The UK government’s narrative reproduced the World Health Organisation’s (Box 1). It did not reflect nuanced discussions in the Scientific Advisory Group on Emergencies (SAGE), some of whose members had published concerns that respiratory viruses in general14 and coronaviruses in particular15 may be airborne and had raised the possibility of other transmission routes on 18thFebruary 2020.16 Rather, it reflected advice from a small group of infection prevention and control experts (known as the “IPC Cell”) from Public Health England, Public Health Wales, NHS Scotland and Public Health Agency Northern Ireland (see Appendix on bmj.com). Like their World Health Organisation counterparts, these clinicians adhered to a droplet-but-not-airborne narrative.17 An inquiry criticised the UK government for modelling its pandemic response on an influenza scenario and assuming—wrongly, it turned out18—that influenza was transmitted via droplets not aerosols (page 1919).

Box 1: Early announcements about preventing transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from UK and Japan