics of the social structure are social order, social system, behavior pattern, organized unity, relations organization, configuration of relations in which people participate, relations between groups and individuals, weak balances of multiple relation hierarchies, relation networks, interconnectedness of different social structures. The social structure typologies differ according to the characteristics of the elements and the nature of the relation which connects the elements. The influence on the given structure can be wide-ranging, barely visible or a strong, and often more precise, blow. Given that over time a need to restructure society arises, stemming naturally from the development process, influence is carried out in a slow process that mimics the usual rearrangement in order to maintain dynamics and follow trends. In other words, it mimics the situation in which human beings produce and reproduce society (Gurvitch 1965). That kind of long-term planning and anticipation seems more acceptable and in line with today’s times, so it is much easier to justify or cover up.

Due to the nature of this knowledge, the attack on the controlled knowledge corpus seems paradoxically easier to carry out with methods that aren't publicly known but could be imagined as actions that require subtlety and have a long duration with the overall process that is more stable and predictable. As political structure indicates structural, formal and institutional dimensions of politics, it could be platform for its performance.

The question of criteria

Phythian and Gill (2018:129), while discussing the limits of Intelligence respectively mentioned US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who 'captured a central and inescapable fact: in a highly complex world, uncertainties and insecurities abound, and intelligence, however well funded and organized, cannot be omniscient.' The authors furthermore clearly differentiate between limits of intelligence, some of which are related to the lack of information or cognitive constraints of the personnel, while others are related to the process, including difficulties in identifying goals, routine guidance caused by practical or ideological reasons and directed towards known, common suspects, bureaucratic reasons, and difficulties in sharing information due to the concept of secrecy. However, they still find that numerous cases of failure are due to analytics, which includes the influence of ideological frameworks. In the context of this paper, it is interesting to analyze the difference between the concept of an ideological framework and the concept in which the intelligence system is responsible for the political and social system and which is in this paper thus referred to as regular politicization. Does the specific difference lie in the reasons for action or in terminology? Or is the key in terminology and certain words leave a better impression, so the word 'ideology' is worse than the word 'values'?

The fact is that the answer in this section is not unambiguous, and it is especially not simple. It seems we do not know where to start, so we do not touch upon problems such as difficult conditions for gathering useful information, misinformation, the speed of information change, etc. According to many sources, gathering information is no longer a problem in today's world. As per some estimates (Omand 2020) open sources contain a high percentage of required information, indicating an increased need to improve the decision-making process, mainly the analysis process. However, regardless of the percentage ratio of required information in open sources and the need for gathering information in other ways, capacities should not be reduced just because everything seems more accessible. That is, accessibility is precisely what can present an obstacle to good work in terms of assessing the relevance, purposefulness, and usefulness of information (Weissmann and Nilsson 2024). But if we are not sure what we are looking for and why, the capacities we are developing are very unlikely to fulfill their function.

Simulation of the relation between national identity and social structure generally and in the context of knowledge

It is not seemingly clear how to approach a situation in which the social structure or its parts begin to question the element of national identity, especially in the circumstances of today's trends. Furthermore, when discussing attacks or influence operations, it is necessary to analyze whether the factors with a negative opinion on national identity as a necessity for the development of the society are actors of the influence operation and what exactly is necessary for an action to be considered an influence operation. In a democratic framework, society carries the opportunities for conversation and exchange of opinions, lack of judgement for holding different opinions, coexistence of opposing opinions and actions; however, discussions about premises of communication and a necessity for setting boundaries are becoming more prominent. It is difficult to determine what these boundaries would be apart from the existing legal framework with an emphasis on the criminal law and the increasing use of criminal law mechanisms in the context of media freedoms, defamation of character, etc., but this will not be discussed in this analysis.

The purpose of this preliminary communication is to reach different insights into the relationship between system politicization and influence operations in relation to its constituent part and that is concerned society.

If we return to the negative opinion on national identity as a constitutive element of cohesion necessary for the development of society and to those who hold that opinion we can find question ejecting: To what extent is it possible to discuss this topic in a democratic society and how does this conversation have to be held in order not to pose a security threat?

Perhaps just thinking about redefining the concept would not necessarily lead to bigger breaches in the cohesive fabric of society if it were not followed by a complete negation of one or more content elements of the concept. Therefore, we distinguish different levels and think about the line of detection after which we should start observing the phenomenon:

1. organization into specific groups, associations etc. which act by creating knowledge in and outside of the state,
2. when the created knowledge with its content significantly changes ingrained (established) narratives in the society,
3. when connections with other groups start, which in turn raise the level of action,
4. when the created knowledge enters the political sphere of action by reaching a certain level and context of the connection.

We could perhaps conclude for the purposes of this analysis that ad 4) represents belatedness because it is the moment in which observation or acting in defense could be defined as antidemocratic.

Going back to A), if we locate detection, observation, prevention/defense in the institution which is the competent intelligence agency, it is interesting to note the possibility of politicization existing in actions. It is seemingly not difficult to determine on what the forming and setting up of detection indicators depends, and equally so for decisions on observation, prevention or active defense, but in regard to potential results it is beneficial to try to observe the problem with an appropriate complexity. This imposes the indisputability of the system politicization in the context of setting up national goals, protected values, etc., making this a contentious area in which we can locate answers. The concept of politicization is not even the best term for this, especially in the context in which it has been used in recent years, since we are dealing with a regular relation in which the system protects the constitutional order of the state and is therefore subject to the set goals of political structure which are contained in the Constitution, laws and other regulations and are in that sense institutionalized. The question posed here is whether it is at all possible to have a system that would not be 'politicized' in such a regular way. For the purposes of this paper, I can call this type of politicization regular.

Furthermore, if we take into account the relation between national goals and protected values while approaching protected values not only in the normative sense but also in the sense of an open knowledge corpus outside of the normative part, and specifically as a part of knowledge that is generally considered correct in the society, we can envision the following imaginary scenario.

Let us return to A) and, in order to escape regular politicization, skip all actions, from 1 to 3. If 4 happens, the group wins the democratic elections and becomes a political structure which, after creating knowledge bottom up, is in a position to standardize knowledge; moreover, to turn it into knowledge that must be protected. In this way, social structure can be restructured top down. Let's call it scenario B.

After the imaginary scenario B comes scenario C in which identical actions occur, but there is factor M, not escaping regular politicization, due to which scenario C is called 'hostile action' and thus is characterized as a negative phenomenon against which the system must fight. In other words, it must detect, observe, prevent, and ultimately actively defend a restructured society that now embraces a completely different body of knowledge while much of the knowledge that existed before scenario B is deemed inappropriate, dangerous to the safety and health of the society and brought to a point where negativity of that knowledge can even be standardized.

Beyond evaluating the positive and negative, the scenario is questioned in the context of influence operations and attitudes toward them. Is it legitimate, is it a consequence of negligence or intentional omission, will it be considered by the competent institution, is it a consequence of a circular or gradual irregular system politicization? Can we talk about the concept of an ideological framework when it comes to hostile action in scenario C, but adopt the concept of regular politicization aimed at the preservation of scenario B when it comes to defense caused by a hostile action C?

On the other hand..

On the other side of the targets of hostile actions is their author as factor M. I will divide actions into two general categories – attack and defense, which does not exclude the possibility of a different categorization. It is clear that the concepts of attack and defense can intersect and that their manifestations can be ambiguous. Some hostile actions can essentially be seen as defense in terms of a preventive attack, deterrence, and similar concepts. In a broader sense of the term, we can also talk about gaining someone’s trust, achieving a goal that could not be achieved otherwise, etc. Therefore, for the purpose of identifying the true nature of actions, it is useful to consider all sides of politicization as well as its layers and shapes.

Here, I am talking about the politicization of the intelligence system using the meaning and content of the term in a way it was used and analyzed by other authors. It may overlap with one of the two concepts defined for the purpose of this paper, regular and irregular politicization, with both of them or with neither of them.

Stephen Marrin cites Harry Howe Ransom, according to whom politicization (Marrin, 2013:33) ‘has multiple meanings’ and identified three different kinds: 1. ‘partisan politicization when an agency or an issue has become a point of contention between organized political groupings, normally political parties’; 2. ‘popularization, or publicity, which generates public debate over ends and means (frequently leading to) bipartisan politicization’; and 3. ‘when intelligence are influenced by imbedded policy positions. When preferred policies dominate decision making, overt or subtle pressured are applied on intelligence systems, resulting in self-fulfilling intelligence prophecies or “intelligence to please” that distorts reality.’ He concludes that politicization, according to Ransom’s definition ad 1) and ad 2), does not necessarily lead to worse outcomes and that he is attempting to discover the causes of the process despite the negative connotations of the term. This line of thinking enables a deeper understanding of the decision-making process on both the intelligence level and the political level as well as the way in which they are interwoven. In terms of study, such a value-neutral concept of politicization paves the way for finding subtle boundaries in understanding the elements of the process as it is devoid of negative connotations and becomes a legitimate subject of research, which is brave and borderline, but most importantly, it is promisingly connected to the reality because, as Marrin says (2013:33): ‘That intelligence becomes intertwined with politics is inevitable byproduct of the intentional production of useful knowledge to support foreign policy and national security decision making . Such decision- making occurs within a political or policy context, so the fact that the intelligence becomes embedded in politics should not be a surprise. Instead, the existence of this kind of politicization should be expected as part of the normal policymaking process.’. However, the last definition ad 3) has an immanent negative connotation due to its essence expressed in a phrase ‘intelligence to please’ which implies the distortion of the analysis because of the failure to apply the standard of objectivity by omitting certain findings, highlighting suitable parts of the collected information, delaying the analysis and using related procedures in order to accommodate political preferences.

Here I shall analyze the difference between the regular politicization, described in the text, in which, within the concept of defense, indicators are set in accordance with the political and social order for the purpose of the analysis of potential dangers and the politicization ad 3) in which the analyses are made as part of the planning of hostile actions, according to indicators which politically change faster than the overall political and social order and are subject to a wide range of influences.

When talking about a standard form of analysis, Marrin claims that it is the intent that makes analysis bad in the context of politicization, thus arguing that good politicization cannot be distinguished from the bad one only on the basis of a possibility of ideas and concepts influencing the interpretation (Marrin 2013).

While discussing about intelligence failures Gill and Phythian (2018:139) have no doubt that Betts's concept of politicization referring on political pressure with the impact on the intelligence process 'would benefit from greater definitional clarity' so they are adding to their discussion Treverton's five different forms that politicization may take. It goes from hard range to the soft one, from the direct pressure to the shared mind set. And although they emphasize the danger of the politicization that just seemingly transcends regime type, they leave unanswered the question of appropriate distance and independence of the intelligence in relation to the decision-making politics.

In the context of questioning boundaries, is the shared mind set a situational phenomenon related to one case or to a group of cases? Or can it exist as a more permanent phenomenon and share certain similarities with regular politicization? Is the shared mind set as a situational phenomenon a more harmful form of politicization than the shared mind set as a more permanent sameness of intelligence and politics? We might ask the question of who intelligence works for if it is not allowed to have the same permanent shared mind set as the one policymakers have in the same system, making it possible to consider scenarios in which it shares a mind set with some other policymakers in some other systems. Theoretically, it sounds complex, but practically speaking, it is an old phenomenon and not at all shocking. Another question in a series of questions is whether radical depoliticization leads to objectivity of intelligence or to hostile actions in which the intelligence system transforms from the system that should recognize factor M into factor M. This, again, puts us outside of categories of positive and negative because I have already stated that in certain calculations, factor M can also offer a positive solution in the context of the impact on concerned society .

Irregular politicization of the intelligence system as the result of the simulation

From the excerpt in the previous part, I can conclude that only factor M is a source of the irregular politicization of the intelligence system, because its influence makes scenario B the one that must be defended and scenario C the one to be defended against unlike M's decision on defending scenario A. Therefore, promoting regular politicization when it is suitable, and not promoting it/demonizing it when it is not, sounds more irregular than regular.

Factor M

All sources of the irregular politicization here are marked as factor M and should be verified in terms of strength, content, people, their risks, and benefits and should thus be evaluated so that they can be included in the planning of the activities of the system as a whole and especially of the intelligence system.

Few main characteristics of the factor M could be extracted from the simulations above:

1. it is outside of categories of positive and negative
 - a) in certain calculations, factor M can also offer a positive solution in the context of the impact on concerned society
 - b) social consensus would certainly be one of the few legitimate factors M for which it is assumed that they lead to a positive outcome for the society from its perspective, so the lack of detection can be seen as irregular politicization which makes it possible to consider its positive aspects in addition to the emphasized negative ones. At that point, it would be possible to talk about true levelling of natural social restructuring

as producing and reproducing (Gurvitch 1965) and influence operations whereby holder/representative of factor M can also receive additional impulses that he did not take into account during planning

c) another question in a series of questions is whether radical depoliticization leads to objectivity of intelligence or to hostile actions in which the intelligence system transforms from the system that should recognize factor M into factor M.

2. there can be a holder of the factor M power and there can be a/the representative/s of the factor M power

a) On the other side of the targets of hostile actions towards concerned society is their author as the factor M

b) Factor M can be a foreign policy factor which includes large-scale geopolitical factors, a financial factor that may or may not have its roots imported with large-scale geopolitical factors, a consensus of a significant part of the social structure, an economic factor, a partial interest of a certain group with sufficient power to be a factor M and all of them may be related or even derived from each other.

3. promoting regular politicization when it is suitable and not promoting it/demonizing it when it is not

a) whatever shape it takes, it has the power to evaluate the situation that goes beyond the existing state of things which includes the social structure and political structure or their parts that are currently qualitatively or quantitatively relevant

When it comes to a previous situation analysis or subsequent one for the purposes of the learned lesson, it is certainly necessary to take into account the limitations of the intelligence system in the context of democratized societies in which making decisions about specific activities fortunately goes through control mechanisms and depends on the reached consensus. This is precisely why it is important to take into account point (scenario) A, as well as factor M, in which cases the intelligence system legitimately and legally performs its tasks according to the prescribed procedure maxims which are continuously renewed in order to adapt to the recurrent 'new circumstances' and 'old problems'. The possibility of the existence of a positive aspect of irregular politicization shows that all elements should be taken into account in the analysis calculation, whether it is a subsequent analysis or a previous one, in order to reach useful results.

Epistemic relevance

Discussing the issue of risk of politicization, Omand (2020) rejects Sherman Kent's pure, academically rigorous model, valuing it as false comfort while also considering it as an obstacle to achieving the full functionality of intelligence, i.e. he considers it a reducing element. At the same time, he does not dispute the human tendency that makes intelligence users produce assessments that suit their worldviews and/or political preferences. He clearly addresses the problem in order to encapsulate the collision into a principle according to which analysts should be trained in both understanding the users and explaining the situation. 'As a former chair of the JIC famously wrote: The best arrangement is intelligence and policy in separate but adjoining rooms, with communicating doors and thin partition walls, as in cheap hotels.' (Omand 2020:44).

What is the relation between the shared mind set and the quote by the former chair of the JIC? At what level would the latter concept be on Trevorton's scale? Would he include it there? Or would he agree that it is a minimum that one cannot do without?

If we take a moment to look at the fundamental that Floridi (2008:90) analyzes in isolation from the subject matter, a claim such as 'Agents require a constant flow and a high level of processing of relevant information in order to interact successfully among themselves and with the environment in which they are embedded.' can serve as a useful point of interest.

The usefulness of the issue on both sides is reflected in the increased ability to produce epistemic relevant information as seen in the simple example given by Floridi in the chapter on the relevance of misinformation. If a student's answer to the question 'Who fought in the Battle of Thermopylae?' is 'Napoleon', it is clear that they said something incorrect, uninformative and irrelevant to someone who is interested in the battle, but it could be relevant to someone who is grading the student's knowledge of history. Due to such examples, Floridi considers it necessary to keep the domain and context in which relevance is evaluated, as well as the level of abstraction at which relevance is evaluated, clear and fixed during the analysis because otherwise the outcome is a conceptual carnage.

According to Strawson's Principle of Relevance (Floridi 2008:73) we 'intend in general to give or add information about what is a matter of standing or current interest or concern'. Floridi adds that this process most often happens in the interaction of questions and answers, which corresponds to the Borlund's claim, as Floridi paraphrases, that relevance is situational.

If we return to the questions that require answers from analysts (what, where, when and who) and which are used to achieve situational awareness, we can imagine answers similar to the student's response described above. They would certainly be poorly received by information users/decision makers while the informative answers would at least be accepted at a basic level. However, it is hard to dispute the fact that it is them who ask the questions what, where, when and who and not the analysts, so we should think about whether this can be seen as regular politicization of the process/shared mind set/rooms in cheap hotels, level up or down.

Betts claims (2007) that given the purpose of intelligence, which is to serve politics, there is an agreement on the principle according to which users/decision makers lead the process with their requests and prioritization and this acts to strengthen the relevance and mitigate futile or misdirected efforts. He, however, also mentions the problems which occur in practice when applying the principle everyone generally agrees with and the need for better integration of intelligence requirements and concerns of decision makers, which further strengthens the importance of the perspective that takes into account the regularities that Floridi implements in his consideration of epistemic relevance.

Betts further describes situations in which, due to lack of communication, that is, 'abdication' of the decision maker, intelligence formed 'key intelligence questions (KIQs) to "identify topics of particular interest to national policymakers" when Departmental intelligence agencies set comparable mechanisms for determining requirements.' (Betts 2007:72) and regardless of the fact that in the circumstances of that time the attempt did not yield results, it is possible that this could be a bright spot in the discussion of politicization. It is to be expected, and entirely legitimate, to express at least five reasons against such an approach, which goes beyond the scope of this paper, but I can mention some that do not require much thought – non-transparency of prioritization, excessive secrecy in relation to the public interest, possibility of several forms of corruption, reduced opportunities for public oversight, etc. Most importantly, it is necessary to take into account the degree to which phenomena depend on the human factor, which only in sufficient quantity makes up the system from which we expect the correction of action irregularities, regardless of the position of individual human factors in a given moment. Therefore, the choice of personnel is often a crucial intervention into the system's irregularity, as opposed to the organization and reorganization of quality control mechanisms, which are also important, but only secondarily. However, it cannot be disputed that this approach prevented politicization, at least initially, and induced an attempt at professionalization.

Perhaps it is not the best analogy, but it is certainly worth mentioning that economic entities, which are now largely international and transnational, can certainly be influence holders and may even be factor M. At least some of the cons mentioned above can be attributed to them, but their existence does not cause significant concern in the context of democracy and its values. It is true that the argument is that it is about private capital which as such must enjoy certain fundamental autonomy while it is really about that – about private capital which generates profit for the owner. However, the instrumentalization of functions, the scope of action and the interwovenness with other structures are certainly outside of the realm of autonomy, but not even those circumstances make them minimally equal to 'suspicious and probably bad guys in intelligence'.

Nevertheless, I consider these possibilities for the sake of the argument and not because of the belief that they should or should not be implemented. In a similar vein, it is necessary to emphasize that with this last principle I am stepping away from epistemic relevance, unless I transfer the relation to other entities and allow a version in which the epistemic relevance of intelligence is determined between other agents. We can imagine a situation (scenario) D in which the analyst is the one who asks questions and the one who answers them (it may be the same agent or different one or it may be the act of a certain group of personnel in accordance with the agreed document, but in any case located in the intelligence system) while all sources, human and non-human, are treated as an agent with whom epistemic relevance is determined in certain domains, context and at a certain level of abstraction. In doing so, we then agree that the product probably will not have epistemic relevance for the information user/decision maker who will, nonetheless, without their own engagement, receive a concise, informative intelligence that may or may not be followed.

If we look at this model in theory, it could seem that politicization is comprised in the decision maker's decision to act/not to act and that it is limited to it; since the decision-making function lies in the political structure, the model works. However, in theory, it is not difficult to come up with a model that works, yet it is also not difficult to refute it, which then, admittedly, makes it a legitimate result of consideration.

Conclusion

This analysis of the issue touched upon debatable points in the problem area, as well as areas in which it is possible to search for answers or even new questions. Although it is not yet possible to get exact answers, any new opening in a given problem area can help in the consideration of the phenomenon as a whole and of its parts and thus contribute to the processes.

From the current position of the intelligence system, any detection of factor M may prove crucial. Restoration of ethical principles, such as employees of the competent agency leaving their private political views in the confines of their homes even after they cease to be active officials or stopping the leakage of information that is less a consequence of omissions and more frequently of political actions, are just some elements (Gentry 2021) which could protect the system from irregular politicization.

A number of other suggestions possibly useful in the continuous correction of actions could certainly be discussed. That is to say, the reproducibility of problems encountered by the intelligence system and their modification in the environment are certainly reasons to continuously question the actions toward the intelligence system and its actions toward the rest of the system with which it was imported through formal or informal connections. Last but not least, part of the solution, inevitably lies in the society and its resilience while developing critical thinking that can help it in becoming more constructive audience/actors in the interactive scenarios.

Reference list

1. Afrić, Vjekoslav. 1987. "Koncept društvene strukture i strukturalna analiza u sociologiji" "(Concept of the Social Structure and Structural Analysis in the Sociology)." *Revija za sociologiju* 17(1-2):49-62. Retrieved from <https://hrcak.srce.hr/155735>.
2. Betts, Richard Kevin. 2007. *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.
3. Floridi, Luciano. 2008. "Understanding Epistemic Relevance." *Erkenntnis* (1975-) 69(1) :69-92.
4. Gentry, John A. 2021. "Trump-Era Politicisation: A Code of Civil- Intelligence Behavior is needed." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 34(4):757-786.
5. Gill, Peter and Mark Phythian. 2018. *Intelligence in an Insecure World*. Cambridge, UK; Medford, MA: Polity Press.

6. Gurvitch, Georges. 1965. *Suvremeni poziv sociologije*. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša ("La vocation actuelle de la Sociologie/Contemporary vocation of the Sociology).
7. Giannopoulos, Georgios and Hanna Smith and Marianthi Theocharidou. 2021. The Landscape of Hybrid Threats, A conceptual model, EUR 30585 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-76-29819-9, doi:10.2760/44985, JRC123305.
8. Marrin, Stephen. 2013. "Rethinking Analytic Politicisation." *Intelligence and National Security* 28(1):32-54.
9. Milanja, Cvjetko. 2012. *Konstrukcije kulture: Modeli kulturne modernizacije u Hrvatskoj 19. stoljeća (Culture construction: Models for cultural modernisation in Croatia of the 19th century)*. Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar.
10. Omand, David. 2020. "Reflections in Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 33(3):471-482.
11. Skoko, Božo. 2009. *Država kao brend: upravljanje nacionalnim identitetom (A State as a brand: Managing national identity)*. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska.
12. Tudman, Miroslav. 2002. *Informacijsko ratište i informacijska znanost (Information battlefield and information sciences)*. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada.
13. Threatcasting Workshop hosted at Arizona State University (2019) Information warfare and the future of conflict, Technical Report by Brian David Johnson, Alida Draudt, Jason C. Brown, Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Ross, Ph.D.
14. Weissmann, Mikael and Niklas Nilsson. 2024. "Current Intelligence and Assessments: Information Flows and the Tension between Quality and Speed." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence*. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2023.2296886> 14 March 2024.