The UK government’s narrative reproduced the World Health Organisation’s
(Box 1). It did not reflect nuanced discussions in the Scientific
Advisory Group on Emergencies (SAGE), some of whose members had
published concerns that respiratory viruses in
general14 and coronaviruses in
particular15 may be airborne and had raised the
possibility of other transmission routes on 18thFebruary 2020.16 Rather, it reflected advice from a
small group of infection prevention and control experts (known as the
“IPC Cell”) from Public Health England, Public Health Wales, NHS
Scotland and Public Health Agency Northern Ireland (see Appendix on
bmj.com). Like their World Health Organisation counterparts, these
clinicians adhered to a droplet-but-not-airborne
narrative.17 An inquiry criticised the UK government
for modelling its pandemic response on an influenza scenario and
assuming—wrongly, it turned out18—that influenza
was transmitted via droplets not aerosols (page 1919).
Box 1: Early announcements about preventing transmission of
SARS-CoV-2 from UK and
Japan